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ABSTRACT 
The Missing Link in the History of Islamic Legal Theory:  
The Development of Uṣ l  l-Fiqh between al-Shāfi‗ī  nd  l-Jaṣṣāṣ during the 3rd/9th and 
Early 4
th
/10
th
 Centuries 
by 
Ahmet Temel 
 
The 3
rd
/9
th
 and 4
th
/10
th
 centuries witnessed significant developments in Islamic intellectual 
history. Most of the   dīth collections that later came to be recognized as canonical were 
compiled in this period and the major schools of law and certain theological schools also 
completed their formation during the same period. Despite this continuous progress in other 
fields of religious sciences, there is an unusual lapse of time between what is widely 
considered the first work in u      -fiqh (Islamic legal theory)   -R      by  l-Shāfi‗ī 
(204/819), and what is recognized as the second work   -F     f -al-     by  l-J ṣṣāṣ 
(370/981). Due to the absence of a major work devoted solely to uṣ l  l-fiqh from this period, 
the majority of contemporary scholars considered it as a period of history during which there 
was little or no intellectual activity in the field of uṣ l  l-fiqh and where no significant 
developments took place. This assumption has driven some scholars to assign a new st rting 
point for the field of uṣ l  l-fiqh  nd even different definitions of uṣ l  l-fiqh. The question of 
wh t in f ct took pl ce during this ‗d rk period,‘ however, h s not been fully or adequately 
explored.  
viii 
This dissertation attempts to provide an answer to this question and to shed light on the 
development of uṣ l  l-fiqh during this period. It  rgues th t the ostensible ‗g p‘ (or  bsence 
of scholarly production) between the years (204/819) and (370/981) in the field of u    
al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory) is in fact illusory. The years mentioned here are the death year 
of  l-Shāfi‗ī, the author of   -R     , often reckoned to be the first treatise in u      -fiqh and 
the death year of al-Jaṣṣāṣ (370/981), the author al-Fu    f -al-u   , the next independent 
treatise in the field. The presence of a gap may be defended only if understood in the sense of 
the absence of an independent extant work in the category of u      -fiqh. Based upon the 
results of this examination of extensive documentation, this dissertation argues that the 'gap' 
period, rather than a one in which no important developments took place, should instead be 
viewed by scholars as a "period of independent productivity,‖ where the schol rs of the time 
contributed to the topics of uṣ l  l-fiqh without a strict school affiliation.  
 I trace the lineage of the debates found in   -F     f -al-     by  l-J ṣṣāṣ (         to 
earlier works and debates within the century and a half in question to earlier sources.  Three 
sets of sources were examined in this research.  The first set consists of a number of 
manuscripts that have either being ignored by modern scholars or been under-studied as 
works relevant to the history of usul al-fiqh.  The second set of sources are works in various 
fields of the religious sciences, including but not limited to works on fiqh, k lām,   dīth, and 
tafsir, which contain scattered information relevant to the study of uṣ l  l-fiqh. The third set of 
sources consists of citations from the scholars of the ‗g p‘ period found in the later liter ture of 
uṣ l  l-fiqh as well as biobibliographical sources.  
I have restricted the topics presented in this dissertation to the discussions of the 
primary sources of Islamic law due to the predominance of these issues in the documentation 
ix 
examined. The dissertation therefore consists of four chapters. The first chapter deals with the 
evolution of the concept of u    to uṣ l  l-fiqh.  I examine the topics that were included within 
that rubric by first tracing the transformations of the term during the gap period and then by 
comparing  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s   -R       nd  l-J ṣṣāṣ‘s   -F    . The subsequent three chapters 
examine the discussions of the period over the use of          -      (solitary report),     „ 
(consensus), and     s (analogy) as sources of authority for Islamic law. I chose these three 
issues because the legal theoretical discussions intensified around these topics during this 
period, and they later came to be considered among ―the fund ment l sources of Isl mic l w.‖  
The dissertation makes significant new claims about the early development, function, 
and definition of u      -fiqh in the period between  l-Shāfi‗ī and  l-J ṣṣāṣ that contradict 
commonly held opinions. It will therefore be of interest to scholars researching the early 
history of Islamic law and legal theory, but also to the broader audience who are interested in 
the authority problem in Islam and the discussions related to orthodoxy and orthopraxy. 
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2 
A. Outline of Research 
George Makdisi argued that one of the most important phenomena for the student of 
Islamic jurisprudence is the lapse of time between   -R     ‘s  ppe r nce  nd th t of the first 
independent and comprehensive works of uṣ l  l-fiqh.1 When Makdisi pointed out this 
problem,  l-J ṣṣās‘s (         m nu l of uṣ l al-fiqh had not yet been discovered. With the 
discovery of  l-J ṣṣās‘s al-Fu   , we acquired a significant source shedding an important 
light on this gap in the history of Islamic leg l theory. Nonetheless, the g p between 
 l-Shāfi‗ī  nd  l-J ṣṣ ṣ rem ins. This period th t covers the  rd/9th and early 4th/10th centuries 
has still not been analyzed in comprehensive studies with regard to the development of 
Islamic legal theory. This study is an attempt to contribute toward filling this gap with a 
diachronic analysis of the theoretical discussions of the time on the sources of uṣ l al-fiqh.  
Some recent studies have ch llenged  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s (         role  s   founding figure 
of Islamic legal theory (u    al-fiqh) with an overarching argument that his contribution to 
Islamic legal theory had been exaggerated too much in the Orientalist scholarship, and that 
his treatise cannot be regarded as belonging to the genre of uṣ l  l-fiqh. Even though I  gree 
with the first p rt of this  rgument, I  rgue th t  l-Shāfī‗ī‘s tre tise   -R      must be 
accepted as the first work to directly address the main legal theoretical issues in the history of 
Islamic legal theory. In other words,  l-Shāfi‗ī represents   developed st ge comp red to 
those who had come before him for the formation of uṣ l al-fiqh, but he must be considered 
                                                 
1 M kdisi, George, "The Juridic l Theology of Shāfi‗ı   Origins  nd Signific nce of Uṣ l  l-Fiqh". Studia 
Islamica, no. 5  (         . (This period will be referred to  s ―the g p period‖ henceforth  
3 
as a modest contributor to the formation of uṣ l al-fiqh compared to the later scholars in the 
field. The content of   -R      represents the earliest theoretical extant example in this field, 
and encompasses the fundamental topics of uṣ l al-fiqh. The second extant work on uṣ l 
 l-fiqh th t we h ve is the   n fī schol r  l-J ṣṣāṣ‘s (           -F     f    -     which 
represents a more developed work than   -R     , both in terms of content and style.  
During the century following  l-J ṣṣāṣ‘s work, we see  n enormously rich production 
in the literature of uṣ l al-fiqh. Among the H n fīs, al-D bb sī (         ,  l-S ym rī 
(         ,  l-S r hsī (         , and  l-P zd wī (            mong the Shāfi‗īs, Ab  
Is  q  l-Shirāzī (         ,  l-Juw ynī (       5 ,  l-S m‗ānī (           among the 
Mālikīs, Ibn  l-Q ṣṣār (         , Ab  B kr  l-Bāqillānī (         ,  l-Bājī (           
 mong the   nb līs,  l-F rrā ( 5       , Ibn ‗Aqīl (5           mong the Mu‗t zil , Qāḍī 
Abd  l-J bbār (  5      , Ab ‘l-Hus yn  l-B ṣrī (           among the Shi‗ī-Z ydīs, 
 l-Nāṭiq bi-al- aqq (424/1033); among the Shi‗ī-Imāmīs,  l-Sh ykh  l-Mufīd (          
and al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā (       5   and among the  āhirīs, Ibn   zm ( 5        were  
among the scholars who contributed to the literature of uṣ l al-fiqh within about a century 
following the work of al-Jaṣṣāṣ. The main questions that this dissertation addresses are 
therefore the following: Even though we see many extant books written on uṣ l  l-fiqh right 
 fter  l-J ṣṣāṣ, why do we not see one single ex mple between  l-Shāfi‗ī  nd  l-J ṣṣāṣ  Wh t 
exactly was happening during this period with respect to the development of uṣ l al-fiqh? My 
dissertation tries to solve this big problem as well as other related problems, and to fill this 
gap in the history of Islamic legal theory. Even though my primary investigation will be into 
the development of uṣ l al-fiqh in particular, this dissertation also makes a contribution to the 
4 
field of Islamic intellectual history in general.  
In the light of my research, I argue that the apparent negligence of uṣ l al-fiqh during 
the period between  l-Shāfi‗ī  nd  l-J ṣṣāṣ is misleading. Rather, this ―dark period‖ is 
significant for the development of uṣ l al-fiqh. I make this argument in opposition to some 
contemporary historians who have described the developments during this stage as 
rudimentary contributions that are too hard, if not impossible, to be uncovered and 
reconstructed due to the lack of sources. First and foremost, the high level of development 
and systematized content of al-J ṣṣāṣ‘s   -F     in comparison to  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s   -R      
provides the most important evidence that a significant developmental process was taking 
place during this period. In addition to this, biographical accounts and various sources in 
different fields provide sufficient data to see how the scholars contributed to legal theoretical 
discussions during this period. In the following section, I will describe the sources of my 
dissertation as well as some of people who constitute the subject of my investigation and 
their general contributions to the development of uṣ l  l-fiqh in the gap period.  
The primary method of this research used here is comparative textual analysis of 
individual textual sources. In  ddition to m king   comp rison between  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s al-R      
and al-J ṣṣāṣ‘s al-F      I will focus on the written sources from the period in multiple fields. 
I delve into those texts from the literature of refutation (al-Radd),  disagreements (     f    
       f , t fsīr,   dīth,  nd k lām, all of which contain important passages providing 
implications about the development of legal theory. In order to draw an intellectual picture of 
the period in general, I keep my focus and the scope of my research as broad as possible.      
In addition, the preserved citations in the later literature of uṣ l al-fiqh are crucial for 
5 
this research. However, this method comes with the risk of falling into anachronism in 
historical analysis; since the later authors were under the influence of an intellectual 
terminology and environment that was different from those of earlier scholars, their reports 
might suffer from backward projection. Therefore, several critiques have appeared in recent 
scholarship about the use of this method. Christopher Melchert makes one of these critiques. 
Melchert thinks that using later citations is a backward projection, and is therefore 
misleading. In his view, only the sources from the analyzed period should be taken into 
account in historical research. As   result, he criticizes H ll q‘s work for falling into the 
fallacy of backward projection.
2
  However, Melchert himself relies heavily on biographical 
sources that were written in a later stage. There is no reason to think that the later juristic 
works are more misleading than the biographical sources. Therefore, I do not think that it 
would be appropriate in such a study to ignore completely those preserved citations found in 
the later literature. I do agree, however, that they might be misleading sometimes, because 
the later authors report from earlier scholars by transforming the report into the language of 
the later stages. For instance, it is not uncommon to see later authors attribute some technical 
details of certain topics to earlier figures based on deduction, while these discussions did not 
exist at all during the time of the earlier scholars.   
In order to use the most reliable evidence from later sources in my research, I apply 
the following criteria respectively in selecting citations from later sources.  First, if there is 
                                                 
2
  Melchert, Christopher, T   f          f     S     schools of law, 9th-10th centuries C.E., Leiden: Brill, 
1997, xxiv. 
6 
clear proof that the later author has a book of an earlier scholar that we do not have now and 
indicates that he relies on this book, I consider these references as the most reli ble 
references, especi lly when the  uthor provides the quoted text together with its source. For 
inst nce,  l-J ṣṣ ṣ‘s quot tions from ‗Isā b. Abān  nd  l-Z rk shī‘s quot tions from 
 l-Muz nī f ll into this category. The second tier of reliable citatios in the later sources are 
those where the later author uses the past tense verb conjugations that imply citing from a 
written source of the earlier scholar such as dhakara or     . In these instances, the later 
author most probably quotes from a written text of the earlier scholar, even if he does not 
mention the book. However, the later author might paraphrase the source from which he cites. 
I use this type of citation after comparing its content to the characteristics of the scholarly 
writings of the period. The third tier of reliability consists of those citations in which the 
author mentions an opinion while attributing it to the earlier scholar; for example, in the form 
of ―w  huw  q wlu fulān‖ (it is the opinion of X  or ―nuqil  min fulān‖ (it has been reported 
from X). This type of citation requires external evidence to be confidently used in research, 
or its weakness should be indicated if it is necessary to mention the citation.  
The other set of sources I use are biographical, bibliographical and historical sources. 
Norman Calder has criticized the use of biographical evidence. According to Calder, 
biographical tradition cannot be considered a known historical fact.
3
 He also holds the 
opinion that the  biographical tradition should only be read in light of juristic texts, and not 
                                                 
3
 Calder, Norman, Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence, Oxford, UK:Clarendon Press, 1993., 20. 
7 
vice versa.
4
 By saying that, Calder actually draws attention to an inconsistent method within 
the Orientalist tradition which advocates an extremely skeptical approach to   dīth 
compilations, but far less skeptical when referring to later biographical sources. As far as I 
know, no proper method has been suggested in using later sources of this kind, and the basic 
principle of historical investigation, namely that every case should be examined 
independently, still seems to be the accepted approach. My general approach will be to 
prioritize neutral data, which I believe constitutes the majority of the materials we have, and 
to be more suspicious of descriptions that express commendation or condemnation.  
Despite the fact that the existing materials that I collected over the course of my 
research cover many topics of uṣ l  l-fiqh including the sources of law, i.e. consensus (    „), 
analogy (     ), reports (      ), juristic preference (        ), earlier revelation-based laws 
(    „             ), hermeneutical principles such as identifying general (   ) and 
specific (     ) texts, and abrogation (naskh), the limits of this study compel me to restrict 
the scope of my research to the first three topics. Therefore, the outline of the dissertation 
will be as follows: The first chapter examines first the development of the concept of uṣ l 
and then provides a comparison of the topics treated in  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s   -R      and al-Jaṣṣāṣ‘s 
al-Fu   , in order to portray a rough sketch of developments made during the gap period 
between the two texts. I will examine three sources of uṣ l  l-fiqh in the subsequent three 
chapters. The second chapter discusses solitary reports, their authority, and the distinct 
methods for evaluating reports as developed by different groups of scholars of the period. 
                                                 
4
 Calder, Studies, 38. 
8 
The third chapter deals with discussions about ijmā‗ by ex mining the contributions of the 
scholars in conceptualizing the authority of ijmā‗, the ide  of inf llibility th t is inherent in 
the claim of ijmā‗, the different types of ijmā‗  s they were articulated during this period, and 
finally the role of assigning authority to the predecessors (salaf  in the form tion of ijmā‗  s   
source of religion. The final chapter traces the development of qiyās, ijtihād  nd discussions 
of t qlīd. 
B. Sources, Places, and People 
The majority of the scholars under analysis in this rese rch lived in Irāq, especi lly 
B ghdād  nd B ṣra. However, some individuals who contributed to the early development of 
uṣ l  l-fiqh settled in different parts of the Muslim world of the time including Miṣr, Hijāz, 
North Afric , Khur sān,  nd Tr nsoxi n . I point out the regional origins of these scholars 
throughout my rese rch. However, Irāq  nd especi lly B ghdād rem ined the center of 
intellectual life in the Muslim world during the gap period. The gap period, as defined for the 
sake of this research as being between the years 204/819 and        , witnessed eighteen 
‗Abbāsid c liphs beginning with the reign of  l-M ‘m n (197/813-218/833) and ending with 
the reign of al-Ṭā‘i‗ (363/974-381/991). Even though Samarra temporarily became the 
political capital between the years 221/836 and 278/   , B ghdād effectively remained the 
center of the Muslim world. Based on the number of bathhouses in the year 383/993, the 
population of B ghdād during the gap period can be estimated as between 1,000,000 and 
9 
1,500,000.
5
 The translation movement, the foundation of Bayt al- ikma, and the introcution 
of paper manufacture in B ghdād in in the late 2nd/8th century were the main factors fueling 
intellectual life and the production of knowledge. 
The gap period was a period in which the formation of schools of law was a 
continuing process, and independent scholarly contributions were still more prevalent. This is 
precisely the reason why I call this period as a ―period of independent productivity‖ r ther 
than a gap period in which no significant development took place. However, these 
independent or semi-independent characteristics of contributions make it harder to label the 
contributors. In other words, it is difficult to label the scholars of this period who did not 
have a sense of belonging to a school—a sentiment that emerged mostly in the following 
centuries—with certain schools that only completed their formation in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th 
centuries. It would be easy to become trapped in anachronistic labels through backward 
projections. In order to overcome this hardship and to point out the importance of this 
formative aspect of the period, I have tried to avoid using such labels as   n fī, Mālikī, 
Shāfi‗ī,   nb lī,  āhirī, and J ‗f rī for these scholars. Instead, I refer to these scholars either 
as independent scholars by pointing out their teachers and students, or by employing the 
group labels that existed in the literature of the time such as K fī, Irāqī, member of  hl 
al-r ‘y or ahl al-  dīth.  
Since some theological schools were already established, I use the l bels Mu‗t zilī, 
                                                 
5  l-D rī, ‗Abd  l-Azīz, TDV İ     A      p     , s.v. ―B ğd t‖. IV, Istanbul: TDV, 1991., 425-33.   
10 
Shi‗ī (or Rāfiḍī , Z ydī  nd Murji‗ī for those who identified themselves with these schools. 
However, these l bels become t ngled  nd overl p  t times depending on the criteri  of 
c tegoriz tion. For inst nce, cert in Mu‗t zilī schol rs  re  lso described  s Z ydīs by some 
authors of the period.
6
 In order to emphasize their early contribution to these schools, I 
preferred using the prefix proto such as proto-  n fī for those who lived in   period closer to 
the time of the establishment of these schools, or hyphenated descriptions such  s 
Mu‗t zīlī-Z ydī  Shī‗ī-Imāmī etceter .  
It should be also emphasized that contribution to the development of uṣ l  l-fiqh in 
the gap period was not restricted to the scholars of ahl al-r ‘y  nd  hl  l-  dīth  s 
erroneously claimed by many modern historians. Many individual scholars who were 
affiliated with diverse groups, or who were not affiliated with any group, contributed to the 
theoretical discussions of the period. This phenomenon will be noted frequently in the body 
of the dissertation. Having clarified this important point, I will introduce the distinguished 
scholars of the gap period in chronological order and the sources that I use to reveal their 
contributions to the development of uṣ l  l-fiqh.  
                                                 
6
 Al-Malaṭī (        ,   Shāf‗ī jurist and a scholar of Quran recitation (    ‟ ) who lived during the gap 
period,  mentions J ‗f r b. Mub shshir (        , J ‗f r b.  arb (236/850), and Mu  mm d b. ‗Abd All h 
al-Iskāfī as Z ydīs  among the Mu‗t zīl , due to their opinions on  ccepting the im m te of the less excellent 
(  -f ḍil) over the most excellent (al-afḍal) and  the superiority of ‗Alī over other comp nions. See Ab  
al- usayn al-Malaṭī, al-Radd wa-al-       „          -    ‟ wa-al-    „, Ed. Zāhid  l-K wth rī, Miṣr: 
al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li-al-Turāth,   . This  rgument in f vor of ‗Alī is evident in the ext nt book of 
 l-Iskāfī. See Ab  J ‗f r  l-Iskāfī, Ed. Mu  mm d Bāqir M  m dī,   -M        -  -          f  f ḍ      A   
    A            -       fḍ                        -                -          -  -        , B yr t  [Dār 
M  m dī lil-Ṭ b  w -al-Nashr], 1981. 
11 
I use three sets of sources in my research. The first set consists of recently discovered 
primary texts both in manuscript and in print. The second set of sources comprises prim ry 
texts written during the g p period in v rious fields including k lām, fiqh, ḥ dīth, t fsīr, 
compilations of agreements and disagreements, biographical and bibliographical sources, and 
refutations. The preserved citations describing the opinions and contributions of scholars of 
the gap period in the later sources, mostly in the genre of uṣ l  l-fiqh, constitute the third set 
of sources. In the remaining part of this section, I will describe the scholars of the gap period 
and the selected sources that I used to reveal their contributions in my research.  
‗Isā b. Abān (        , the f mous disciple of  l-Sh ybānī  nd   l te contempor ry of 
 l-Shāfi‗ī, w s  n import nt schol r for the development l stage of uṣ l  l-fiqh in the initi l 
period following  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s de th. He is reported to h ve written works on various topics of 
uṣ l al-fiqh such as I        -       İ         -  ‟     -H       -           -H       -K       
and   -R    „            -M      wa-al-S  f „  f -al-      .7 Fuat Sezgin indicates that a 
text titled   -H       -        exists in B nkīb r, yet unfortunately this manuscript was not 
written by ‗ sā b. Abān.8 In order to reveal his opinions, I made use of the preserved 
                                                 
7  l-Ziriklī, Kh yr  l-dīn b. M  m d.   -A                      -        -        -  -            -      
  -  -              -  -            ,  ṭ-ṭ b    5 ed. B yr t  Dār  l- Ilm li- l-M lāyīn,     . V,       l-J ṣṣāṣ, 
A m d ibn  Alī,   -F     f    -    , Kuw yt  Wizār t  l-Awqāf  l-Kuwaytiyya, 1994. I, 103; III, 35.  
8
 Sezgin, Fuat, T        -         - A     (GAS), tr nsl ted by  Ar f h Muṣṭ f . Riyādh  Al-M ml k h 
 l- Ar bīy h  l-S   dīy h, Wizār t  l-T  līm  l-  lī, Jāmi  t  l-Imām Mu  mm d ibn S   d  l-Islāmīy h, 
1991., 434.; In a recent article, Murteza Bedir has pointed out that this manuscript must be   -H      „       
  -M       of  l-Sh ybānī not   -H       -        of ‗ sā b. Abān. For this cl im, Bedir relies on   conference 
paper presented by an Indi n schol r M wl n   Atiq Ahm d  l-B st wi who w s  ble to rese rch the 
m nuscript. See Bedir, Murtez , "An E rly Response to Shāfi ī    s  B. Abān on the Prophetic Report (kh b r ." 
Islamic Law and Society, 9.3 (2002): 290.    
12 
cit tions  ttributed to ‗Isā b. Abān in the l ter liter ture of uṣ l al-fiqh, particularly those 
found in  l-J ṣṣāṣ‘s al-Fu   , in the Z ydī imām  nd schol r Ibn  l-Murtaḍā‘s M     , and 
other legal, biographical and bibliographical sources of l te H n fī  nd Shāfi‗ī schol rs.9  
Bishr b. Ghiyāth  l-M rīsī (        ,   f mous Murji‗ī who w s in the c liph 
 l-M ‘m n‘s court  nd w s  nother l te contempor ry of  l-Shāfi‗ī, w s  n import nt figure 
for the early stages of development of uṣ l  l-fiqh in the third hijrī century. The 
bibliographical sources attribute the following titles to Bishr b. Ghiyāth  l-M rīsī: K     
  -  „  f   K     f -al-        and   -R    „      -khawarij, which must have contained 
theoretical discussions on uṣ l  l-fiqh. His leg l theoretic l opinions  re cited in Abd 
 l-‗Azīz  l-Kinānī‘s (     5   K       - ayda 10   nd  l-Dārimī‘s ( 55      refut tion 
  -R    „            -M     .11  These refutations are also important in revealing the 
contributions of  l-Kināni  nd  l-D rimī, who were identified  s members of  hl  l-  dīth. I 
have  lso relied on quot tions from Bishr  l-M rīsī in the l ter uṣ l literature such as can be 
found in K       -M „     .12 
There were a number of Mu‗t zīlī scholars who contributed to the legal theoretical 
                                                 
9
 Ibn al-Murtaḍā seems to h ve quoted directly from ‗ sā b. Abān‘s book al-Ḥujja. See Ibn  l-Murt ḍā, M      
a -W     I   Mi„    al-„     F  „ilm a -U   ,   n‘   Dār  l- ikm h  l-Y mānīy h,     ., 400.  
10   l-Kinānī,  Abd  l- Aziz, K       -     , edited by ‗Alī b. Mu  mm d  l-Fiqhī.   l-M din   l-Mun ww r   
M kt b t  l-‗ul m wa-al- ikam, 2002. 
11  l-Dārimī,  Uthmān ibn S  īd  N  ḍ   -I    A   S      U          S            -M        -J       -      
f     f          A             -            -      , edited by R shīd ibn   s n Alm  ī.  l-Ṭ b  h  . ed. 
 l-Riyāḍ  M kt b t  l-Rushd, 1998. 
12 See for ex mple  l-B ṣrī, Mu  mm d ibn  Alī Ab   l- us yn,   -M        f       al-fiqh, edited by H  līl 
 l- M ys B yr t  Dār  l-kutub al- ilmiyy ,     ., II,    ,    .  
13 
discussions of the first h lf of the third hijrī century.  Bishr b. Al-Mu‗t mir (      5 , 
Thumām  b.  l-Ashr s (        , Ab  Is āq Ibrāhīm  l-N   ām (   -230/835-    , J ‗f r b. 
Mubashshir (234/848 , J ‗f r b.  arb (236/850), and Mu  mm d b. ‗Abd All h  l-Iskāfī 
(240/854) were important figures of the early third/ninth century. Bishr b. al-Mu‗t mir 
reportedly wrote treatises entailing his thoughts on uṣ l  l-fiqh entitled I         -  ‟   
al-Radd „          A   Ḥ   f     -R    „      -N      and M            -Quran.13 In a 
book on Ijtihād  l-r ‘y attributed to Thumām  b. Ashr s, the author criticized Ab    nīf  
 nd the entire K fī tr dition th t Ab    nīf  followed for their adherence to r ‘y.14  J ‗f r b. 
Mubashshir (234/848) is reported to have written refutations including   -R    „          
al-                -  ‟   and A       -  „   f.15 Some of Al-Iskāfi‘s theoretic l opinions 
are available in his extant work   -M „   .16 Even though none of the writings of  l-N   ām 
have reached us, his controversial opinions on uṣ l al-fiqh are frequently cited by later 
scholars. His critiques of the authority of qiyās, ijmā‗,  nd reports reflect his influence on the 
development of uṣ l  l-fiqh. In  ddition to Ab   usayn al-Baṣrī‘s al-M „     , 
al-Kh yyāṭ‘s work   -I       is an important source for uncovering the leg l theoretic l 
thoughts of these e rlier Mu‗t zilīs. Some other sources in the liter ture of uṣ l  l-fiqh such 
                                                 
13  l-Bābānī, Ismā īl Bāshā, H         -    f            -       f     -        -       f  , Istānb l  Wikāl t 
 l-M  ārif,   5 ., I,    .  
14
  l-F ḍl Ibn Shādhān, al- ḍ  , edited by J lāl  l-Dīn  us ynī Mu  ddis. Tihrān  Mu‘assasah-i Intishārāt 
v -Chāp-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān,     ., 524. 
15
 al-Khayyāt, Abd rrahim Ibn Mohammed Ibn Osman, K       -       , edited by Henrik Samuel Nyberg. 
Second ed. Al-Qahir   M kt b t  d-dār  l-  r biyy  lil-kitāb,     .,   . 
16
 al-Iskāfī, Ab  J ‗f r Mu  mm d ibn  Abd Allāh al-Khaṭīb, al-M        -al-          f  f ḍ      A       
A            -       fḍ                        -                -          -al-        , edited by 
Mu  mm d Bāqir M  m dī, B yr t  [Dār M  m dī lil-Ṭ b  w -al-Nashr], 1981. 
14 
as  l-Juw ynī‘s   -       contain citations from these scholars. Another important Muʿt zilī 
schol r,  l-Jāhī  ( 55     ,  lso tr nsmitted  l-N   ām‘s leg l opinions in one of his works. 
Josef Van Ess reconstructed the quotations from al-Na  ām in the l ter liter ture b sed on 
 l-Jāhī ‘s book K     u      -f    .17 It is plausible that his book by  l-Jāhī  addressed 
certain topics of uṣ l al-fiqh, but unfortunately, it has not been discovered.18 Al-Jāhī  
describes his book, s ying ―I h ve a book in which I collected divergent views on the 
principles (      of leg l opinions, which le d to differences in fur ‗ and conflicting specific 
rulings.”19 In my research I used treatises in which al-Jāhī  gives his opinions on several 
topics in uṣ l  l-fiqh including qiyās, reports,  nd ijmā‗.20 
Ab  ‗Ub yd  l-Qāsim b. S llām (         is gener lly listed  mong tr dition lists in 
the bio-bibliographical accounts, but reportedly studied fiqh under  l-Sh ybānī (         as 
well. His contributions to uṣ l al-fiqh are scattered in his extant writings 
                                                 
17
 van Ess, Josef, D   K       -         N                R   p        K       -f                     
Sammlung der Fragmente, 1972. 
18
 al-Jā i , ‗Amr b. B  r, K       -Ḥ      ,  l-Ṭ b  h  . ed. B yr t  Dār  l-Kutub  l- Ilmīy h,     .  I,   .   
Pellat claims that it is a book on fiqh. See Pellat, Charles, T     f             f J      Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1969, 50-51.  
19
 al-Jā i ,  Amr b. B  r, R         -J    , edited by  Abd  l-S lām Mu  mm d Hār n,  l-Qāhir h  M kt b t 
 l-Kh njī,     .,  I,    .  
20   For inst nce,  l-Jā i  rejects the authority of „           -M       nd summ rizes v lid sources  s Kitāb, 
agreed upon Sunna, correct reasoning and analogy. He also lists out the chapters of the science of uṣ l  s the 
 ssessment of  khbār, w ‗d  nd w ‗īd, p rticul r  nd gener l texts (     -„   ), abrogating and abrogated, 
obligatory and recommended (f      and   f   ) sunna and sh rī‗ , consensus  nd dis greements (      ‗  nd 
firqa). See al-Jā ī , R     , IV, 277, III, 265. 
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  -N        -  -         K       -       K       -ṭ      and K       -    .21  
The famous S fī  nd tr dition list schol r Hārith  l-Mu āsibī (     5    lso 
mentioned his opinions on various topics of uṣ l  l-fiqh including reports, ijmā‗, qiyās,  nd 
abrogation. These opinions are scattered througought his various works, including M       
al-„     F      -Q  ‟    and   -M      .22  
A m d b.   nb l (     55 , the heroic le der of  hl al-  dīth in his time and the 
eponymous scholar of the   nb lī school, is   cruci l figure for the g p period. He is 
reported to have written on certain topics of uṣ l al-fiqh in some of his works such as K     
  -       wa-al-       , K       -muqaddam wa-al-muakhkhar min al-Quran and K     
ṭ „     -       none of which have re ched us. However, his refut tion of Z nādiq   nd 
Jahmiyya
23  nd his deb tes with Mu‗t zilī theologi ns that have been preserved in various 
sources
24
 contain material rel ted to our rese rch. Ibn Q yyim reports some of A m d b. 
                                                 
21 Ab   Ub yd  l-Qāsim ibn S llām,   -N        -  -        f    -Q        -         -   f          -f     ḍ 
wa-al-sunan. Ed. by Mu  mm d ibn  āli  Mud yfir.  l-Riyāḍ  M kt b t  l-Rushd, 1997. See bibliography for 
the list of full titles of his other books.  
22  l- ārith ibn As d  l- Mu āsibī, Ed.  us yn Q w tlī.   - A     -f      -Q     . [B yr t   Dār  l-Kindī, 
19  .   l- ārith ibn As d  l-Muhāsibī,   -M      , Ed. N r S ‗īd, Beirut  Dār  l-Fikr, 1992.;  l- ārith ibn 
As d  l- Mu āsibī, Ed.  us yn Q w tlī, M         - A        „               f   -    f  , [B yr t   Dār 
 l-Kindī,          .  
23
 A m d ibn Mu  mm d Ibn   nb l, Ed. D gh sh ibn Sh bīb  Ajmī,   -R           -          
  -  -J         f -           f                     -Q        -                                 , 
 l-Kuw yt  Ghirās lil-N shr w - l-T wzī  w - l-Di āy h w - l-I lān,    5. 
24 For inst nce  l-Jāhī  mentions his deb te with Ibn Abī Du‘ād. See  l-Jāhī ,   -R     , I, 224-25. 
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 anbal‘s opinions on uṣ l al-fiqh in his I„      -M      „  25 in which he underlines how 
A m d b.  anbal favors traditions over legal reasoning, a point cited in many sources.26 
There are also abundant citations, despite falling into the third type of citations that I 
mentioned earlier, in the later uṣ l al-fiqh literature.27 A letter written by A m d b.   nb l 
to the caliph al-Mutawakkil that has recently been discovered and published sheds some light 
on his legal theoretical opinions.
28
   
From the early stage of the third century, al-Shāfi‗ī‘s disciple, tr dition list schol r 
Hus yn b. ‗Ali  l-K rābīsī (         is reported to h ve written on cert in topics of uṣ l 
al-fiqh, even though these works have not reached us.
29
 He is also reported to h ve eng ged 
in deb tes with the f mous Mu‗t zilī  l-Iskāfī.30 Al-J ṣṣāṣ mentions his n me together with 
Dāw d  l- āhirī  mong those who did not  ctu lly know u      -     „  and focused only on 
                                                 
25  Ibn Q yyim  l-J zwiyy , Mu   h mm d b. Ab  B kr, I„      -       „   „          -„      , Ed. 
Muḥ mm d ‗Abd  l-S lām Ibrāhīm, B yrout  Dār  l-Kutub al-‗Ilmiyy .     ., I,   -32.  
26 See Ibn ‗Abd  l-B rr, Ab  ‗Um r Y suf ibn  Abd Allāh, J             -       -f ḍ   , edited by Ab  
 l-Ashbāl  l-Zuh yri.  l-Ṭ b  h  . ed.  l-D mmām  Dār Ibn  l-J wzī, 1994., II, 1038.   
27
 For some of them see Ibn T ymīyy ,  Abd  l-S lām Ibn  Abd llāh, A m d Ibn T ymīyy ,  nd Ab  
al-Mu  s  Abd  l-  lim Ibn Abd  l-S lām,  al-M         f         -fiqh, edited by Mu ammad Muhy 
al-Dīn ‗Abd  l-  mīd. Beyr t  Dār  l-Kutub al- Ar bī, n.d.,   ,       l-Z rk shī, Mu  mm d ibn 
B hādur.   -       -    ṭ.  l-Ṭ b  h  . ed. C iro  Dār  l-K tbī,     ., IV,       l- midī,  Alī Ibn-Abī- Alī, 
al- i     f         -a       edited by ‗Abd  l-R zzāq  l-‗Afīfī. B ir t  nd D m scus   l-Maktab al-Islāmī, 
n.d., IV, 55. 
28 A m d ibn   nb l, Ed.  Alī Mu  mm d Z yn , R         -I    A         Ḥ            -K    f   
  -M            - A     , Dim shq  Dār  l-N wādir,     . 
29  l-Kh ṭīb  l-B ghdādī, Ab  B kr A m d ibn  Alī, T                          , edited by Musṭ f  ‗Abd 
 l-Qādir ‗Aṭā. B yr t  Dār  l-Kutub  l- Ilmiyy h,          , VIII,      l-N w wī, Ab  Z k riyy  Mu y 
 l-Dīn Y  yā b. Sh r f, T         -        -  -      , B yr t  Dār  l-Kutub  l-‗Ilmīy h,     ., II,      
 l-Ziriklī, Kh yr  l-dīn b. M  m d.   -A                      -        -        -  -            -      
  -  -              -  -            .  ṭ-ṭ b    5 ed. B yr t  Dār  l- Ilm li- l-M lāyīn,     ., II,    .  
30 Kh ṭib  l-B ghdādī, T               III, 34. 
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  dīth.31 Al-Z rk shī‘s work is  n import nt source th t cites Hus yn b. ‗Ali  l-K rābīsī 
several times.
32
  
Some opinions of the f mous tr ditionist  l-Bukhārī ( 5       on uṣ l al-fiqh appear 
in several chapters at the end of his celebrated Sa    such as A        -        -I„         
  -      wa-al-sunna, al-T      and his work K      f„     -„    .33 There is also a growing 
body of secondary literature aiming to reveal more about his legal theory.
34
  
The second half of the third century witnessed increasing production of works relating 
to the topics of uṣ l  l-fiqh. The e rliest schol rs who wrote on this subject were  l-Muz nī 
(          nd Dāw d b. ‗Alī  l- āhirī (        . Al-Muz nī‘s tre tise on ― l-amr and 
al-n hy‖ h s reached us.35 Dāw d is reported to h ve written on v rious topics of uṣ l al-fiqh. 
Sources attribute several works to him, including K       -      K       -    „  K        ṭ   
  -        K        ṭ     -Q      K               -       K               -      li-al-„     
                                                 
31  l-J ṣṣāṣ,   -F    , III, 296. 
32 Z rk shī,   -       -mu  ṭ, II, 190; III, 322, 323, 452.  
33 See  l-Bukhārī, Mu  mm d ibn Ismā īl.    ī   l-Imām  l-Bukhārī   l-mus mm   l-Jāmi   l-musn d  l-ṣ  ī  
 l-mukht ṣ r min um r R s l Allāh w -sun nihi w - yyāmih. edited by Mu  mm d Zuh yr ibn Nāṣir  l-Nāṣir. 
B yr t  Dār Ṭ wq  l-N jāh,          ., IX, 86-162;  al-Bukhārī, Mu  mm d ibn Ismā īl, K      f      -       
  -  -            -           -        -   ṭ  , B yr t  Mu  ss s t  l-Risāl h,     . 
34 See Luc s, Scott, "The Leg l Principles of Muh mm d b. Ismāīl Al-Bukhārī  nd Their Rel tionship to 
Classical Salafi Islam", Islamic Law and Society, (2006    , no.       -     Ghulāmī,  us yn Gh yb,   -I    
  -          -f          - I             f       f   -            A   Ḥ   f  , B yr t  Dār  l-I tiṣām 
lil-Ṭibā  h w -al-Nashr, 2000. 
35  l-Muz nī, Ismā‗īl b. Y  yā (        , al-M        -M „                -amr wa-al-        hiriyy , Uṣul 
al-fiqh:120.; It is also edited and published by Brunschvig, See Brunschvig, ―Le Livre De L ordre Et De L  
Dèfense D‘ l-Muz ni‖ Bulletin d'etudes Orientales, Beirut, (1945-46). 145-65. 
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K       -       K       -       wa-al-„   m, and K       -mufassar wa-al-mujmal.36 We 
also see plenty of quotations reflecting Dāw d‘s thoughts on uṣ l al-fiqh in the later 
literature.  
Toward the end of the third century, interest in uṣ l  l-fiqh w s growing. Dāw d‘s 
son Ab  B kr b. Dāw d (         is reported to h ve written K       -            „  f   
  -    . A recent study b sed on F ṭimī jurist Qādī  l-Nu‗mān‘s (         I      f      
al-mad      has shown that it was a manual of uṣ l al-fiqh in conception, content and 
form.
37 The contribution of the  āhirī school to uṣ l al-fiqh is not only important for the 
development of uṣ l al-fiqh, it is also crucial to help explain the reasons for the school‘s 
disappearance. 
Mu  mm d b. Is āq  l-Kāshānī (        ,   former  āhirī who later became Shāfi‗ī, 
is also reported to have written U      -f      K       -     „    D „    . „A   f    ṭ   
  -       K               -qi   .38 I cite some of his opinions in the dissertation.  
The interest of Mu‗t zilī theologi ns in uṣ l  l-fiqh seems to h ve continued  nd 
incre sed by the l te third ninth century. The most import nt figures were Ab  ‗Ali 
al-Jubbā‘ī (303/915) and his son Ab  H shim  l-Jubbā‘ī (        . Ab  ‗Ali  l-Jubbā‘ī‘s 
                                                 
36
 Ibn  l-N dīm, Mu  mm d b. Is āq,   -F         -I     -N    , edited by Ibrāhīm R m ḍān.  nd ed. B yr t  
Dār  l-M  rif ,          .,    -8.  
37 Stew rt, Devin. ―Mu  mm d b. Dāw d   l- āhirī‘s M nu l of Jurisprudence,  l-Wuṣ l ilā M ‗rif t  l-Uṣ l‖ 
in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory. Ed. By Weiss, Bernard G. Leiden: Brill, 2002.
 
38 K   āl h, ‗Um r Riḍā, M „      -  ‟    f                   f    -        - A       , B yr t  M kt b t 
 l-Muth nnā,     ., IX,   .  
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recently reconstructed work on t fsīr cont ins some of his opinions on uṣ l al-fiqh.39 
However, the m in sources for their opinions  re the works of  l-Qādī ‗Abd  l-J bbār 
(415/1024) and Ab   l-Hus yn  l-B ṣrī (         . Al-Qādī‘s   -M      and F ḍ    - „       
Ab   l-Hus yn‘s al-M „      contains plenty of citations from them. Al-Kh yyāṭ (         
 nd his student Ab   l-Qāsim  l-B lkhī  l-K ‗bī (         were other import nt Mu‗t zilī 
scholars of the time. Al-Kh yyāṭ‘s work al-Intiṣ   was an important source for the research, 
both as a source of his opinions and of the opinions of e rlier Mu‗t zilī schol rs. Al-K ‗bī‘s 
extant works T f     Q       -         -     f     -      and D       -M „       „   
          -I          are important sources to trace his opinions and legal theoretical shifts 
within the school.
40
  
Within the K fī school, Ab  J ‗f r  l-Ṭ  āwī (      5 ,  l-Muz nī‘s nephew, 
appears as an important figure around the end of the third and the beginning of the fourth 
hijrī centuries in the traditionalizing of Hanafism.41 Al-Ṭ  āwī is known more for his 
extensive works S       „      -      and Shar  M        -     , which are the most 
significant sources for revealing his contribution to the tr dition lizing of   n fism. 
However, his works I     f   -f     ‟ and A       -Quran are more representative of some 
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 al-Jubbā ī, Ab  ‗Alī Mu  mm d ibn  Abd  l-W hhāb, T f    A    A     -J      , edited by Khiḍr 
Mu  mm d N bhā. B yr t  Dār  l-Kutub  l- Ilmīy h,     . 
40
 See the bibliography for all titles in detail.  
41 H ll q gives precedence to Mu  mm d Ibn Shujā‗  l-Th ljī (         in tr dition lizing H n fism before 
 l-Ṭ  āwī, however the only source th t mentions his n me  nd his contribution to the school with his works on 
  dīth is Ibn  l-N dīm‘s al-Fihrist. Ibn al-Nadim attributes the three following titles to him K            
  -        -       K       -         and K       -  ḍ     . See Ibn  l-N dīm, al-Fihrist,  5 . For H ll q‘s 
discussion: See Weiss, Studies, 394- 5. For the ev lu tion of H ll q‘s  rgument see Ch pter IV, Solit ry report. 
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of his opinions on uṣ l  l-fiqh. Al-Qur shī indic tes th t Al-Ṭ  āwī wrote   refut tion to the 
f mous follower of K fī school ‗Isā b. Abān.42 Even though this treatise has not reached us, 
it is likely that  l-Ṭ  āwī must h ve criticized ‗ sā‘s opinions on solitary reports (khabar 
al-     ).43 Secondary literature is also useful in revealing  l-Ṭ  āwī thoughts on legal 
theory.
44
  
Another influenti l figure for Isl mic l w  nd leg l theory in the l te third ninth 
century w s the f mous histori n  nd schol r Mu  mm d Ibn J rīr  l-Ṭ b rī (        . He is 
reported to have written on uṣ l al-fiqh in a manual called   -      „          -      on 
which there is also a recent study aiming to reveal his theory of uṣ l al-fiqh.45  
Mu  mm d b. Mundhir  l-Nīsāb rī‘s (         ext nt writings, such  s al-Ishr f „    
           -„     ,   -A   ṭ f    -sunan wa-al-    „ wa-al-     ,  nd his t fsīr,46 are 
important sources of my research; in particular, the one on I   „ is an important source that 
                                                 
42  l-Qur shī,  Abd  l-Qadir b. Mu ammad Mu y al-Dīn,   -J         -  ḍ     f  ṭ         -Ḥ   f    , 
K r chi  Mīr Mu  mm d Kutubkhān h, n.d., I,   5.   
43
 For the analysis of al-Ṭa āwī‘s  ppro ch to reports  nd its distinct  spects from e rlier K fī schol rs see the 
section titled ―K fī  ppro ch to Reports  W s There   Tr dition liz tion of Ahl  l-r ‘y‖ in the second ch pter. 
44
 For example see Sh r f, S  d B shīr As  d,   -I    A   J  f     -         -          f    -f    
  -I     ,  Ammān  Dār  l-N fā is,     .  Zāhid  l-K wth rī, al-Ḥ    f         -I    A   J „f     - a       
K rācī  Ayc. Aym. S  īd K mp nī,     .  ‗Abd  l-M jīd M  m d, A   J „f     - a                 
f -al-      ,  l-Qāhir h  Wizār t  l-Th qāf h,    5.  A m d,  Abd Allāh N dhīr, A   J  f     -        
  -       -            -f    , (    H-    H . Dim shq  Dār  l-Q l m,     .   Abd  l-M jīd M  m d, 
  -I      -                ,  l-Qāhir h  Dār  l-Mu  ddithīn lil-B  th  l- Ilmī w -al-Tarjamah wa-al-Nashr, 
2008.
 
45 Devin Stew rt. ―Mu  mm d b. J rīr  l-Ṭ b rī‘s   -      „          -     ‖ in Montgomery, James 
E.  Abbasid Studies: Occasional Papers of the Sc      f  A       S        C        , 6-10 July 2002. Leuven: 
Peeters, 2004. 321-349.
 
46
 For the complete titles of his extant works see the bibliography.   
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shows surviving discussions on the authority and functionality of ijmā‗ during his time.47 
The founder of one of the two Sunnī k lām schools of M turidism, Ab  M nṣ r 
 l-Māturīdī (          lso reportedly wrote   m nu l of uṣ l al-fiqh entitled M ‟       
  -     ‟ „ and another related work K       -      f    -u    al-fiqh.48 These import nt 
works th t represent the tr nsox ni n-  n fī School‘s e rliest uṣ l al-fiqh examples 
unfortunately have not reached us; however, some of his opinions can be found in his T       
al-Quran and K       -taw  d. I also used existing quotations from him in the later 
literature.
49
  
One of the most import nt figures of the l te third century w s Ab   l-‗Abbās Ibn 
Sur yj (         who m de   signific nt contribution to the form tion of Shāfi‗īsm through 
his teachings, disciples, and writings. In honor of his influential status, he w s c lled 
― l-Shāfi‗ī  l-s ghīr‖ (the little Shāfi‗ī . Ibn Sur yj reportedly wrote m ny books including 
some on uṣ l  l-fiqh. However, even  l-Subkī (         , who lived only   few centuries 
 fter Ibn Sur yj‘s de th, regretfully s ys th t only Ibn Sur yj‘s two refut tions of Ibn Dāw d 
and a fifteen-pages-long fragment of R         -      „   u      -      that contained the 
                                                 
47 Ibn  l-Mundhir, Mu  mm d ibn Ibrāhīm,   -I          ḍ         -          -f          -     f           
                       -Mu      , edited by Fu ād  Abd  l-Mun‗im A m d.  l-Ṭ b  h  . ed.  l-Riyād  Dār 
 l-Muslim lil-N shr w - l-T wzī,     . 
48  l-S m rq ndī,  Alā   l-Dīn, M       -     f            -       f         -fiqh, edited by  Abd  l-M lik 
 l-S  dī. al-Ṭ b  h  . ed. B ghdād  Wizār t  l-Awqāf w - l-Shu  n  l-Dīnīy h, L jn t I yā   l-Turāth 
 l- Ar bī w - l-Islāmī,     .,  .  Şükrü Özen reconstructed M ‟         -     „  in   work. See Şükrü Özen, 
Ebu Mansur el-M  ü    ‟    f         ü ü            ş   , n.p.: Istanbul, 2001. 
49 Especi lly Alā  l-Dīn  l-S m rq ndī (5      5   nd  l-Kāṣānī (5         quoted directly from  l-Māt rīdī‘s 
works.   
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opinions of  l-Shāfi‗ī, Mālik, Sufyān, Ab    nīf   nd his two disciples,  nd Dāw d  l-Z hirī 
on uṣ l al-fiqh were extant in his time.50 Al-J ṣṣās reports th t Ibn Sur yj  nd  l-Qāshānī‘s 
refut tions of one  nother on the topic of qiyās re ched to      p ges.51 There are other 
works (books or treatises) on uṣ l  l-fiqh  ttributed to Ibn Sur yj th t h ve not re ched us. 
His di lectic l deb tes with the schol rs of other schools, especi lly   hirīs, h ve been 
reported in biographical sources. Apparently these debates led to him to write tre tises, three 
of which were  g inst  āhirī imāms on the authority of qiyās  nd defending  l-Shāfi‗ī   
  -R    „    D       -                     -         -R    „    I   D     f    -      and 
  -R    „    I   D     f          „               -S  f „ . He  lso seemingly  tt cked 
  n fīs by writing   -R    „    M         .   -Ḥ      and   -R    „    „I    . A   .52  
Even though recent scholarship theoretically puts him in a significant place for the 
formation of uṣ l al-fiqh through the reported writings of his disciples based on biographical 
sources, his writings have not been studied enough in the current scholarship. There are three 
extant manuscripts attributed to Ibn Surayj in the contemporary sources. One of them is 
K       -      wa-al-      , which is registered in Chester Beatyy Library with the number 
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 al-Subki, Taj al-dīn, T         -S  f         -     , edited by Ma m d Mu ammad al-Ṭ nā ī,  nd ‗Abd 
al-f ttā  al- ulw. 2nd ed. Cairo: Hijr li-al-Ṭibā‗  wa-al-nashr wa-al-t wzī‗,     ., III,   ,  5 . However, it is 
not certain that R        -      was whether about certain fundamental legal topics or was about legal 
theoretical principles in deriving rulings. It was not uncommon to use the word uṣ l for the fund ment l topics 
of fiqh. (For a discussion of this meaning of uṣ l see Ch pter I   Al-Subkī  lso reports from  l-Gh zālī th t he 
studied another work of Ibn Surayj entitled al-Int    . This might be seen as another evidence for explanation of 
certain lost books during the Mongol invasion in the 13
th
 century.  
51  l-J ṣṣāṣ,   -F    , IV, 32-33.  This is another important evidence for the ravage of history in explaining 
why these important works were lost before the 14
th
 century.   
52 Ibn  l-N dīm, al-Fihrist, 263. 
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5515. Nonetheless, after studying a copy of this manuscript, I am confident in asserting that it 
does not belong to Ibn Surayj but to his disciple whose name is A m d b. ‗Um r Ab  B kr 
 l-Kh ffāf (between    -360/951-970).53 However, since this work was written in the early 
third century, it is still an important source for my research and I benefitted from using it as a 
reference throughout the dissertation.
54
 Another text attributed to Ibn Surayj is   -A      f  
u      -   .55 Even though the text   -A      f  u      -    is devoted to theologic l m tters 
(k lām , it cont ins some inform tion with respect to ‗ijmā‗. However, the attribution of this 
text to Ibn Surayj might not be accurate, because the author of the text states at the end that 
he does not follow al-Mu‗t zil  or al-Ash‗ riyy . Even though Mu‗t zil  w s  n est blished 
school during the time of Ibn Sur yj, Ash‗ riyy  w s f r from being recognized as a school. 
The eponymous scholar of this theological school,  l-Ash‗ rī died a few decades after the 
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 See Ibn K thīr, Ismā‗īl ibn ‗Um r,           -f     ‟   -S  f „    , edited by A m d ‗Um r Hāshim, 
Mu  mm d Z yn hum Mu  mm d ‗Az b,  nd Mu  mm d ibn A m d ‗Abbādī.  [C iro   M kt b t 
 l-Th qāf h  l-Dīnīy h,     .,      Ibn Qāḍī Shuhb , Ab  B kr b. A mad, T         -   f     . edited by 
 l-  fī   Abd  l- Alīm Khān. Beirut  ‗Al m  l-kutub, 1987., I, 124. The name of author on the manuscript is 
h rdly re d ble except the p rt ―b. ‗Um r‖. After   comp r tive study in the sources, in  n unpublished  rticle 
of mine, I re ched the conclusion th t it belongs to Ab  B kr  l-Kh ffāf. Since Ibn Sur yj  nd Ab  B kr sh re 
the same name as well as their fathers (―A m d b. ‗Um r‖ , biogr phic l sources must h ve confused the two 
scholars.   
54
 Even though it is   l w book (belonging to furu‗  l-fiqh), the introduction includes rich data on uṣ l al-fiqh, 
especially sources and words. The author uses the term ―b yān‖ inste d of bāb or f ṣl for ch pters. It is 
probably the influence of  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s theory of b yān in his   -R     . The following  ch pters  re discussed in 
the book    lāl-H rām  four sources (Kitāb, sunn , ijmā‗, d līl    uthority of Mursal   dīth  Ijmā‗  Qiyās  
definition  n cl ssific tion of knowledge, fiqh, f qīh, mut f qqih   mr  ‗ām  nd khāṣ  ijtihād  dis greements in 
uṣ l  l-fiqh  the definition  nd w ys of b yān from the prophet  mujm l   ctions of the prophet  matters related 
to İjtihād  n fy   uthority of e rlier sh rī‗ ts.  
55 Ibn Sur yj, A m d b. ‗Um r Ab   l-‗Abbās.Cüz' fîhi ecvibetü'l-İ â    -'âlim Ebi'l-'Abbâs Ahmed b. 'Ömer b. 
Süreyc fî usûli'd-dîn - Süleym niye Ktp., Şehid Ali P ş , nr.     . The entire treatise is also reported by Ibn 
Qayyim in his I     „   -         -I         „             -  „ ṭṭ    wa-al-jahmiyya. Maṭābi‗  l-f r zd q 
 l-tijāriyy . Riyāḍ: 1988., II, 170-74. 
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death of Ibn Surayj. Also, Ibn Surayj is reported to have inclined toward al-Mu‗t zil . 
Consequently,   -W    „             -     ‟ „ remains as the only reliable extant writing of 
Ibn Surayj.
56
 In   -W    „, Ibn Surayj gives   summ ry of Shāfi‗ī fur ‗ fiqh; however, 
toward to the end of his book he discusses the following topics of uṣ l al-fiqh in seven 
chapters: ―conditions of judgeship;‖ ―naskh and its classification;‖ ―Sunna and its 
classification;‖ ―solitary report and its authority;‖ ―the essence of Ijm ‗ ‖ ―the authority of 
qiyās ‖  nd fin lly ―requesting knowledge.‖57  
    Ibn Sur yj‘s disciples reportedly wrote numerous books on uṣ l  l-fiqh in the 
e rly fourth tenth century.  Ab  B kr  l-  yr fī (         is reported to have written 
  -      f           - „    „           -     .58  Ab   l-‗Abbās Ibn  l-Qāṣ  l-Ṭ b rī 
(335/947) has four extant works that also address certain legal theoretical matters: K     
N        -           -I      -S  f       -T        A      -Q ḍ  and   -T      ṭ [b yn 
 l-Muz nī w   l-Shāfi‗ī .59 Another f mous disciple of Ibn Sur yj, Ab  B kr Mu  mm d b. 
‗Alī b. ‗Ismā‗īl  l-Q ffāl  l-Sh shī (    or   5     or   5  is reported to h ve h d books on 
both jadal (disputation) and uṣ l  l-fiqh  s well  s   comment ry on  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s   -R     .60 
In the introduction of his extant work M         -S    „    l-Q ffāl  l-Sh shī writes about 
                                                 
56 Ibn Sur yj, A m d b. ‗Um r Ab   l-‗Abbās.  l-W    „             -      „. Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, 
Ayasofya, 1502, [130 vr] It is also published in Saudi Arabia see Ibn Sur yj, A m d ibn  Um r,    -W       
  -         -        , edited by  āli  ibn  Abd Allāh ibn Ibrāhīm Duw ysh. Saudi Arabia: s.n., 199-], 1990. 
57
 Ibn Surayj, al-W   ‟ „  122a-128b. 
58  Ibn N dīm, al-Fihrist, 263. 
59
 For example, the introduction of   -T       is devoted to the discussions of       , isti    , and interrupted 
reports (       ). For the complete titles of the books, see the bibliography. 
60
  l-Shīrāzī, Ab  Is āq Ibrāhīm ibn  Alī ibn Y suf,           -f      , edited by I sān  Abbās. B yr t  Dār 
 l-Rā id  l- Ar bī,     ., I, 112.  
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several topics of uṣ l al-fiqh.61  
From the M likī school, the sources attribute the first uṣ l  l-fiqh book to Ab  
 l-F r j  l-M likī (       -3) with K       -L   „ f  u    al-fiqh, but the earliest extant text 
is  Ibn  l-Q ssār‘s (397/1007)   -M         f  u    al-fiqh. However, Ibn  l-Q ṣṣār‘s work 
contains references to related contributions by earlier figures within the school.  
From Shi‗ī-Imāmī tradition, the earliest texts on uṣ l  l-fiqh  ppe r in the writings of 
Ab  S hl  l-N wb khtī (        . Al-N wb khtī reportedly wrote   refut tion of  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s 
  -R       nd on the inv lidity of qiyās  nd ijtihād entitled N               -S  f „   I ṭ   
  -      and N  ḍ            -ra‟y.62 I also benefitted from al-Sayyid Murtaḍā‘s   -D    „  
 nd Sh ykh  l-Mufīd‘s al-Tadhkira.  
Shi‗ī-Ismā‗īlī schol r  l-Qādī Nu‗mān‘s (         ext nt book I      f  u    
  -         is not only important for revealing Ismā‗īlī contributions and for the defense of 
Shi‗ī principles of uṣ l al-fiqh against Sunnī legal theory in general, but it is also important 
due to its quotations from third/ninth century Sunnī scholars.  
Shi‗ī-Z ydī, or, more precisely, Mu‗t zilī-Z ydī schol rs  lso contributed to the 
development of uṣ l  l-fiqh. Even though Z ydī schol rs  re categorized as Shi‗ā in most 
contemporary scholarship as well as in the classical Islamic intellectual literature, their 
methods, doctrines, and theoretical approaches were distinct from those of Shī‗ī-Imāmīs  nd 
                                                 
61  l-Q ffāl, Mu  mm d ibn  Alī, M         -          f  f       -S  f               f            -        , 
edited by Ab   Abd Allāh Mu  mm d  Alī S m k. B yr t  Dār  l-Kutub  l- Ilmīy h,     . 
62 Ibn  l-N dīm, al-Fihrist, 219-20. 
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Shi‗ī-Ismā‗īlīs. Their theoretic l  rguments were more in p r llel with the  rguments of 
Mu‗t zilī  nd proto-Sunnī schol rs th n with the views of their Shi‗ī-Imāmī  nd 
Shi‗ī-Ismā‗īlī counterp rts. This dissert tion demonstr tes their distinct  ttitudes tow rd 
ijmā‗  nd qiyās and the fact that they drew upon the opinions of Mu‗t zilī schol rs in leg l 
theory. In addition to some of the  forementioned Mu‗t zilī schol rs of B ghdād who were 
 lso  ffili ted with Z ydīs such  s  l-Iskāfī,  l-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm  l-R ssī (246/860) was also 
an important Z ydī Imām  nd scholar of the early third hijrī century. Some of  l-R ssī‘s 
theoretical opinions are scattered in his treatises.
63 For the l te third hijrī century, Z ydī 
Imām Y  yā b.  l- us yn  l-Hādī ilā  l-  qq‘s (         tre tises  re the main sources for 
tracing Z ydī contributions to the development of legal theory.64 However, probably the 
most important work among the early contributions of the Z ydīs to the leg l theory, which is 
also helpful in clarifying their interrelation with Mu‗tazila, is  l-Nātiq bi-al-  qq‘s 
(424/1033) recently published four-volume manual of uṣ l  l-fiqh   -M     f         -fiqh.65 
This work is also an important source to reconstruct the theoretical opinions of certain 
scholars of the gap period, especially those of his teacher Mu‗t zilī-Z ydī  nd   n fī uṣ l 
schol r  nd theologi n Ab  ‗Abd Allah al-Baṣrī (        . Ab  ‗Abd Allah al-Baṣrī w s one 
of the eminent students of  l-K rkhī  nd Ab  Hāshim  l-Jubbā‘ī and he was a contemporary 
of al-Jaṣṣāṣ. He is reported to have written on legal theory in his works al-U  l and Naqḍ 
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 al-Qāsim b. Ibr hīm  l-R ssī, M              -          -I      -Q         I         -R         -246 H., 
edited by  Abd  l-K rīm A m d J d bān,  l-Ṭ b  h  . ed.   n ā   Dār  l- ikm h  l-Y mānīy h,     . 
64
 al-Hādī ilā  l-  qq, Y  yā ibn  l- us yn,    -M    „     -f               f -hi      „             -I    
  -H   ,. [Yemen   M kt b t  l-Y m n  l-Kubrā, 1980. 
65
 al-Nāṭiq bi- l-  qq, Y  yā ibn  l- us yn,   -M     f         -fiqh, edited by ‗Abd  l-K rīm A m d 
J d bān. 2013. 
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  -f    . Lastly, Ibn al-Murtaḍā‘s M        -wu        ma„      „      -„     f  „ilm al-u    
is a source that traces certain legal theoretical opinions of the Mu‗t zilī-Z ydī schol rs of the 
gap period, in addition to opinions of other scholars.
66
 
Another important figure from the   n fīs of the e rly fourth tenth century w s Ab  
 l-  s n  l-K rkhī (     5   who w s  s import nt in the formation of the   n fī school as 
Ibn Surayj was in the Shāfi‗ī school. Like Ibn Surayj, al-K rkhī h d m ny influenti l 
students.
67
 He has an extant work entitled       however, this short treatise contains legal 
maxims rather than discussions on theoretical topics.
68
 His opinions  re reported in l ter 
  n fī uṣ l literature and there is a secondary study aiming to reveal these opinions.69 Even 
though sources do not mention his having authored another work, these rich citations imply 
that he might have had works on uṣ l al-fiqh or may have expressed his opinions in his 
teaching circles.  
This list of scholars and of the sources I have used to reveal their contributions to the 
development of uṣ l  l-fiqh are representative of the types of data used in my research. The 
list also provides an outline for the main contributors of the time to the science of uṣ l 
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 Ibn  l-Murt ḍā, A mad b. Ya yā, M      a -W     I   Mi„    al-„     f  „ilm a -U   , edited by A m d A. 
M. Mākhidhī.   n‗ā  Dār  l- ikm h  l-Y mānīy h,     .  
67 Ibn Quṭl bughā, Ab   l-Fidā  Z yn  l-Dīn. T     -       . edited by Mu  mm d Kh yr R m ḍān Y suf 
 l-Ṭ b  h  . ed. Dim shq  Dār  l-Qalam, 1992., I, 200-202.   
68  l-K rkhī, Ub yd Allāh ibn  l- us yn, U     in   -A       -        , [S udi Ar bi     . Kh.  l-Jub rī, 
1989., 139-150.
 
69 Jub rī,  us yn Kh l f,   -A       -         li-al-i    A     -Ḥ       -K     , [S udi Ar bi     . Kh. 
 l-Jub rī,     . 
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al-fiqh.
70
 A detailed list of my sources can be found in the bibliography.   
C. Previous Studies 
Several attempts have been made in order to explain this gap in the history of uṣ l 
al-fiqh literature between the 9
th
 and 10
th centuries. Although Sch cht‘s studies focus on the 
first two centuries, his p r digm tic theses on  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s role in Islamic legal history shed 
some light on his thoughts about what happened in the centuries following  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s de th. 
Sch cht  rgues th t the period following  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s de th w s first   time of consolid tion 
which produced the classical system of legal theory, and then a long period of 
scholasticism.
71
 According to Schacht,  l-Shāfi‗ī not only founded leg l theory with its 
fundamental four sources and an emphasis on the prophetic legal authority embodied in texts, 
his footsteps had also been followed in legal theory. That is to say that  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s leg l 
theory was magnificently superior to the preceding doctrines,  nd the liter ture of Isl mic 
leg l theory  fter him c n be seen  s footnotes on  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s leg l theory.72 Sch cht thinks 
th t one of the import nt  chievements of  l-Shāfi‗ī w s to m ke the tr ditionist thesis, which 
argues for the formal traditions from the prophet to supersede the living tr dition, prev il in 
leg l theory in opposition to  hl  l-k lām  nd  hl  l-r ‘y.73 Schacht argues that at the end of 
the 3
rd
/9
th
 century this position taken by  l-Shāfi‗ī  nd the tr ditionists h d been gener lly 
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accepted in orthodox Islam, and that this forced other groups, especially the Mu‗t zil , to 
reconsider their legal theoretical attitudes, p rticul rly in rel tion to consensus  nd r ‘y.74 
Schacht frequently labels the Mu‗t zil   s deniers of reports, and presents their thought on 
legal theory in matters of consensus, disagreements and systematic reasoning based on a few 
references to al-Kh yyāṭ‘s  nd  l-K ‗bī‘s works.75 Sch cht‘s  ccount is only interested in the 
third century, and only with respect to the development of attitudes about   dīth.76 Even 
though I  ccept  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s import nt role in leg l theory, I dis gree with Sch cht th t 
 l-Shāfi‗ī represents the pinnacle of Sunnī legal theory.  
Taha Jabir Alwani devotes a chapter to the development of uṣ l  l-fiqh  fter  l-Shāfi‗ī 
in his work Source Methodology in Islamic Jurisprudence.
77
After mentioning various texts 
that are reported to have been written on certain topics of uṣ l al-fiqh based on 
bibliogr phic l sources  nd  cknowledging  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s   -R     ‘s domin nt influence in 
parallel with Schacht, he argues that it is hard to regard what happened during this period as 
development. Rather, Alwani claims, these texts seem limited to criticizing, supporting, or 
commenting on   -R     .78 However, he does not provide any quotations from this period 
citing   -R     .  On the contr ry, bibliogr phic l  ccounts show th t the texts written during 
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th t period were not building on  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s  rguments. Moreover, even if we accept 
Alw ni‘s  rgument that what was written in this period was just commentary on   -R     , 
this argument does not necessarily lead to his inference that this period was not a significant 
developmental stage, especially in light of the fact that building on earlier works has been the 
main element of development throughout Islamic intellectual history. 
Recent scholarship tends to consider this gap as the formational stage of uṣ l al-fiqh 
as opposed to a developmental process,  nd to shift the pivot l role from  l-Shāfi‗ī  nd from 
the early third/ninth century to Ibn Surayj and the early fourth/tenth century. Wael Hallaq 
and Kevin Reinhart are the chief proponents of this thesis. Hallaq gives precedence to Ibn 
Sur yj‘s disciples; Kevin Reinhart, however, underscores Ibn Sur yj‘s own role by 
attributing to him a manual of jurisprudence.
 79
 Wael Hallaq explains the lack of literature 
on uṣ l al-fiqh in the ninth century as being because this period represented the initial 
development of legal theory, which was only to fully emerge  s l te  s   century  fter 
 l-Shāfi‗ī‘s de th.80 He emphasizes the importance of Ibn Surayj and his disciples by 
assigning them a foundational role in the formation of uṣ l al-fiqh.   
Wael Hallaq goes further and explains the formation of Islamic legal theory as arising 
from the great synthesis between ahl  l r ‘y  nd  hl al-  dīth. According to Hallaq, the main 
factor for the emergence of uṣ l al-fiqh was the compromise between rationalism and 
                                                 
79
 Hallaq, Wael B., A          f I     c                           c        S            -fiqh, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997., 36; Reinhart, A. Kevin, Before Revelation: The Boundaries of Muslim 
Moral Thought, Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1995., 14-15. 
80
 Hallaq, A history of Islamic legal theories, 36. 
31 
tr dition lism  t the end of the third ninth century. H ll q does not consider  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s 
  -R      as a true work in uṣ l,  nd further, he  rgues th t  l-Shāfi‗ī h d very little to do 
with the elaboration of uṣ l al-fiqh, claiming instead that al-Shāfi‗ī merely advocated the 
synthesis in a rudimentary form. He identifies Ibn Surayj (306/918) and his students as the 
ones who created uṣ l al-fiqh in its ―org nic  nd comprehensive form.‖ His main sources of 
evidence are reports attributing some works on uṣ l  l-fiqh to Ibn Sur yj‘s students such  s 
Abu B kr  l-F risi (fl. c .  5      , Ibn  l-Q ss (        , Abu B kr  l-S yr fī (        , 
and al-Qaffal al-Shashi (336/947).
81
 Melchert follows Hallaq and explains the evolution of 
jurisprudence through this same theory of synthesis. According to Melchert, the strict 
division between ahl al-r ‘y  nd  hl  l-  dīth in the early third century softened towards the 
end of the century. Then, in the fourth century, compromised forms emerged between the 
―H nb lī school, submitted to the forms of jurisprudence,  nd the  l-Shāfi‗ī,   n fī  nd 
Mālikī schools, submitted to the forms of   dīth.‖82  
Devin Stewart approaches the problem differently than the above historians. Stewart 
criticizes the claims that works on uṣ l  l-fiqh did not appear in the third/ninth century based 
on a lack of supporting evidence. He argues that many works mentioned in the biographical 
sources have been lost and many more have totally escaped mention; therefore, the 
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third/ninth century must be considered the st rting point of uṣ l  l-fiqh.83 Even though 
Stewart shares the opinions of previous historians that   -R      does not cont in 
ch r cteristic fe tures of l ter uṣ l  l-fiqh works, he accepts that   -R      can be regarded as 
a work on uṣ l  l-fiqh in the sense that it aims to provide a comprehensive method for the 
deriv tion of rulings for  ll possible future c ses.‖84 He also supports his thesis with two 
articles that attempt to reve l the contents of two schol rs‘ books on uṣ l  l-fiqh from the 
third/ninth century.
85
 Stew rt‘s  ppro ch is more reasonable than those of the other 
historians mentioned above, but these arguments should be supported through a more 
comprehensive examination of the period. 
In addition to these theses above, two important recent challenges regarding the role 
of  l-Shāfi‗i need to be discussed. The first is asserted by Norman Calder who argued that the 
works  ttributed to  l-Shāfi‗ī were  ctu lly written by  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s followers long after 
al-Shāfi‗ī‘s death.86 The second critique is m de by H ll q  bout  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s  ctu l role in 
the development of legal theory, which is mentioned  bove. H ll q cl imed  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s 
treatise   -R      should not be accepted as the earliest example of legal theory due to its 
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rudiment ry contribution comp red to the l ter developed works on leg l theory. Hence, 
 ccording to H ll q,  l-Shāfi‗ī should not be viewed as the foundational figure for Islamic 
legal theory.
87
 First of all, even though they reach similar conclusions, the dramatic contrast 
between these two arguments is striking. While Calder argues that the content of   -R      is 
theoretically too developed of a work to have be written at the beginning of the third/ninth 
century, Hallaq argues that   -R     ‘s imm ture content forces us to exclude it from the 
genre of uṣ l al-fiqh. This contrast implies there is a different understanding between the two 
historians about what uṣ l al-fiqh means. From his work, it seems that Calder perceives it as 
legal theoretical discussion on sources, methods and principles separate from law. Hallaq, 
however, explicitly says that what he means by uṣ l al-fiqh is the legal theory that emerged 
as the product of the four schools in the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleven centuries.
88
 Based on 
this description, Hallaq compares   -R      to the later uṣ l al-fiqh works developed by the 
members of the fours schools, and excludes it from the genre due to its relatively immature 
content. C lder‘s description of uṣ l al-fiqh is more accurate. The term ‗uṣ l al-fiqh‘ refers to 
the source methodology of law. Thus, an inquiry that investigates the development of the 
science of uṣ l al-fiqh must take into consideration every effort related to the development of 
source methodology. Otherwise, one would have to ignore any contributions made before the 
complete formation of the science. In other words, one could not ever understand and explain 
the developmental process. It is for precisely this reason that W el H ll q‘s strict 
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understanding of uṣ l al-fiqh leads him to ignore all of the contributions m de by Mu‗t zīlīs, 
Murji‗īs,  āhirīs  nd other v rious groups  nd independent schol rs before the fourth tenth 
centuries. As the first complete extant work written almost one and a half century before the 
second extant work, i.e.   -F    ,   -R     ‘s rel tively imm ture content, concepts,  nd 
structure should not surprise a student of jurisprudence.  
C lder‘s skepticism  bout  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s  uthorship of   -R      is also based on 
argumentum ex silentio and erroneous comparison.  By following Sch cht‘s thesis, C lder 
compares   -R      with ancient schools and arrives at the conclusion that the legal theory 
presented in   -R      is a magnificently consistent and superior system.89 However, we do 
not have any extant legal theoretical work dating from the time before  l-Shāfi‗ī. He  lso 
comp res some concepts in  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s   -R      with those of Ibn Qut yb ‘s T ‟   . For 
example, he questions the fact that certain technical terminology [kh b r  l-wā id  
‗ mm-khāṣṣ   nd the theory of naskh are absent from Ibn Qutayba‘s work, but  ppe r in 
  -R     .90 Ibn Qut yb ‘s work is exclusively devoted to the defense of   dīth  g inst  hl 
 l-k lām  nd  hl  l-ra‘y based on the reconciliation of seemingly contradictory   dīths. Thus, 
it is not surprising th t Ibn Qut yb ‘s T ‘wīl does not focus on the theoretic l terminology or 
naskh. On the other h nd, e rlier works th n Ibn Qut yb ‘s T     contained this type of 
terminology, such as „    and      , including Muz nī‘s al-amr wa-al-nahy or Kinānī‘s 
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(240/854)   -Ḥ    .91 A considerable amount of literature dealing with naskh had already 
been produced as well.
92
 Furthermore, a careful study of the early quotations from   -R     , 
commentaries on   -R     ,  nd refut tions  g inst  l-Shāfi‗ī written before the middle of the 
third/ninth century support the  uthorship of  l-Shāfi‗ī. This was also the view accepted by 
the consensus of all the schools, as can be seen in the later literature of uṣ l  l-fiqh. The 
f mous Mu‗t zilī theologi n,  l-Jāḥi  cites  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s   -R      in his treatise R      F ḍ  
H      „    „A   S    , which w s written between    -       -  5 during the time of 
 l-Wāthiq.93  Y  yā b. S ‗īd  l-Q ṭṭān (         is reported to h ve re d   -R       nd 
pr ised  l-Shāfi‗ī.94  Al-Muz nī reportedly s id to  l-Anmāṭī th t he h d been re ding 
 l-Shāfi‗ī‘s   -R      for fifty years and kept benefiting from it with something new each 
time.
95 Ab   l-‗Abbās Ibn  l-‗Aṣ m (     5   reportedly s id th t he h d studied  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s 
  -R      before 270/883.96 Among the refut tions, ‗Isā b. Abān‘s (           -R    „    
        -M      wa-al-S  f „  f -al-       is already mentioned above. It is most probably 
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written against the theory of  khbār that  l-Shāfi‗ī presents in   -R     . Ibn S  n n‘s 
(256/870)   -R    „      -S  f „  wa-al-„I         97    mmād b. Ishāq  l-J hd mī‘s 
(267/880)   -R    „      -S  f „ ,98 Ibn ‗Abd  l-  k m‘s (268/882)   -R    „      -S  f „  f  
        f  f      -      wa-al-sunna,99 Ismā‗īl b. Ishāq  l-Qādī‘s (282/896)   -R    „    
al-S  f „ ,100  Y  yā b. ‗Um r  l-Mālikī‘s (           -R    „      -S  f „   101 Y suf b. 
Y  yā  l-Az dī‘s (  8/901)   -R    „      -S  f „ ,102  nd A m d b. M rwān  l-Mālikī‘s 
(298/910)   -R    „      -S  f „ 103 are works written in refut tion of  l-Shāfi‗ī during the 
3
rd
/9
th
 century.
104
  The first manuals of uṣ l  l-fiqh also cite   -R      multiple times, which 
indicates that early scholars of uṣ l  l-fiqh were in conversation with earlier books and 
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treatises in the genre, and that they accepted   -R      as belonging to the same genre.105 
H ll q‘s thesis  lso suffers from multiple we knesses. First of  ll, H ll q‘s thesis 
 ims  t depicting  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s work   -R      as insignificant as a reaction to the excessive 
emphasis on its importance within Orientalist discourse. The position he takes is to describe 
what happened in the third/ninth century as merely a formational process of uṣ l al-fiqh 
instead of real development. However, the literature of uṣ l al-fiqh, especially references to 
  -R      in this literature, as well as the content of   -R      refutes this point.106 Even those 
whom Hallaq accepts as the founders of uṣ l al-fiqh, such as al-Sayr fī  nd  l-Q ffāl 
 l-Shāshī, reportedly wrote commentaries on   -R      referring to it as an uṣ l work.107  
Hallaq assumes that only two groups, namely ahl al-r ‘y  nd  hl  l-  dīth, were influential in 
the formation of uṣ l al-fiqh. However, biographical and historical sources confirm that in 
the third/ninth century there were many different groups, such  s Mu‗t zil   nd   hirism, 
involved in uṣ l discussions on topics such as the authority of ijtihād, qiyās and solitary 
report.  
Most of these earlier studies either presented this gap as an insignificant time period  
for the history of Islamic legal theory, or just a period in which only the first commentaries 
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on  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s   -R      were produced with respect to Islamic legal theory. The first claim 
motivated its proponents to look for a new starting point for Islamic legal theory and new 
founding figures. While the second claim resulted from assigning a significant place to 
al-Shāfi‗ī and his time, and resulted in describing the gap period as the first stage of 
 l-Shāfi‗ī‘s influence on Islamic legal theory. Both of these claims are challenged directly in 
the body of this dissertation.  
One of the secondary problems that the dissertation deals with is the formation of the 
schools. There are several studies exclusively dealing with this problem; however, my 
primary focus will be on the question of the relationship between the formation and survival 
of a school and its development of a legal theory which had been relatively neglected. It is 
clear that those schools of law that survived over long periods of time each produced a 
distinctive legal theory that was articulated in works of usul al-fiqh.  The question of 
whether the production of works on usul al-fiqh contributed to their longevity is one that can 
and should be posed by scholars. On the other hand, uncovering the problem of how 
developing a legal theory affects the formation of a school will enable us to reach a more 
accurate understanding of Islamic legal history.  
Sch cht loc tes the form tion of schools  t  round the middle of the third century. 
This is when the Ir qi school bec me completely H n fī, when M likī  nd Sh fi ī doctrines 
were cryst llized in the respective h ndbooks of Abu Muṣ‗ b  nd  l-Muz nī,  nd the 
39 
opinions of A m d b.   nb l were collected by his disciples. 108  Coulson identifies 
 l-Sh ybānī  s "the true founder of H n fī l w" and Ibn  l-Q sim  s the comp r ble figure 
for M likī l w. He also s ys th t Sh fi ītes bec me   school in the gener tion  fter  l-Shāfi‗ī, 
when only   minority were immedi tely converted to his views,  nd th t A m d founded the 
  nb lī school by collecting his Musn d.109  
Makdisi has identified three stages in the development of schools of law: the regional 
school, the personal school, and the guild school.
110
 Melchert assigns the emergence of the 
madhhab as a full-fledged legal school to the end of the 9th century and the beginning of the 
10th century. He follows the careers of the major jurisprudents of six schools in great detail 
in order to show that some of these jurisprudents were responsible for founding what he calls 
the classical schools. Thus, Ibn Surayj (306/918) and his immediate students contributed 
directly to the formation of the Shafi'ite school; al-Karkhi (340/952) to the Hanafite school; 
al-Khallal (311/923) to the Hanbalite school; and Ismail Ibn Ishaq (282/896), among others, 
to the Malikite school. According to Melchert, the establishment of a regular system of 
education for transmitting legal doctrine, with identifiable teachers and students, was the 
cause of the formation of the madhhabs. Thus, "Ibn Surayj marked a turning point in the 
history of Shafi'ism because he was the first to have one identifiable te cher in jurisprudence 
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( l-Anmāṭī), on the one hand, [and] a number of identifiable students, on the other.‖111  An 
exceptional challenge to the historians above has recently been made by Hallaq. Hallaq 
argues that geographical schools never existed and that the later schools were not personal. 
Although a transformation did in fact take place, according to Hallaq it was a transformation 
from individual juristic doctrines to doctrinal schools.
112
  
One of the prevalent hypotheses explaining why some schools survived and others 
did not is that the ones th t survived did so bec use they were supported by c liph p tron ge. 
This view c n be tr ced b ck to the e rly Isl mic leg l liter ture. For ex mple Ibn H zm 
st tes th t the   n fī  nd M likī schools prev iled bec use Ab  Y suf,  s chief q di for 
H run  I-R shīd, s w to it th t only   n fis were  ppointed to judgeships  nywhere in the 
empire, while Y  y  ibn Y  y  simil rly influenced the Um yy d ‗Abd  l-R hmān ibn 
 l-  k m (r. 206-238/822-852).113 Yet we know of a number of Basran jurisprudents who 
were  ppointed to judgeships in B ghd d. ‗Um r ibn   bīb, Mu  mm d  l-Anṣārī  nd 
Y  y  b. Akth m (     5   h ve been counter ex mples, the l tter two  ppointed  s chief 
qādīs by H run after Abu Y suf. 
Another problem that I will deal with is the reason for the split between ahl al-r ‘y 
and ahl al-  dīth, and the influence of the split on the evolution of legal theory during these 
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two centuries. Different explanations have emerged in the scholarship to explain this problem. 
Melchert states th t the Ir qī jurists in gener l, and Ab  H nīf ‘s followers in p rticul r 
represent ahl al-r ‘y  nd he thinks the m in re son for this split w s the doctrine of the 
createdness of the Quran. Melchert asserts that al-Sh ybānī  nd Ab  Y suf promulg ted this 
doctrine early on, then their followers, especi lly Bishr  l-M rīsī, continued this doctrine 
later in the early third Islamic century.
114
 Secondary factors for the split, according to 
Melchert, were the use of the principle of analogy (qiyās), setting aside known   dīth reports 
in favor of personal opinions, and lack of piety.
115
 
Another important - and the most recent - work that needs to be pointed out here is 
Ahmed Sh msy‘s The Canonization of Islamic Law.116  Despite differences of data and 
scope, certain aspects of Sh msy‘s work overl p with my research topics. The overarching 
argument of the work is that the cl ssic l institution of m dhh bs (Sh fi‗īsm,  anafism, 
Mālikism,  anbalism) was rooted in the canonization project of al-Shāfi‗ī. According to 
Sh msy, e rlier leg l schools of M dīna and ‗Irāq were fundamentally different from the 
institution of classical madhhabs as they relied on communal tradition and it was al-Shāfi‗ī 
who managed to found a coherent legal system exclusively based on canonized sources and 
independent from communal traditions. Therefore, Shamsy argues that this legal system as 
developed by al-Shāfi‗ī, and further developed by his students, was followed by other 
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scholars and resulted in the formation of the madhhabs as they were known in the classical 
period.  Even though Sh msy successfully demonstr tes the different st ges of Shāfi‗īsm in 
the process of emerging as a classical madhhab, his larger argument is based on 
generalization and reductionism. Modern scholarship operates on the assumption that all four 
sunnī schools h d simil r or even identical stages in their formation as madhhabs, and that 
they even emerged as madhhabs at the same time. This ignores the independent and distinct 
factors in the history of each school. Even though it is true that the scholars of the 3
rd
/9
th
 
century were in constant interaction, this interaction did not always result in following the 
same direction. Also, by following the two main theses of Schacht, Shamsy argues that the 
pre-Sh fi‗ī period was the period of communal practices through which the claims of 
normativity were made, and that  l-Sh fi‗ī m de   signific nt imp ct by completely repl cing 
the authority of communal practices with the exclusive authority of textual sources. Shamsy 
calls this process the canonization of Islamic law.  
In my dissertation, I argue that the topics in the field of uṣ l  l-fiqh stemmed from 
dialectical debates among a wide variety of scholars on certain theses of authority and their 
stratified structure. In this sense, the formation of uṣ l  l-fiqh lies in the crisis of authority 
and the constant theses proposed by certain individuals to solve this crisis. Communal 
practices, or „    , which Schacht calls the living tradition, was just one of the theses 
proposed for establishing normativity. It w s only some schol rs, such  s cert in M dīn n 
jurists, who considered „     to have an overarching authority, especially in matters of 
interpretation, and even it was just one source among various other sources for them. An 
overemphasis on communal traditions during the first two centuries of Islam simply does not 
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accurately reflect the story of the much more developed discussions on authority and 
normativity, which Shamsy calls the canonization process. In addition, the overall authority 
of the text of the Quran was already a matter of agreement, and a majoritarian agreement on 
the authority of transmitted reports h d been growing r pidly long before  l-Shāfi‗ī. I agree 
th t  l-Sh fi‗ī pl yed  n import nt role in the form tion of Isl mic l w  nd leg l theory, but 
 l-Sh fi‗ī w s only one of the signific nt contributors of this development l process.  
Even though various studies have helped to explore certain parts of the period, they 
are far from presenting a comprehensive description of the period with respect to the 
development of uṣ l al-fiqh. My dissertation differs from earlier studies in several respects. 
First, it is the only study exclusively devoted to the developmental process of uṣ l al-fiqh in 
the 3
rd
/9
th
 and early 4
th
/10
th
 centuries. Earlier studies only focused on certain elements or 
people from this period. Therefore, we have not had an accurate and comprehensive 
explanation of this gap in the history of Islamic legal theory yet. Secondly, because earlier 
studies tend to be so limited in their focus, they suffer from a lack of comparative textual 
analysis of the sources. My research examines almost all relevant materials that were written 
during this period. It also encompasses the references provided in the later literature. Besides 
the texts directly related to fiqh and uṣ l al-fiqh from the period, I use all of the related 
materials written within the disciplines of K lām,   dīth, T fsīr  nd Khil f. I also use 
historical, biographical and bibliographical sources and later uṣ l al-fiqh literature. Thirdly, 
my study investigates texts that were discovered and published only recently, and which were 
not available as sources for some of the earlier studies. These include  l-J ṣṣās‘s   -F      
K rkhī‘s   -U      l-S ym rī‘s M        -     f  Muz nī‘s K       -Amr wa-al-Nahy, 
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 l-Kh ffāf‘s K       -      wa-al-         l-Q ffāl  l-Sh shī‘s M         -S    „   Ibn 
 l-Qās‘s Tafsir and   -I      , Ibn Q ṣṣār‘s al-Muqaddima and other materials from the 
period mentioned earlier in this section, or can be seen in the bibliography.  
 In the following chapters, I argue that the individual efforts of scholars embodied in 
dialectic debates, oral or written, to solve the problem of religious authority during the gap 
period shaped the science of uṣ l  l-fiqh significantly and provided its major topics. The 
different arguments elaborated within these debates competed with each other and 
constituted the body of uṣ l  l-fiqh. Scholars coming from different regions and backgrounds, 
and later on schools, had to engage in these arguments in order to participate in this genre 
and support their points of view on the questions of authority. This is precisely the major 
reason of why exceptional, even heretical opinions, have been preserved in the literature of 
uṣ l  l-fiqh.    
Therefore, the following chapters examine the shifts, evolution, and development in 
the concept of us l; the development between the works of  l-Sh fi‗ī  nd  l-J ṣṣās; in the 
articulated discussions on solitary report (khabar al-wā id), consensus (ijmā‗), analogy 
(qiyās), legal reasoning (ijtihād), and imitation (taqlīd) during the gap period. 
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CHAPTER I 
The Evolution of Uṣ l: What Was It and What Did It Become? 
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A. The Concept of U    in the Gap Period 
This study argues that uṣ l  l-fiqh did not emerge with the aim of providing 
principles and methods restricted to the use of fiqh, meaning the derivation of religio-legal 
rulings from the fundamental sources. Taking into account topics covered in the later 
literature, one can also argue that it never in fact became a specific legal theory merely for 
fiqh, despite several efforts by certain classical scholars to restrict it in that way.
117
 Uṣ l 
al-fiqh arose with the need for theoretical principles that would distinguish correct religious 
knowledge from heretical (bid„a) or inaccurate opinions (ta akkum), and reach authoritative 
and normative solutions. These methodological efforts, though mostly related to practical 
matters of fiqh, were not limited to the realm of fiqh. This was precisely because people were 
in need of normative belief principles and normative views on piety in addition to normative 
rulings in everyday life. The subsequent chapters will provide evidence for this argument. 
 This search for authoritative sources of religion as a filtering body discerning correct 
opinions and beliefs from incorrect ones underwent different stages and entailed a rich, but 
transforming, terminology that later came to compose the backbone of uṣ l al-fiqh. These 
authoritative sources were denoted by the use of the term ‗uṣ l‘ in the gap period, a term 
which would later, toward the end of the gap period, be incorporated into the name for a 
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religious science of source methodology, uṣ l  l-fiqh. In this chapter, I will explain the 
history of this transformation of the concept of uṣ l into uṣ l al-fiqh in the gap period.  
A sufficient answer for the question of the formation of uṣ l  l-fiqh as a source 
methodology can be found in its functions throughout the early developmental stages, and a 
comprehensive analysis of the concept of u    during these stages is needed to answer the 
question completely. This answer will also shed some light on its origins and the question of 
why Muslim scholars needed this science. However, before dealing with the conceptual 
analysis of uṣ l  l-fiqh, I want to point out a few different modern definitions of uṣ l  l-fiqh 
in the existing scholarship, which, I think, create confusion in the study of Islamic legal 
history.  
1. Three Approaches to the Definition of Uṣ     -Fiqh in Contemporary 
Scholarship  
In the introduction, I briefly mentioned how the various definitions of uṣ l al-fiqh 
used by contemporary scholars of Islamic legal history inevitably affect their research results. 
In order to avoid confusion and cacophony, it is essential to clarify what we mean by uṣ l 
and uṣ l al-fiqh. Aside from a technical definition of uṣ l al-fiqh, which also has varying 
facets, what I mean here is what the present historians of Islamic legal law and legal theory 
mean when they investigate the history of this science. Because the term and concept of uṣ l 
al-fiqh had not yet clearly emerged during the gap period, attempts to identify what is and is 
not usul al-fiqh in this period rely upon reading backwards from later works and 
understandings. The existing conceptual framework on the history of uṣ l al-fiqh revolves 
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around three main approaches.  
The first one presents uṣ l al-fiqh as the Sunnī theory of law that emerged from the 
great synthesis between reason and tradition achieved by the scholars of ahl al-r ‘y  nd  hl 
al-  dīth. The proponents of this approach confine their research to those scholars who were 
described as affiliated with what later came to be recognized as Sunnī schools of l w, i.e. 
  n fīs, Mālikīs, Shāfi‗īs,  nd   nb līs. This  ppro ch, therefore, ignores the contribution of 
scholars who were not affiliated with these schools such as Mu‗t zilīs, Z ydīs, Shi‗īs,  nd 
independent scholars of the gap period.   
The second approach understands uṣ l al-fiqh as a specific genre devoted solely to the 
theory of law. The scholars who follow this approach look for independent manuals and 
treatises written on uṣ l  l-fiqh in this period to trace the early development of this field. 
Depending on how one recognizes a text as a text of uṣ l  l-fiqh, this  ppro ch c n be more 
restrictive or more encomp ssing. As mentioned in the introduction, some contempor ry 
schol rs  rgued th t  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s   -R      does not belong to the genre of uṣ l  l-fiqh due to 
its lacking certain discussions and structures that are present in the later literature of uṣ l 
al-fiqh. In any case, this approach confines the research on the early development of uṣ l 
al-fiqh to a limited range of materials and ignores the scattered discussions on uṣ l  l-fiqh in 
various genres.  
The third approach is the     ‟  -based approach and it represents uṣ l al-fiqh 
through the topics and problems it deals with. The scholars of this approach look for any 
discussions in the earlier periods related to the existing topics in the later literature of uṣ l 
al-fiqh. This approach provides a wider scope in tracing back the eary development of uṣ l 
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al-fiqh and enables researchers to analyze more materials from various fields of religious 
sciences that contain discussions on the topics of uṣ l  l-fiqh. In addition, this approach is 
also useful to explore the interrelations between uṣ l  l-fiqh and other religious sciences 
during the early developmental stages. 
The first two approaches fall short for the aim of uncovering the formation and early 
development of uṣ l al-fiqh because they restrict the scope of investigation either to certain 
contributors and a relatively late period, or to a body of writings on theory of law. Both 
methods fail to account for the many other players from different groups or independent 
players who were on the stage and contributing in their diverse writings to the discussions of 
the problems of uṣ l al-fiqh during the early period. Therefore, my research follows the 
    ‟  -based approach and tries to discover who contributed to discussions of the problems 
of uṣ l al-fiqh such as the evaluation of sources and hermeneutical principles. This approach 
enables the researcher to trace back different periods and scholars as much as possible with a 
wider scope.  
I will begin with an investigation of how an idea relating to the sources of religion 
developed in the early stages of the gap period and how the concept of uṣ l came to be 
denoted as identifyiong these sources. Later, I will discuss how the concept of uṣ l c me to 
comprise a significant part of uṣ l  l-fiqh and provided the name for this emerging field of 
religious science. The following two sub-sections examine the concept of uṣ l emerging 
vis-a-vis innovation (bid„a), arbitrary adjudication (ta akkum) and secondary branches 
(f   „), and the development of the idea of the sources of religion in the sense that uṣ l 
generally conveys. 
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2. Conceptual History of Uṣ   
Uṣ l is the plural of a l, which means the lower part of something, the foundation and 
root upon which something else is based. Fur ‗ is the plural of far‗ which means the upper 
part of something or a branch.
118
 In parallel with the lexical meanings, two kinds of 
relationships between the words uṣ l  nd fur ‗ seem to have been considered, and these were 
used sometimes slightly differently and sometimes vaguely interchangeably during the gap 
period: reliance and sequence. As for understanding the relationship in terms of reliance, uṣ l 
is understood as those things th t  re needed for the existence of fur ‗. In other words, things 
th t  re fur ‗ emanate from other things that are uṣ l. In this kind of relationship the English 
equivalent of uṣ l would be sources or causes and of fur ‗ would be outcomes or results. For 
example, when he describes his work K     u      -f     wa-al-a    ,  l-Jā i  underscores 
this meaning by claiming that the differences in subordinate (f   „) and specific rulings 
(a   m) depend on the divergent views on the sources of legal opinions (       -f    ).”119 
The second understanding of the relationship between uṣ l  nd fur ‗ is represented as 
priority between different entities. In that case, the uṣ l are what is primary to the fur ‗ that 
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are secondary, but that are not necessarily based on the primary entities. In the second 
context, uṣ l can be translated as fundamentals or essentials,  nd fur ‗ as subordinates and 
details. For ex mple,  l-Māt rīdī expl ins u      -    through the categories of belief, the 
kinds of rituals, the rulings on certain punishments and rights, and good ethics. According to 
his account, the Quran explains these uṣ l that are primary and general, while the prophet 
explains other kinds of det ils th t  re fur ‗.120 Both contexts might implicitly entail the 
claim of significance; however, sometimes the term uṣ l might refer only to significant data 
in the sense of priorities, without implying a relationship of reliance whatsoever or vice versa. 
Be that as it may, one thing is common for all these nuances in using these two words: the 
conviction that uṣ l and fur ‗ should be in accordance with each other. If there is a reliance 
relationship between uṣ l  nd fur ‗, fur ‗ should not contradict the  uṣ l; and if there is a 
sequential rel tionship, fur ‗ should not precede uṣ l. However, I argue that through a 
process that Pierre Hadot calls creative misunderstandings and misrepresentations, scholars 
confused the ideas of a reliance relationship between uṣ l  nd fur ‗ with the idea of a 
sequential relationship throughout the early development of Islamic intellectual history. This 
resulted in looking for an assumed dependence between those things that are deemed primary 
and those that are secondary, although they may not have that kind of dependence.
121
 The 
efforts to represent fiqh  nd k lām as having such a relationship can be explained in the same 
way. In the remaining part of this section, I trace the usage of the term uṣ l in diverse 
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intellectual traditions of Islam during the gap period.  
a. Uṣ     -    
Now, I turn to the conceptual history of uṣ l in the intellectual disciplines of Islam. 
The word uṣ l in relation to religious sciences was used in four main phrases during the gap 
period, highlighting either a type of relationship based on dependence, or one based on 
sequence. First, the phrase uṣ l  l-dīn was used in multiple contexts. It was used in the sense 
of multiple primary and general topics of religion. As pointed out earlier,  l-Māturīdī uses 
this concept when he mentions an interpretation of the verse ―This book was sent down for 
explaining everything (                      ‟   ‖ by explaining the generality of the meaning 
of the verse in terms of uṣ l  l-dīn. In this usage, he is using uṣ l  l-dīn to include belief 
(    ), kinds of rituals (    „ al-„      ), the rulings on certain punishments and rights 
(al-a       „a al-      wa-al-     ), and good ethics            -       . According to 
this interpretation, these topics of uṣ l  l-dīn  re expl ined by the Qur n, while other topics 
outside of uṣ l  l-dīn, however, are explained by the prophet.122 Along similar lines, uṣ l 
 l-dīn w s used for those significant primary topics of religion that one should necessarily 
know about. Ab  J ‗far al-Na  ās (     5  , for inst nce, uses the phrase uṣ l  l-dīn with 
this meaning when he defines islam and iman and where he mentions pilgrimage ( ajj); these 
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are things about which, according to him, one must not be ignorant.
123
 The third sense in 
which the concept of u      -    has been deployed was as a synonym for        in reference 
to Islamic theology. This sense of the concept is seen increasingly after the late third century 
after the hijra.
124
 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ uses the same concept for religious beliefs about which 
disagreement is not acceptable, and which are the same as were expressed in the earlier 
revelations such as the Torah.
125
 In this sense, uṣ l  l-dīn me nt the belief principles of 
religion, which are primary in contrast to the rulings (a    ), which are secondary. Belief 
principles were regarded as the most important topics of religion, but there was not 
necessarily a sort of reliance between belief (i„     ), wich is more important, and practical 
matters of religion, such as fiqh for example.
126
 The last and probably the most important 
meaning used for the concept of uṣ l  l-dīn during the g p period is the most relevant to our 
discussion. This is the sense of uṣ l  l-dīn as the sources of religion. For instance, al-Malaṭī 
(        ,   Shāfi‗ī jurist  nd contempor ry of  l-Jaṣṣāṣ, mentions ijmā‗ as one of the 
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54 
sources of religion (a lun min u      -   ).127  
b. Uṣ     -Tawḥ   
The second use of the term uṣ l in relation to the religious sciences of Islam was u    
al-taw   . This term was used in relation to theology. Despite the fact that the more common 
term for theology during that time was k lām, the belief principles of Isl m were  lso 
identified by categories termed „ilm al-taw    or ma„rifat al-taw   . Based on this, a concept 
such as uṣ l al-taw īd c n be identified in cert in texts of the time. In his introduction to his 
work A       -   ‟  , Al-Jaṣṣāṣ uses this concept to refer to ―signific nt topics of   „  f   
al-taw    that everyone should know‖. Unfortunately, although the main text of this work is 
available, there are no known extant texts of his introduction.
128
 Before al-Jaṣṣāṣ,  l-Qāsim 
b. Ibrāhim  l-R ssī devoted   tre tise to U      -„    wa-al-taw   , in which he uses the 
concept of uṣ l to refer to the agreed upon components of the sources of truth. According to 
him, ‗ ql, kitāb,  nd the reports from the prophet have an aspect of convergence through 
ijmā‗ th t constitutes uṣ l,  nd a divergent part, constituting of fur ‗ which should be 
regulated by uṣ l. In other words, al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm  rgues th t ijmā‗ must be the litmus 
test to distinguish primary components from secondary components. The primary 
components are those m tters of  greement upon which ijmā‗ occurred.129 This distinction 
between uṣ l  nd fur ‗ and the claim of ev lu ting fur ‗ based on uṣ l is the most cruci l 
                                                 
127
 al-Malaṭī,   -T       I, 30.  
128
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factor for understanding the origins of the concept of uṣ l  nd why it bec me the n me of the 
science of uṣ l  l-fiqh. This idea was circulating in the late second and early third centuries 
as an important proposal of reason-based theologians and scholars for establishing 
normativity and minimizing disagreements as opposed to the proposal of ahl al-  dīth th t 
argues for independent authority of the transmitted reports of reliable narrators over all other 
sources.      
c. Uṣ     -Futya/Uṣ     -Fiqh 
Thirdly, the term u    was used in relation to fiqh in the form of u    al-fiqh or u    
  -f     referring to the fundamental topics of fiqh such as prayer and alms giving (     ), or 
to certain common and distinct aspects and/or maxims among these rulings. Ibn  l-N dīm, 
for instance, uses uṣ l al-fiqh to refer to certain topics of fiqh when he attributes certain texts 
to scholars.
130
 Ab  Y suf uses this phrase together after mentioning ablution (wuḍ ‟) and 
sitting in prayer (tashahhud) in the sense of well-known topics of fiqh and al-Shāfi‗ī cites 
Ab  Y suf in his al-Umm.131 The Mālikī schol r Mu ammad b. al- ārith  l-Khush nī 
(         wrote   book with the title ―u      -f     f  f    „            M    ‖ in which he 
tries to show common and differing aspects within certain topics in fiqh, a pursuit which later 
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became a distinct genre called f     or   -       wa-al-na  ‟  .132 Even though these uses 
of uṣ l in rel tion to fiqh were not referring to ―theoretic l discussions on the sources of 
fiqh‖, they did ent il the gener l  ppro ch of re son-based scholars in distinguishing primary 
components from the secondary ones and the relation of dependence between them. Also, it 
should be mentioned th t  l-Jā i ‘s lost work K     u      -f     wa-al-a     did include 
certain main topics of uṣ l  l-fiqh such as the direct causes of disagreements in the details of 
fiqh. The contribution of  l-Jā i  to the development of the concept of uṣ l will be  n lyzed 
below.   
d. Uṣ     -Sunna 
The last use of uṣ l in the religious sciences of Islam during the gap period was u    
al-sunna. The term sunna was probably one of the main multivalent terms of the time that 
underwent different stages and was fixed with the authority of the prophet in religion and the 
reports representing this authority. The term uṣ l al-sunna, therefore, was used by the 
traditionalists of the gap period. However, this use, as opposed to what one might suppose, 
was also unrelated to the later use of uṣ l  l-  dīth which means the science dealing with the 
methods and principles of   dīth criticism. Uṣ l  l-sunna appears to have been used by the 
traditionalists in the sense of theoretical principles of religion combined with topics related to 
belief that are filtered through the normativity apprehended via chained reports. This sense 
was an alternative to the use of uṣ l  l-dīn  nd uṣ l  l-taw īd by their  dversaries, who were 
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mostly Mu‗t zil   nd Murji‘ . The first known work with a title using the phrase u    
al-sunna is  ttributed to Ab  B kr  l- um ydī (    834), who was known  s the pupil of 
Sufyān b. Uy yn   nd the te cher of  l-Bukhārī.133 In his treatise, al- um ydī covers the 
following topics: belief (    ) in predestination (qadar), increase and decrease in belief, 
respect for all of the companions, the nature of the Quran as the word of God, the vision of 
God in the hereafter, the proof of the  ttributes of God, the difference between  hl  l-sunn  
 nd  l-kh wārij on the excommunication of a major sinner, the pillars of Islam and the 
situation of abandoning them, and theologic l opinions of Sufyān b. Uy yn  on the nature of 
the Quran and belief. B sed on its content  nd the f ct th t this tre tise follows  l-Hum ydī‘s 
al-Musnad, it is clear that by uṣ l  l-sunna al- um ydī refers to ―the most signific nt topics 
of belief thorough the lens of tr nsmitted reports.‖ 
The second work on uṣ l  l-sunna is attributed to the famous traditionalist A mad b. 
 anbal. Even though he does not provide a definition for the term, the components in his 
description of uṣ l  l-sunna clearly refer to the main theoretical principles in religion 
according to ahl al-  dīth, according to his understanding. A mad b.  anbal states that 
―according to us, the principles of the sunna (u      -sunna) are:  
 Adhering to the practice and the way of the companions of the prophet and 
following them.  
 Abstaining from innovation (bid„a) which is aberration (ḍ     ), and from debating 
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in the matters of religion.  
 The sunna that entails the signs of the Quran explains the Quran  
 There is no qiyās in sunna as it cannot be used a source of analogy, [since] there is 
no role to reason, or personal desire, because it [sunna] is just something to be 
obeyed and for which personal desire should be put aside. 
 It is from the necessary sunna to believe in destination (qadar) both its evil and 
good and to confirm the reports about it. If one does not accept or believe all these 
reports, one does not deserve to be associated with sunna.  
 This belief should be without asking why and how. And confirming belief-related 
reports is enough for those who do not know the explanation of reports and cannot 
grasp them. They are only obliged to confirm these reports such as those about 
predestination or vision of God (  ‟    A    ).  
 One cannot reject even a letter of a report as long as it is transmitted by reliable 
narrators, regardless of the text of the report being appaling.  
 It is condemned  nd prohibited to deb te or to le rn di lectics of k lām for these 
topics (predestination, the vision of God, and the Quran). 
 One cannot be from ahl al-sunna unless one believes in reports and refrains from 
dialectics.‖134  
This quotation clearly indicates that what Ahmad b.  anbal meant by uṣ l  l-sunna 
was not about   dīth criticism  nd not limited to the realm of belief; rather, it was used to 
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refer to theoretical principles of religion based upon the acceptance of transmitted reports as 
the overarching principle. It is a known fact that the Mu‗tazila named themselves ahl 
al-taw    wa-al-„adl and ahl al-  dīth  lso referred themselves as ahl al-sunna, as well. It 
should not be a coincidence that these two concepts were also the most salient aspects of 
religion according to these groups respectively. It seems to have been one of the few 
agreements between the two camps that the realm of faith is more significant than other 
components of religion to the extent that in this field believers should not disagree. This is 
why we see such emphasis on belief-related topics. Ibn Qutayba (276/889), a well-known 
member of ahl al-  dīth,  rticul tes this cle rly by emphasizing that ―fiqh is a field in which 
disagreements are permissible, but the dis greements of  hl  l-k lām f ll into the re lm of 
belief (taw   ), the attributes of God (  f  ), and alike about which even a prophet would not 
know anything without revelation.‖135   
Ibn Baṭṭa al-‗Ukb rī (    997), a   nb lī contempor ry of  l-Jaṣṣāṣ, wrote a book 
known by its abbreviated title   -I       -      . However, the full title is al-Shar  
wa-al-      „ala u      -sunna wa-al-      .136 Ibn Baṭṭa explains in his introduction to the 
book that his reason for writing it is the increase of disagreements based on predilections and 
innovations and the need for adherence to sunna, as represented by transmitted reports, to 
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prevent these disagreements.
137
 He also describes the content of the work, in which, as he 
hints by using the term uṣ l in the title, he identifies the agreed upon (    „   -a‟imma) 
topics that every Muslim necessarily has to know about and follow in order to be considered 
belonging to ahl al-sunna. After introducing the necessity of following the sunna that is 
embodied in reports, Ibn Batṭṭa first presents belief (     ) topics and then ethico-legal (fiqh 
and adab) topics with a sub-section beginning with the phr se ―it is from sunn  th t‖ (min 
al-sunna). He ends the book with a section dealing with the things that are bid„a (innovation). 
Ibn Baṭṭa uses sunna as the opposite of bid„a throughout the work.  
Ibn Abī Z m n yn (         ,   l te And lusi n-Mālikī contempor ry of  l-Jaṣṣāṣ, 
wrote the last known work with the phrase uṣ l  l-sunna in its title during the gap period.138 
This work examines the belief-related topics and the problem of       from the perspective 
of ahl al-  dīth b sed on reports.   
Among these four uses of the concept of uṣ l in the intellectual disciplines of Islam, 
the use closest to the topics of later uṣ l al-fiqh was obviously in the sense of sources of 
religion, and is related to the concepts of uṣ l  l-dīn  nd uṣ l al-taw īd. According to this use, 
the uṣ l constitute the foundations of religion and the sources one should consult to verify 
anything subordinate in religion (f   „). It was with this meaning that uṣ l al-fiqh emerged as 
a distinct topic of study. Together with uṣ l,  ujja (pl.  ujaj),       (pl. adilla),        (pl. 
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       ), and       (pl. ṭuruq) were also used to refer to these sources both during and after 
the gap period. The fourth section will identify how these terms were used during the gap 
period and why the term uṣ l became the most prevalent among them. In the following 
section, however, I will trace the transition from uṣ l  s   concept encomp ssing sources of 
normativity to uṣ l  l-fiqh as a field of religious science. This transition was manifested in 
the discussions surrounding the dichotomy of a l (fundamental) versus far„ (subordinate).  
3. Transition from Uṣ       ṣ     -Fiqh 
One of the earliest sources that mention this dichotomy of a l versus far„ is Ab  
Y suf‘s K       -      . Ab  Y suf gives two example cases: whether one eats from the 
crops that his field produced in an amount reaching five wasaq (an amount equivalent to 300 
  „, which is equal to about 850 kilograms), or a thief steals that amount from the crops, one 
still is obliged to pay one tenth of the rem ining p rt  s z kāt if the crops are watered 
naturally, or half of th t  s z kāt if the owner made an extra effort or paid for watering. Ab  
Y suf concludes th t ―these  re the fundamental (u   ) cases and subordinate (f   „) cases 
 re to be solved b sed on them‖139 
In  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s l ngu ge, uṣ l was not a common word and uṣ l  l-fiqh  s   phr se 
does not  ppe r even once, except when he cites Ab  Y suf, which was mentioned above.  
The dichotomy between u    and f   „ appears in   -R      only when  l-Shāfi‗ī defines 
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  -       s follows  ― l-b yān is   noun th t ent ils both joining fundamental meanings and 
disjoining subordinate meanings‖ [ismun     „un li-ma„  i mujtami„a al-u  l wa 
mutasha  iba al-fur ‘].140 
One of the most relevant examples of this dichotomy between a l and far„ and its 
relations with uṣ l and fiqh can be seen in the works of  l-Jā i  (255/869) who makes a 
distinction between the science of ruling („      -f     i.e. fiqh) and the science of theology 
 „      -     ). According to  l-Jā i , k lām is fund ment l (a l) and fiqh is subordinate 
(far‗ . The theologians, he claims, learned this subordinate science as well, in order to 
combine a l and f  „ together and out of caution, so that they could avoid any deficiency in 
the study of theology.
141
 
Al-Jā i  was an important scholar for the early development of the concept of uṣ l 
al-fiqh. According to the available data of this research, he was among the earliest persons 
who used the concept of uṣ l encompassing certain topics of uṣ l al-fiqh in his work K     
u      -f     wa-al-a    . He describes his work as a book ―that collected divergent views 
on the principles of legal opinions (     al-f    ), which lead to differences in subordinate 
rulings (f   „) and conflicting specific rulings (a    )”142 Unfortunately, the entire text of  
K     u      -f     wa-al-a     has not yet been discovered; however, this quotation from 
the letter he wrote to Ibn Abī Du‘ād (240/854), the vizier of the time, suffices to prove three 
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signific nt f cts. First,  l-Jā iz uses the concept of uṣ l in the sense of principles. Second, he 
identifies that subordinate rulings (fur ‗  and theoretical principles (uṣ l  have a direct 
relationship. Third, he argues that it was this relationship which was the cause of 
disagreements in the realm of f     (legal opinion) and  ukm (legal valuation). The fourth 
and probably the most import nt f ct is th t  l-Jā i  claims that he collected the different 
approaches and opinions in uṣ l  l-futyā, which me ns there h d been enough discussions to 
be collected before  l-Jā i  wrote this book.  
The preserved cit tions from  l-Jā i ‘s K     u      -f     wa-al-a     in the later 
literature provide us sufficient data to show that certain topics of uṣ l al-fiqh were certainly 
discused in the book, and one of the contributors to these topics w s  l-Jā i ‘s te cher 
al-Na  ām, whose opinions  re  n lyzed in the subsequent chapters. These topics included 
reliability of reports, the authority of qiyās, ijmā‗, and the opinion of a companion.143 
However, it is not clear whether  l-Jā i  discusses these topics at the theoretical level; 
according to the preserved citations, he instead gives long quotations from al-Na  ām. It is 
unfortunate that very little of his own voice can be identified in the preserved citations from 
K     u      -f     wa-al-a    .  
It seems that during the fourth century after  ijra, the phrase uṣ l al-fiqh was still 
being used by many in its second meaning, namely, those fundamental topics of fiqh upon 
which secondary rulings are based. Ab  J ‗far al-Na  ās (     5   mentions     dīth on 
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stoning (rajm) as an aṣl of uṣ l al-fiqh.144 Ibn Abī Z yd  l-Q yr wānī (         describes 
his famous treatise of fiqh as containing uṣ l al-fiqh.145 Both scholars are using the term in 
the sense of certain significant evidence or rulings directly restricted to fiqh topics, rather 
than a theoretical discussion on the sources and methods of deriving rulings. 
Ab   l-  s n  l-K rkhī (340/951), the famous   n fī schol r, is known for his 
contribution to the topics of uṣ l in the   n fī school. His opinions  re extensively cited in 
the later literature, especially in  l-J ṣṣāṣ‘s al-Fu     nd Ab   l- usayn al-Baṣrī‘s 
al-M „     . One treatise attributed to him has the title al-U   . However, this treatise 
includes legal maxims (    „id) of the   n fī school, r ther th n theoretic l discussions of 
uṣ l  l-fiqh.146 This demonstrates that the concept of uṣ l w s used in the sense of m xims 
and was not solidified as uṣ l  l-fiqh even in the language of a well-known uṣ lī schol r of 
the first h lf of the fourth hijrī century.  
The shift from a more general discussion of sources of normativity to the restricted 
understanding of uṣ l  l-fiqh as a religious science seems to have occurred in the fourth/tenth 
century. In addition to al-Jaṣṣās, for inst nce, in his celebrated work M f     al-„    , 
written in the same century,  l-Kh wārizmī (         defines uṣ l  l-fiqh as the sources of 
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fiqh, such as the kitāb, sunn ,  nd ijmā‗.147 However, Ab  al- usayn al-Baṣrī (          
provides a clearer explanation of this shift. He first remarks that he will discern the topics of 
uṣ l al-fiqh according to the jurists (f     ‟  from the topics of k lām. This was opposed to 
the use of the term by his te cher Qāḍī ‗Abd  l-J bbār, who frequently included the topics of 
k lām in his „U   . Again he carefully defines fiqh in the technical vocabulary of the jurists 
 s ―the body of sciences on the v lu tions of sh rī‗  (            -„              
    „     .‖ His analysis of uṣ l and uṣ l al-fiqh is more important for our discussion: 
As for uṣ l, it literally means what another thing is based upon and what it is 
extended from. As regards uṣ l al-fiqh, it literally means the things that fiqh 
branches out into such as taw īd, ‗ dl, proofs of fiqh  however, in the l ngu ge of 
jurists it means the reasoning on the sources of fiqh (ṭuruq al-fiqh [as       and 
     ]) in a theoretical manner („    ṭ       -     ), regarding how to infer rulings 
from them (       l) and the subordinate tools needed for this inference. If it is asked 
‗why did you restrict [u   ] to what you said and did not include other things [that 
fiqh is established upon] ‘, we would respond by s ying th t there is no doubt that 
in the language of jurists uṣ l means the theoretical sources (al-ṭuruq al-mujmala) 
and how to infer rulings from them, because they do not include other things among 
the uṣ l for fiqh even if those can generate fiqh such as [the principles of] the 
oneness of God (taw   ), justice (al-„   ), prophethood (  -        ), as well as 
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the particular proofs of fiqh (adillat al-fiqh al-mufa  ala).148  
It seems that the jurists of the fourth/tenth century turned all these theoretical 
discussions about the sources of authority into an independent field of religious science for 
their specific purposes and tried to define this newly emerged religious science through their 
own conceptual restrictions. Even theologians who had been working with the same 
theoretical topics had to come to terms with these restrictions, and came to identify this field 
with fiqh. However, discursive topics of uṣ l  l-fiqh mixed with k lām, t fsīr,   dīth, m ntiq, 
and language remained in the literature, and a constant critique of some scholars who tried to 
restrict uṣ l  l-fiqh to the realm of fiqh can be observed throughout history.  The following 
section will complete the discussion of the conceptual development of uṣ l  nd uṣ l  l-fiqh 
with an investigation of the development of the theory of sources under the rubric of uṣ l.  
4. The Development of the Theory of Sources  
Another important factor in revealing the early conceptual development of uṣ l 
al-fiqh is to trace back the formation of the theory of sources. By the theory of sources, I 
mean various sets of sources suggested as the sources of religion by different scholars. These 
sources were fixed l ter in Sunnī leg l theory with four fund ment l sources  nd other 
secondary sources in varying numbers. The overarching idea of identifying authoritative 
sources for the claims of normative beliefs, rulings, and pieties paved the way for the 
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scientific discipline of uṣ l  l-fiqh. The significant part of this topic for our discussion in this 
chapter is that the scholars of the gap period referred to these sources with diverse concepts 
in the early stages of the gap period, but they increasingly adopted the concept of uṣ l for 
these sources in the later stages of the gap period. This section traces the attempts to identify 
various sources of authority throughout the gap period by reve ling schol rs‘ opinions during 
the period on the sources of religion. The chronological examination of these ideas will 
reveal both the transformation of ideas about sources of authority during the gap period, and 
also some of the diverse suggestions for authoritative sources which appeared during the gap 
period, before the sources were fixed to four in Sunnī leg l theory. 
Ab  Hilāl  l-‗Ask rī (  5    5  mentions Wāṣil b. Aṭā‘ (          s the first person 
who s id th t ―the truth (al- aqq) is known through four ways (     )  The pre ching kitāb, 
the  greed upon report, the evidence of re son,  nd ijmā‗.‖149 He is also reported to have 
been the first person who divided reports into categories such as sa    and f    , and       
and „   .  
Al-Shāfi‗ī uses the concept jihat al-„ilm referring to the sources that discern   lāl 
from   rām. According to him, al-khabar (tr nsmission  in the kitāb  nd sunn , ijmā‗,  nd 
qiyās constitute „ilm, and these are used to claim the permissibility or prohibition of 
something.
150
 Even though al-Shāfi‗ī did mention qiyās  nd ijmā‗ among the four ways 
through which the knowledge of       (permissible) and       (prohibited) can be derived, 
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it took well over three more centuries to solidify the four fundamental sources of law in 
Sunnī leg l theory  s the kitāb, the sunn , ijmā,  nd qiyās.  
Al-Jā i  mentions th t ―an agreement of a local place does not establish       
(permission) or       (prohibition). Permission or prohibition can be known only through 
the pre ching kitāb (  -        -  ṭiq), agreed upon sunna (al-sunna al-mujma„ „alayha), 
correct reasoning (al-„     al- a    ) and accurate analogies (  -          -mu    ).‖151 
Al-Jā i  mentions these sources in a slightly different manner when he argues for the 
permissibility of eating uromastyx (a dabb lizard)  ―A thing c nnot be prohibited (al-    ‟u 
      arram                 ) unless through the way of the kitāb, or ijmā‗, or r tion l 
evidence ( ujjat „aqlin), or analogy (        -     ) to the original case (a l) that exists the 
kitāb or ijmā‗.‖152 Elsewhere in K       -       , he gives a similar list among the sources 
that he relies on for his discussion of the permissibility of eating elephant, including the 
―pre ching kitāb (Quran), true report (al-khabar al-     ), known reports (  -      
al-ma„  f ), parables (  -         -maḍ    ), and correct experiences (  -        
al- a    ).‖153  
Al- ārith al-Mu āsibī (     5   points out certain sources several times in his extant 
works. Even though he usually does not use a specific term, he considers them the 
authoritative sources on which one should rely and with which one should not contradict. He 
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denotes the words hujja and a l to refer to these sources in two instances. He once lists out 
the sources of his evidence as ―the kitāb, the sunn , ijmā‗  l-umma or apparent derivation or 
qiyās for the m tters in which the  pplic tion of qiyās is permissible when there is no b yān 
in the text.‖154  He also claims that his adversaries (i.e. the Mu‗t zīlīs   re in contr diction 
with the following three sources ―the kitāb, the sunn   nd ijmā‗ of the  ges from the first 
generations and later generations.‖155 Elsewhere al- ārith al-Mu āsibī criticizes  n opinion 
contr ry to ―t        , and the sunna, and the practice of the great companions and of all the 
successors who came after them.‖156 He also indicates that when one cannot find a solution 
for something ―one should go b ck to the kitāb  nd sunn   nd those who  re sincere. If one 
still cannot reveal the solutions, one should take the opinion of someone whom one trusts 
regarding his piety  nd re son.‖157 In all these instances al-Mu āsibī does not denote a 
specific term for the sources, he just lists them out and states that one should not contradict 
them. 
Al- ārith al-Mu āsibī indic tes the role of the comp nions  nd the successors  s 
follows  ―This is our evidence (hujja) from the kitāb,  nd the sunn ,  nd from the pr ctice of 
the great companions of the prophet. The successors whom we are supposed to imitate and to 
derive from also were like that. They were those whom Allah ordained that we obey in his 
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verse ‗Obey All h  nd his messenger  nd ulu‘l- mr from you.‘158 They were the companions 
of the prophet Mu ammad and those who came after them who were sincere and eminent 
schol rs.‖159 Elsewhere al- ārith al-Mu āsibī uses the term aṣl when he n rr tes from Ab  
al-‗ liy   l-Riyā ī (90/708) th t ―the root of true p th (a     -        ) is in three things: the 
kitāb, the sunn ,  nd sticking to the j mā‗ ‖160  
Abu Ubayd al-Qasim b. Sallam (224/838-39) is reported to have used the term uṣ l 
referring to the sources of law in the following statement: 
The sources of legal rulings (u    al-a   m) that a qāḍī should not contradict by 
following other sources  re  the kitāb, the sunna, and what the great jurists and 
righteous people have adjuged based on consensus and ijtihād. There is no fourth 
source. Ijtihād, according to us, means choosing from these opinions if they differ or 
conflict.
161
 
The Z ydī schol r al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm  l-R ssī (    860) mentions four fundamental 
sources ( ujja / hujaj) as al-„    for the knowledge of m ‗b d (the worshipped one, i.e. God) 
 nd through ‗ ql following two sources c n be known, al-      for the knowledge of 
t ‗ bbud (the belief of worship), al-      for the knowledge of ‗ibād  (the ritual of worship), 
and al-    ‗ comprising  ll three previous sources. He assigns a l and far„ for the first three 
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sources in the sense of having prim ry  nd second ry components decided by ijmā‗.162 
Another Z ydī Imām Y  yā b.  l- us yn  l-Hādī ilā  l- aqq (298/911) uses again 
the word wajh (way) for the source and haqq (truth) for the purpose to be derived from the 
source  ―Know th t the truth c n be known only through three ways: the preaching book 
(kitabu       ), the consensus of the umma about what they transmit from the sunna of the 
prophet who brought it from God, and the thing that reason („    „    ) explicates, confirms, 
infers its truth  nd demonstr tes its right.‖163  
Al-Qādī al-Nu‗mān states the following concerning the sources of rulings  ―…for this 
matter, we did not find in the book of Allah any prohibition, and we took the problem to the 
sunna of the prophet. When we did not find any report among people, we took it to the ones 
whom Allah ordained us to follow. Then we found that Mu ammad al-Bāqir (115/732) 
prohibited it.‖164 
Al-Qādī al-Nu‗mān narrates from Mu  mm d b. Dāw d (297/910) that he 
mentioned  ―For me or  ny schol r, it is not right to s y that something is permissible or 
prohibited or to give one‘s right to  nother unless he finds evidence in the texts of the kitāb, 
or the sunna of the prophet, or ijmā‗, or   binding report… A mufti should not issue   f tw  
unless he knows the kitāb with its  brog ting  nd  brog ted texts, gener l  nd specific texts, 
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obligatory and recommended rulings; also he needs to be knowledgeable of the sunan 
[rulings] of the prophet and the opinions of the earlier and present scholars (ahl al-‗ilm    nd 
of Ar bic l ngu ge to be  ble to identify similitudes  nd to comprehend qiyās. ‖165  
Ab   l-‗Abbāṣ b. Al-Qāṣ is reported to h ve m de the following st tement   ―the 
sources (al-u   ) are seven: intuition (al- iss), reason (al-„    , the kitāb, the sunn , ijmā‗, 
exemplary comparison (al-„    ) and language (al-lugha).166 
From the Mālikīs, Ab  ‗Ub yd  l-Jub yrī (         in his al-Tawassut, which was 
written upon the request of al-Hakam al-Mustanṣir (ruled between 350-366), made the 
following st tement  ―If there is no text in the kitāb, sunn , the  greement of the umm ,  nd 
the consensus of M dīn , al-„     should be deployed, which is comparing the new case [to 
the old case] due to [the common effective cause/aspect] that determined the ruling of the old 
case‖.167 
B. A Comparison between   -R      and   -F      
A comparison between the first extant work in uṣ l  l-fiqh, al-Shāfi‗ī‘s al-R     , 
and the second extant work, al-Jaṣṣāṣ‘s al-Fu    f -al-u    is necessary for our study 
focusing on the gap between these two works. Such a comparison will give us a useful 
starting point for the larger research on what exactly happened during this period in 
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terms of which topics continued to be discussed and which new topics had been added. 
Comparing   -R      and   -F     could be an independent dissertation topic itself. 
Therefore, this comparison will be relatively short, and will focus on the most relevant 
aspects to the broader topic of this dissertation.  
In this chapter, we will first examine the categorization and topics of the two 
works, then look at the methods that they follow. However, the main purpose of this 
examination will be to discuss the content of these works pertaining to the major 
theoretical debates of the time, which are on hermeneutical tools, i.e. general (amm) and 
specific (khass) texts and the theory of naskh; Qiyās, ijtihād and istihsan; prophetic 
exemplar (sunna) in particular and reports in general; and finally the theory of consensus 
(    ʿ). In conclusion, we will try to relate the results of this comparison to our broader 
research.  
1. Categorization and Topics 
Al-Shāfi‗ī‘s   -R      consists of 3 parts and is divided into 55 chapters.168 The 
classification of the chapters in   -R      differs than the standards later, mature works 
in the literature of uṣ l al-fiqh. Al-Shāfi‗ī begins his tre tise with al-      and its 
classifications [1-6]. Then he deals with general and specific texts („   -     ) and the 
function of sunna in the specification of general Quranic texts [7-11]. The following 
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three chapters are devoted to the authority of sunna as an independent and explanatory 
source [12-14]. Shāfi‗ī then discusses abrogation (naskh), sample cases and the function 
of sunna in abrogation [15-18]. In the last chapters of the first part and first two chapters 
of the second part [19-28] al-Shāfi‗ī examines na   (manifest) texts in the Quran and 
sunna, and jumal/mujmal (unelaborated) texts and the function of sunna in explaining 
them. After discussing various hermeneutic problems in   dīth including abrogation 
within   dīths, and his methodology in interpreting seemingly contradicting   dīths  nd 
ex mple c ses, [  -    Shāfi‗ī presents his epistemology [     s  n introduction to his 
discussion of the value of solitary reports, which occurs in the following chapter. The 
examination of solitary reports (khabar al-     ) constitutes the longest topic of the 
treatise. In it al-Shāfi‗ī defends the authority of khabar al-wā id and his conditions for 
accepting a certain report in the form of theoretical debate with an interlocutor [45-46]. 
This is the last section with a title in the original manuscript; the following nine chapters 
were entitled by either the commentator of   -R     , Ibn J mā‗ , or the editor, Ahm d 
Muhāmm d Shākir, b sed on the content of the ch pters. After mentioning his critiques 
of the vaguely used concept of ijmā‗ and his stance regarding it [47], al-Shāfi‗ī de ls 
with qiyās  nd ijtihād in the following chapters [48-49] where he explains the authority 
of qiyās  nd equ tes ijtihād with qiyās. This is followed by the refutation of isti sān  s   
kind of ijtihād [50]. Following his discussion on ijtihād, al-Shāfi‗ī responds to his 
interlocutors‘ questions reg rding leg l dis greements  nd how to  ppro ch them in 
three chapters along with sample cases [51-53] in which al-Shāfi‗ī divides dis greements 
into prohibited disagreements, where obvious evidence exists in the Quran and sunna; 
and permissible disagreements, where there is not such obvious evidence. Then, after 
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clarifying his point of view concerning the disagreements of the companions where he 
argues that one should not make an ijtihād outside of these disagreements [54], al-Shāfi‗ī 
ends his treatise with a discussion on the hierarchy of the four fund ment l sources, 
kitāb, sunna, ijmā‗  nd qiyās [55].  
Al-J ṣṣāṣ‘s   -F     f -al-u    written approximately 150 years later consists of 
four parts and is divided into 105 chapters that have detailed subchapters and are longer 
than those of   -R     .169 Al-J ṣṣāṣ begins his work with the linguistic ex mination of 
the aspects of the Quranic text. He first discusses general and specific texts („    and 
     ). Then he continues with the various ways of specifications, elaborated (mufassar) 
and unelaborated (mujmal) texts, real and metaphorical meanings, and definitive 
(mu kam) and obscure (m      bih) texts. In this part al-J ṣṣāṣ  lso mentions more 
specific tools such as the function of the negation particle ( arf al-nafy) and deals with 
several specific theoretical problems within the aforementioned topics that were, 
apparently, being discussed during his time [1-21]. The second part continues the 
discussion about texts, other kinds of classifications related to them and hermeneutic 
tools. Al-J ṣṣāṣ next begins with the definition, classification and aspects of al-b    , 
which was the core topic in   -R      [22-26]. Then he deals with the definitions and 
related theoretical problems related to command (amr) and prohibition (nahy) [27-33], 
which is followed by a detailed discussion of abrogation (naskh) and relevant problems 
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such as abrogation of the Quran by sunna which was also an important problem 
discussed in   -R      [34-44]. In the third part, after a brief discussion on the authority 
of the laws of earlier prophets [45], al-J ṣṣāṣ presents a long examination on solitary 
reports (       al- had) like al-Shāfi‗ī does in   -R     . We see more technical 
problems in accepting and classifying solitary reports, and a summary of the various 
approaches of the earlier scholars in al-J ṣṣāṣ‘s ex min tion [46-58]. He then devotes 
four chapters [59-62] to the practices of the prophet, the classification of sunna as farḍ 
(obligation),   jib (requirement) and nadb (recommendation), and on the problem of 
whether the prophet engaged in ijtihād. After briefly mentioning the well-known  
problem of the value of things before revelation, which was also a theological problem 
[63], al-J ṣṣāṣ goes on with his theory of ijmā‗ with significant details on specific cases 
regarding ijmā‗ and refutes sever l ijmā‗ claims in the subsequent chapters [64-76]. 
After accepting and discussing the theory of imitating the opinion of companions [77], 
al-Jaṣṣāṣ ch mpions re son (   ar) over imitation (     d) in general by confronting the 
Zāhirī Daw d b. ‗Ali in the following chapter [78]. The third part ends with a discussion 
on the denier (n f ) of a ruling (    ) and debates whether he needs to provide evidence 
for his denial [79]. Apparently, this discussion addresses a method in legal theoretical 
debates. The last part of the book begins with the authority of qiyās  nd ijtihād in which 
al-J ṣṣāṣ strongly criticizes  āhiri  rguments  g inst qiyās  nd ijtihād. Then he 
continues with the classific tion  nd  spects of qiyās [80-95], which is followed by two 
ch pters [  -    on defending isti sān  nd its definition. After mentioning the 
specification of the effective causes of rulings („       -a kam) in two chapters [98-99], 
al-J ṣṣāṣ ends his manuscript with a discussion on the mujt hid‘s st tus, conditions for 
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being a mujtahid and whether every ijtihād is correct [100-105].  
This comparison on the topics of the two works shows us that the following major 
topics continued to constitute the main discussions within the discourse on legal theory:  
 Hermeneutics of the Quran, especi lly ‗āmm (general) and khāṣṣ (specific  
texts, specific tion of   gener l text, comm nd  nd prohibition, el bor ted  nd 
unel bor ted texts, b yān,  nd  brog tion (naskh).  
 Sunna-  dīth and its function, solitary reports and the conditions to accept 
them. 
 Qiyās, ijtihād  nd isti sān. 
 Ijmā‗ 
In addition to the technical depth added to the topics above, al-J ṣṣāṣ‘s work 
includes the following new significant topics: 
 Al-Shāfi‗ī‘s discussion on n ṣṣ and jumal is transformed to mufassar and 
mujmal.  
 The topics on mu kam and mut shābih.  
 More det iled cl ssific tion of   kām  s f rḍ, wājib  nd m nd b. 
 The discussion of t qlīd and its refutation.   
 The topic of the denier of a  ukm. 
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2. Method 
Al-Shāfi‗ī usu lly does not give the definition of a concept at the beginning of a 
topic; instead he clarifies his stance based on relevant examples from the Quran or sunna. 
Al-J ṣṣāṣ usually begins with a definition; however, he also tends to base his discussion 
on examples. This type of example-based writing can be characterized as the method of 
the jurists (f     )  ccording to Ibn Kh ld n‘s c tegoriz tion of the genre of uṣ l 
al-fiqh.   
Both al-Shāfi‗ī and al-J ṣṣāṣ present their ideas through the use of dialectical 
debates with an interlocutor in their work; however, al-Shāfi‗ī uses this method more 
than al-J ṣṣāṣ. Al-J ṣṣāṣ usu lly cl rifies his theoretic l st nce first in det il,  nd then 
engages in possible critiques against his points. Al-Shāfi‗ī uses this mode embedded with 
his theoretical opinions. Some of these debates can even be seen as hypothetical; 
however, most of them have clear evidence reflecting actual debates. This mode of 
writing in legal theory will be examined later in our research, as well as its significance 
in understanding the formation of uṣ l al-fiqh.  
Al-J ṣṣāṣ frequently cites e rlier schol rship.  ‗Isā b. Abān (         and Ab  
  s n  l-K rkhī (     5    re the authors he cites most frequently from the   n fī 
school, and al-J ṣṣāṣ refers to them by the term ―        ‖ (our fellow scholars). He 
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also responds to and criticizes earlier scholars including al-Shāfi‗ī himself.170 Al-Shāfi‗ī 
does not mention any name; however, he presents his thoughts usually within a 
dialectical debate, in which his interlocutor seems to belong to ‗Irāqī K fī circles. 
Al-Shāfi‗ī uses some general titles when he wants to support his opinion such as people 
of knowledge (ahl al-„   ).171  
3. Content 
Both works are described in rel tion to the ―the me nings of the Quran‖ and the 
authoritative sources. According to a report at the beginning of   -R     , al-Shāfi‗ī 
wrote his tre tise upon the request of Abd  l-R hmān b. M hdī who  sked him to write   
book that explains  ―the me nings of the Quran, the authority of  khbār  nd conditions to 
accept them, the authority of ijmā‗,  nd  brog ting  nd  brog ted texts from the Quran 
 nd sunn .‖ At the very beginning of his work, Al-J ṣṣāṣ explicitly st tes th t ―uṣ l 
al-fiqh includes the knowledge of methods of deduction for the meanings of the Quran, 
extraction of its proofs, valuations of its texts and the functions of the Arabic language, 
linguistic nouns, and legal-religious (sh r„ ) phrases on it.‖172  
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a. Hermeneutics of the Quran  
i. „   -K     
Excluding al-Shāfi‗ī‘s prelimin ry description and categorization of al-b yān in 
the beginning of his treatise, both authors discuss first the general ( „   ) and specific 
(     ) texts. As we will see in a full chapter devoted to the different stages and 
development of this discussion in multiple fields in the 9
th
 and 10
th
 centuries (Chapter 
III , ‗āmm and khāṣṣ occupied the core of hermeneutical debates. Since the strongest 
evidence in debates was usually a text from the Quran, one p rty criticized the other‘s 
Quranic evidence with specification or abrogation claims. Abrogation critiques required 
external evidence such as a report indicating the abrogation, while a specification 
(      s) critique was easier to make. Therefore, scholars tried to establish certain 
principles to prevent arbitrary claims about the specification of a general text. However, 
the topic of ‗āmm and khāṣṣ was broader than that during that time. Some other topics 
about text in uṣ l al-fiqh were discussed under the rubric of ‗āmm and khāṣṣ/takhṣiṣ such 
as literal (  hir) - metaphorical (  ṭin or     z); ambiguous (mujmal or mushkil); and 
certain (      ) - unknown (          ).  
Al-Shāfi‗ī t kes the concepts of general and specific texts for granted and does 
not deal with definitions nor with linguistic explanations in detail, such as we can see in 
the later literature in discussions about certain particles or prepositions that give a phrase 
general meaning. He only points out the linguistic form by using the term      , meaning 
texts that seem general, but are actually specific. He is interested in the general texts 
81 
with which a specific meaning is intended based on evidence from the Quran, sunna and 
Arabic language.
173
 Al-Shāfi‗ī  lso points out the function of specification in revealing 
whether the intended meaning in the text is literal (     ) or metaphorical (  ṭ  ). His 
examples are not necessarily related to legal matters; rather he examines Quranic texts in 
general. For instance, he mentions the verse ―How many a town, that were unjust, have We 
crushed and raised up after them another people!‖174 and says that it is clear that a town, 
in literal sense, cannot be unjust, the intended meaning should be understood to refer to 
the inhabitants of the town.
175
 Another emphasized topic for which al-Shāfi‗ī provides 
several examples is the function of sunna in specification of a Quranic general text.
176
        
Al-J ṣṣāṣ‘s ex min tion of the topic of general and specific texts is much broader 
than that of al-Shāfi‗ī. However, he  lso does not define wh t ‗āmm or khāṣṣ is right at 
the beginning of the discussion; rather, by the same token, he focuses more on the 
conditions of specification and different subcategories within the topic. However, he 
provides definitions when he tries to distinguish mujmal from āmm later.177 The topic of 
‗āmm and khāṣṣ begins with the discussion of literal meaning and metaphorical meaning 
in which he labels literal meaning as the norm.
178
 Instead of  āhir and bāṭin, al-J ṣṣāṣ 
uses h qīqa (literal) and majāz (metaphorical), which became common technical terms 
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for these concepts later in the literature. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ cle rly distinguishes mujmal from 
‗āmm which was somewhat ambiguous and used interchangeably in   -R     . Al-Jaṣṣāṣ 
refers to ‗Isā b. Abān as the one who used these terms synonymously. Al-J ṣṣāṣ divides 
mujmal into two types and describes the first as closer to the meaning of ‗āmm, while the 
second means a general text that cannot be used in its general meaning because it needs 
clarification for its intended me ning in sh rī‗a, which is different from its linguistic 
meaning.
179
    
Al-J ṣṣāṣ discusses the authority (    ) of a general text in detail and mentions 
the earlier disagreements and various opinions within the scholarship.
180
 The first 
opinion, which he says his school supports, accepts a general text with its general 
meaning unless there is an external evidence for specification, while the second opinion 
claims every text should be considered limited to certain units that the meaning entails 
unless there is an external evidence for its generality. The third opinion suspends the 
result until there is evidence both for generality or specificity.
181
 He also includes the 
discussion on whether the text is a command (amr) or a report (khabar).
182
 
Al-J ṣṣāṣ extensively discusses the specification of a general text (takh   ) with 
its different types. He understands specification as a kind of making exception(s) 
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(        ‟) from the scope of the general texts. 183 He also defines specification as 
―expl ining the authority ( ukm) of a certain text.‖ He adds specification of the general 
text by consensus (    „), by rational indication (da    t al-„   )184, by solitary report 
(khabar al-     )185 and by analogy (    s) as other ways of specification in addition to 
what Shāfi‗ī discusses as the specification of general text by the Quran and sunna.186  
Al-J ṣṣāṣ also makes a distinction within sunna based on certainty and distinguishes 
established sunna (al-sunna al-   bita) from solitary report (khabar al-     ).  
Al-J ṣṣāṣ further includes some  ddition l discussions on ‗āmm and khaṣṣ. He 
discusses what the rule (    ) is for the things remaining outside of specification in a 
general text, and he also mentions several earlier opinions on the similarities and 
differences between metaphorical text (    z), exception (        ‟) and specified text.187  
Al-J ṣṣāṣ also devotes a whole chapter to the meanings and functions of conjunction in 
hermeneutics.
188
  
ii. Naskh 
Al-Shāfi‗ī does not define naskh in his al-R      whereas  l-J ṣṣāṣ points out 
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different models scholars have used to explain naskh (naql, ibṭ l, iz lah), then he 
decides that the aforementioned suggestions for naskh should be understood in 
metaphorical terms rather than literally: ―A  ukm cannot be invalidated via naskh; naskh 
is a declaration (bayān) of the temporal validity of a  ukm.‖ Al-J ṣṣāṣ defines naskh as 
―expl ining the dur tion of the first comm nd.‖189 
Al-Shāfi‗ī‘s theory of n skh focuses on the problem of abrogation between the 
Quran and sunna, and he explicitly states that since these two sources are independent 
one cannot abrogate the other. Al-J ṣṣāṣ devotes an independent chapter to the problem 
and states the   n fī st nce th t it is possible for abrogation between the two sources. 
However, he makes a distinction between established sunna via corroborated reports 
(tawatur) and sunna based on solitary report, and only allows an established sunna to 
abrogate the Quranic ruling. A ruling based on solitary report can be abrogated by 
another solitary report or a stronger source (i.e. the Quran or an established sunna). 
Al-J ṣṣāṣ justifies the position of his school by describing sunna as a form of revelation 
(wa y), whether it is wa y matluw (recited revelation) or wa y ghayr matluw 
(non-recited revelation). This later became the main justification within legal theory, 
including among Z hirītes. Accordingly, since Quran and sunna belong to the same 
category, the question of abrogation between them no longer poses a dilemma.  
Al-J ṣṣāṣ deals with newer and more detailed problems regarding naskh. He 
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refutes the rejection of naskh by Jews and some Muslims, whose views, he argues, 
should not be considered important. He discusses different positions on whether a ruling 
can be abrogated by a more difficult ruling and he answers in the affirmative, as opposed 
to some other scholars, by arguing in terms of masla a (utility), and pointing out that 
utility might sometimes be achieved for people through an easier ruling and sometimes 
through a difficult one. He also discusses new questions, such as considering a Quranic 
text abrogated in form, but not its ruling, as in the case of stoning in adultery (rajm) and 
expiation of oaths (  ff       -     ). Al-J ṣṣāṣ also deals with addition in a ruling 
(    da f -al- ukm) and states that if it is not attached to an earlier ruling in the same 
text, it means abrogation. Al-J ṣṣāṣ does not stipulate knowing the chronological order 
of rulings for making a claim of abrogation. He argues that if the order of rulings is not 
known and there is an obvious contradiction between two texts which cannot be 
reconciled without abrogation, the one that is closer to the sources (               
  -    ) should be considered; for instance, the ruling that is applied among Muslims and 
commonly accepted by scholars should be considered as the abrogating rule based on 
ijmā‗. In  ddition to the practice of Muslims,  l-J ṣṣāṣ mentions several principles to 
decide the abrogating rule. If two contradicting texts require either permissibility ( iba a) 
or prohibition (     ), the prohibiting one should be considered the abrogating text. In 
this principle, he follows Ab    s n  l-K rkhī  nd le ves opinion of ‗Isā b. Abān, who 
thinks in that case both texts become useless in terms of ruling and we cannot take one of 
them as abrogating. Another principle is applying analogy and reasoning (     ) to 
determine which is the abrogating text.   
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Al-J ṣṣāṣ‘s ex min tion of n skh constitutes one of the longest discussions in his 
work, which indicates the significant role of naskh in legal theory in the gap period 
between al-Shāfi‗ī and al-J ṣṣāṣ.  
b. Sunna-Ḥ     /Solitary Reports  
Al-Shāfi‗ī‘s emph sis on sunn  in al-R      led some contemporary scholars to 
think that establishing sunna as the only other authoritative source other than the Quran 
was his actual purpose in writing this treatise. It would not be unfair to say that al-Shāfi‗ī 
wanted to emphasize the role of sunna embodied in the chained reports and that this was 
an overarching aspect of his theory; however, al-R      was not limited to this purpose. 
It is even impossible to say that al-Shāfi‗ī was the first scholar emphasizing the role of 
sunna in law. What can be said is that al-Shāfi‗ī‘s work represents a significant effort 
towards giving more space to solitary reports in law. For instance, he seems to take the 
authority of qiyās for granted; however, he devotes one of the longest chapters in his 
treatise to the authority of solitary reports. Both scholars make a distinction between 
established sunna (  -        -   bita) and solitary report (khabar al-   id). The first 
one is seen certain, while the second one falls into probability. Al-J ṣṣāṣ gives a more 
detailed and technical categorization of khabar al-wā id, where he takes the text of the 
report into account. In his more general analysis of khabar al-wā id,  l-J ṣṣāṣ divides 
solitary reports depending on whether they must be understood as providing certain 
knowledge or merely probable knowledge. He mentions the reports of the prophet about 
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his revelation, or the ones confirmed by the prophet or ijmā‗, and witnesses in criminal 
cases (    d) as the examples of the type that establish certain knowledge. 190 He 
discusses khabar al-wā id as it is known in uṣ l discourse under the title of solitary 
reports in religious matters (khabar al-      f -al-      t) where he devotes a long 
chapter to the authority of khabar al-wā id by referencing ‗Isā b. Abān and rejects the 
claim that two narrators at least are required before a report is accepted.
191
 Al-J ṣṣāṣ 
relies heavily on the writings of ‗Isā b. Abān on solitary reports, most probably on 
al-Radd „            -M      wa-al-S  f „  f    -     r.192  
As opposed to most other topics, al-Shāfi‗ī provides a sort of definition of khabar 
al-kh   ah, which is another expression that he uses along with khabar al-     , in the 
beginning  nd s ys  ―It is the report of one person from  nother until it re ches to the 
prophet or someone before the prophet [i.e. to a companion or a successor .‖193  
Al-Shāfi‗ī lists the conditions of a transmitter as follow: He should be reliable in 
his religion; known for honesty in his speech; comprehending the meanings of what he is 
transmitting; should relate   dīth text-based not meaning-based; should have a reliable 
memory or book that he is relating from; should not relate from someone he did not meet 
(mudallith); and should not be in contradiction with those who are known as reliable in 
transmitting from the prophet. All the narrators in a certain chain should carry these 
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conditions.
194
 Then Shāfi‗ī engages in a long discussion about the differences between 
narrators of   dīth and witnesses in law with his interlocutor. In contrast,  l-J ṣṣāṣ 
examines witnesses within the general categorization of khabar al -wā id.195 Al-J ṣṣāṣ 
devotes a chapter to the conditions for accepting a solitary report, which he begins by 
reiterating that the value of a solitary report depends on establishing a probable 
knowledge about the memorization ability and righteousness of its narrators.
196
 Then he 
lists the defective aspects („    ) of reports that necessitate denial of these reports in the 
  n fī School. The first thing he mentions is being in contradiction with the established 
sunna (  -        -   bita) or the Quranic passages that have a clear, definite meaning. 
Then  l-J ṣṣāṣ points out the problem of „   m   -     , the text of a solitary report 
pointing out something that, if it were correct, should reasonably have been expected to 
be known and related by many people.
197
 He also mentions narrators whose practices 
contradict what they narrate
198
 and the narration being contradictory to necessary results 
of reason.
199
 Al-J ṣṣāṣ discusses the role of qiyās and ijtihād in accepting a report as 
well; even though, hierarchically, an authentic solitary report is considered binding 
before qiyās, however, in the process of evaluating the acceptability of a solitary report 
qiyās should be applied. 200  These five criteria regarding the text of a report are 
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considered to be as important as chain critique („    and ḍabt) in early   n fī legal 
theory.   
c.     s, I     d and I   ḥ     
Al-Shāfi‗ī‘s discussion of qiyās focuses on drawing a line in declaring legal 
opinion. Al-Shāfi‗ī strives for a consistent method that is attached to the textual sources 
instead of arbitrary discretion. Hence he sets forth qiyās  s evidenced opinion in sh rī‗a. 
He does not deal in depth with the question of why qiyās is a valid method or with 
refuting arguments against its validity. Most probably, this kind of attack was not that 
common during his time. However,  l-J ṣṣāṣ begins with the issue of authority and 
devotes a significant amount of space to brutally trivializing the arguments against qiyās 
made by  āhirīs, especi lly Dāw d.  
Al-Shāfi‗ī does not give a technical definition of qiyās or ijtihād, rather he 
focuses on equating the two as pointed out frequently by earlier scholars. However, 
through his descriptions, one can understand that al-Shāfi‗ī held the opinion that every 
Muslim jurist is obliged to apply ijtihād in order to express a legal opinion based on 
valid evidence. This is a description of analogy (     );201 therefore, ijtihād is a different 
name for qiyās. 202  Both classical uṣ l scholars and contemporary scholars have 
criticized this explanation because it restricts ijtihād to qiyās. However, a careful 
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analysis of al-Shāfi‗ī‘s use of these terms reveals that al-Shāfi‗ī uses the term qiyās in a 
general sense in such a way that it enlarges the meaning of qiyās to ijtihād. In the second 
and early third centuries, the term qiyās was not used only to mean analogy. Al-Shāfi‗ī‘s 
writings developed in this era, and he describes ijtihād and qiyās as follows: ―ijtihād, that 
is, qiyās, is looking for evidence to reach the correct ruling if there is no direct ruling in 
revelation.‖203 ―Ijtihād cannot be anything but questioning [searching for a ruling]; 
questioning cannot be answered by anything other than evidence, and the evidence is 
qiyās.‖204 
As opposed to al-Shāfi‗ī,  l-J ṣṣāṣ begins his discussion with the definition of key 
terms related to qiyās  d līl, ‗ill  [distinct re son for   ruling , istidlāl, qiyās and ijtihād. 
His aim seems to have been distinguishing these concepts that were used interchangeably 
before clarifying what qiyās is. One of the main developments in his work relates to the 
‗ill . This concept w s described  s m ‘n  in al-Shāfi‗ī, obviously ‗ill  bec me  n 
established term during  l-J ṣṣāṣ‘s time.205 Al-J ṣṣāṣ gives a general definition for qiyās 
as follows  ―qiyās is ruling on something based on its having a sh red ‗ill  with  nother 
ruling‖206  
Al-Shāfi‗ī also deals with the question of whether every ijtihād is correct, though 
not in detail. Basically, he points out that there is subjectivity in ijtihād and makes a 
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distinction between three subjects: the one who applies ijtihād, other scholars, and God. 
According to the one who applies ijtihād, his result is correct, other scholars might or 
might not confirm his result, but God knows who is actually correct.
207
 He discusses the 
topic in ijtihād in terms of what is seen/apparent (     ) and what is unseen (  ṭ  ) and 
says that ijtihād has to establish truth in things where reaching certainty (   ṭa) is 
possible, such as directing oneself toward the k ‗ba in masjid al-haram. However, the 
realm of ijtihād usually deals with uncertainty, which is unseen. In such cases, one is 
only required to exert effort towards determining truth.
208
  Then he continues with the 
case of disagreement caused by ijtihād/qiyās. Al-Shāfi‗ī divides qiyās into two types. In 
the first one there is no dis greement, bec use ―the thing [the ruling in the new case] 
itself is entailed within the meaning (‗illa) of old case [asl], whereas in the second type a 
similar element exists within the old case; therefore, it falls into the realm of 
disagreement.‖209   
Al-J ṣṣāṣ also addresses what al-Shāfi‗ī discussed using the terms    ṭa 
(certainty) and ijtihād regarding matters classified either as  āhir and bāṭin as being two 
distinct types of istidlāl. According to  l-J ṣṣāṣ, the first type of istidlāl f lls into 
‗ qliyy t and establishes „    (certain knowledge); therefore, we are required to 
determine the truth in this realm. The second type, however, requires only ghalabat 
al-  ‟  (probable knowledge) instead of certain knowledge; therefore, we are not obliged 
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to determine the truth definitively in such matters.
210
 Similarly,  l-J ṣṣāṣ‘s distinction 
between ‗ qliyy t  nd n qliyyāt directs him to classify two types of qiyās as well. As 
al-Shāfi‗ī divided qiyās into two types in terms of certainty,  l-J ṣṣāṣ also divides it in a 
similar way. The first type refers to logical qiyās, which is syllogism ent iling re l ‗ill  
that necessitates the result, while the second type refers to analogy between the rulings 
of new cases to the textual sources and to the topics of agreements. Ijtihād means 
exerting the utmost effort for things whose rulings were not indicated by Allah in a way 
that establishes certain knowledge.
211
 Al-J ṣṣāṣ elaborates on the distinction between 
ijtihād and qiyās by classifying qiyās as one type of ijtihād. The second type of ijtihād 
does not involve a qiyās application such as searching for the direction of the K ‗ba.212 
The third type of ijtihād is called          bi-al-u    (deduction based on the principle 
rulings) and means giving the same ruling to a certain case as the ruling of the principle 
case to which it belongs.
213
  
Al-Shāfi‗ī‘s critique of          (legal discretion) has been studied by many 
scholars. Al-Shāfi‗ī clearly describes isti sān as the opposite of ijtihād. As mentioned 
above, his description of ijtihād/qiyās is based on the argument of evidence, hence, he 
describes isti sān as claiming an opinion without evidence.214 Therefore, al-Shāfi‗ī‘s 
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single word definition of isti sān is ―self-indulgence‖ (taladhdhudh). 215  Al-J ṣṣāṣ 
refutes this understanding without mentioning al-Shāfi‗ī‘s n me by s ying the opponents 
of isti sān actually misunderstood the way   n fīs used this term. He first establishes a 
justification of using this word for this concept through examples from the Quran and 
sunna, as well as from e rlier non-  n fī  uthorities such  s Mālik and al-Shāfi‗ī, who 
used this word in their works.
216
 Then al-J ṣṣāṣ elaborates two meanings for the term 
isti sān in the language of the   n fīs. The first one refers to the second type of ijtihād, 
which deals with deciding amounts in certain cases such as gifts for a divorced woman, a 
topic in which al-Shāfi‗ī  lso used the word isti sān.217 The second and more common 
use of isti sān refers to ― voiding qiyās in favor of some other superior evidence in a 
certain case.‖218 However, in his long discussion,  l-J ṣṣāṣ tries to justify this usage by 
earlier   n fīs through deduction and his theorization does not seem completely 
accurate. His second definition of isti sān does not explain, for instance, cases where 
  n fīs mention two solutions, one of which is acheived through qiyās and one through 
isti sān, and in which they accept the qiyās solution over the one resulting from isti sān. 
To account for this, he had to describe this isti sān as another type of qiyās. His 
understanding then produced the categories of apparent (    ) qiyās and hidden (   f ) 
qiyās in   n fī legal theory.  
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The conditions for the mujtahid in ijtihād/qiyās, which al-Shāfi‗ī discusses as the 
devices that are needed for qiyās and  l-J ṣṣāṣ calls the prerequisites for ijtihād, can be 
summarized in the two texts as follow:  
Al-Shāfi‗ī‘s al-R     219  l-J ṣṣāṣ‘s al-Fu   220  
◆ Knowing the rulings of kitab 
[the Quran], including those that are 
obligatory or recommended; abrogating and 
abrogated ones; general, specific, and 
indicative (     d) ones; the interpretation of 
certain texts that need interpretation through 
sunna or ijmā‗ or qiyās. 
◆ Knowing the previous rulings 
(sunan) and opinions of first generations 
(salaf) 
◆ Knowing the consensus of 
people and their disagreements 
◆ Knowing kitab, established 
sunna, and solitary reports; knowing the 
continuous rulings and abrogated ones 
derived from them; general and specific 
texts; literal and metaphorical meanings; 
classification of texts and having ability to 
put them in appropriate classes. 
◆ Knowing the rulings of 
reason and what calls for it as well as what 
is possible to achieve through it and what is 
not. 
◆ Knowing the consensus of 
the companions, successors and earlier 
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◆   Knowing Arabic language 
◆ Having a fair mind that 
distinguishes similar cases and prevents from 
premature judgments 
◆ Listening to the one who 
disagrees with him 
◆ Exerting utmost effort with 
fair-mindedness (inṣ f) to the extent that he 
knows why he accepts what he accepts and 
why he rejects what he rejects.
221
 
generations that lived before him. 
◆ Knowing istidlāl and legal 
analogy (    yis al-sharʿiyya) not only 
syllogism (    yis al-„       ). 
◆ Being righteous and reliable 
(„   ).  
◆ The mujtahid does not have 
to know all the texts in the Quran, 
established sunna or solitary reports.
222
 
Even for a certain case, he does not have to 
know all the related texts.   
In  ddition to det iled discussion on the f ctors of  n logy, especi lly on the ‗ill , 
 l-J ṣṣāṣ deals with the problem of imitation (      ) and justifies imitation by lay people 
of scholars.  
d. I       
The discussion on ijmā‗ begins with a question asked by the interlocutor in 
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al-R       ―Why do you accept what people agree upon as a binding source in the matters 
where there is no indication in the Quran and they do not relate anything from the 
prophet? Would you argue that, as some others do, it must have been based on an 
established sunna even though they do not rel te it explicitly ‖223 Al-Shāfi‗ī says that it 
does not mean that it necessarily depends on a sunna, but it is impossible to think  that 
they establish an agreement on error or in contradiction with sunna.
224
 Then he mentions 
two proofs for its authority from prophetic reports. On the other hand, this conversation 
shows that some people used to understand consensus as the implicit established sunna 
and to justify its authority through reference to sunna. Even though al-Shāfi‗ī does not 
want to cut the relationship between consensus and sunna completely; he argues that the 
agreement does not have to arise out of a sunna, because all of them cannot agree on 
error. Since al-Shāfi‗ī mentions the famous   dīth praising earlier generations 
(companions and successors), he seems to have understood ijmā‗ as the consensus of 
earlier generations.  
Al-J ṣṣāṣ begins his discussion on ijmā‗ by addressing the authority of ijmā‗. He 
points out the disagreement between jurists (f     ) and some theologians 
(           n) and states that there is no disagreement among jurists on the authority of 
consensus among the first generation (al- adr al-awwal), but that some theologians 
rejected that claim as well as the more general claim of ijmā‗ among later generations in 
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the umma.
225
 We can infer from what  l-J ṣṣāṣ says that when al-Shāfi‗ī mentioned 
ijmā‗, he was interpreting it as being limited to the agreement of earlier generations.  
Al-J ṣṣāṣ bases his theory of consensus on an attribute of this umma described in 
a verse of the Quran
226
  s ‗wasaṭ‘, which he interprets  s ‗just.‘ Then he also mentions 
several other verses that support this idea. He also refers to the same prophetic report 
that al-Shāfi‗ī mentioned about the value of earlier generations. However,  l-J ṣṣāṣ 
points out some other   dīths that are absent in al-R      and later became main 
references for the authority of ijmā‗ in Isl mic leg l theory such  s ―my umm  will not 
agree on misguidance.‖227  
The main difference between the two investigations of ijmā‗ is the obvious 
emphasis on the umma in general in  l-J ṣṣāṣ‘s work. Al-J ṣṣāṣ repeatedly stresses that 
ijmā‗ is not limited to a certain time and earlier generations, rather it is  a universal aspect 
of this umma given by God. He also devotes a chapter entitled     „u ahl al-aʿ  r 
(consensus of different ages) and attributes this opinion to the earlier authorities in the 
  n fī school of law through deduction.228 He engages in a debate with those who claim 
that if everyone individually may fall in error, it means all can fall in error.  As a 
response, he makes a distinction between declaring individual opinion and following an 
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opinion altogether, then he makes a comparison between mutawatir khabar (continuously 
recurrent report) and ijmāʿ by stressing the fact that the individuals are not the same 
when they come together and constitute a whole.
229
  
4. Concluding Remarks 
One of the main conclusions of this comparison is the significant development in 
 l-J ṣṣāṣ‘s al-Fu    in terms of topics, methods and content compared to al-R     . 
However,  l-J ṣṣāṣ‘s work represents a further step within the same field, rather than the 
product of a genre independent from that of al-R     . The contents of both al-R      and 
al-Fu  l reflect earlier and contemporary discussions on legal theory. Hence, since 
al-R      represents basic discussions on the interpretation of textual sources and 
methods for deriving rules from them, it is difficult to justify the arguments that 
appeared in recent scholarship against recognizing this treatise as the first extant work on 
legal theory. Nonetheless, this does not mean it was the first work on uṣ l al-fiqh. Even 
though al-Shāfi‗ī does not reference any earlier work in his treatise, his discussions with 
his interlocutors demostrate that these discussions existed and that multiple positions had 
already emerged among different groups of scholars in diverse topics within this field. 
Furthermore, al-Shāfi‗ī‘s references to opposing legal-theoretical stances and the 
evidence in  l-J ṣṣāṣ‘s work from that period, including references to ‗Isā b. Abān and 
others, indicate that the general tendency towards presenting this gap period as one in 
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which the only activity was commentary on al-Shāfi‗ī‘s al-R      deserves more critical 
investigation. Despite its rich content reflecting both its own time and the gap period, 
al-Fu    only gives us a starting point from which to understand what happened in the 
gap period. On the other hand,  l-J ṣṣāṣ‘s references are centered mostly in his own 
school and most of his attributions to groups of scholars, such as some theologians 
(mut k llim n), also need further research to provide clarification about these groups 
and their time periods. In other words, it suffices to say that this comparison gives us a 
rough image of the development within this period, but does not provide a complete 
picture of the groups, schools, and the aspects of various stages, which is the main task 
of the following chapters.    
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A. Introduction 
This chapter deals with the development of and contributions to the theoretical 
discussions of the gap period for  khbār (reports . The main importance of the gap period for 
the chained prophetic reports lies in the fact that it was this period in which they were equated 
with the authority of sunna and in which they gained an overarching authority to influence the 
centuries to come until the present day. The body of chained reports, largely under the rubric of 
sunna, became the second fundamental source of Islamic law. It is true that the importance of 
the chained reports goes back to earlier times, but becoming a paradigmatic source happened 
during the gap period. In other words, cert in   dīth compil tions th t l ter c me to be 
recognized as canonized sources were still in the initial phases of the canonization process 
during this period, and at the same time many theoretical debates were taking place. Therefore, 
what distinguishes this period from later periods is its significantly rich discussions on the core 
problems of the chained reports and the various ways to approach them.   
The third hijrī century witnessed  n epistemic conflict reg rding the v lue  nd 
authority of reports (        in religion. Even though this conflict h s been studied m inly 
between  hl  l-r ‘y  nd  hl  l-  dīth in recent schol rship, the sides of the deb te were 
certainly more than two. Despite the generality of the titles, ahl al-r ‘y referred to   specific 
group, mostly K fī schol rs of the time  nd those who sh re so-c lled K f n jurisprudence, 
while ahl al-h dīth referred to those who g ve the h dīth reports over rching  uthority in 
comparison to other sources. Besides these two groups, there were different groups of scholars 
and independent scholars who chose a position falling somewhere in a spectrum between the 
two extreme positions. On the one side of the spectrum, some scholars argued for the certainty 
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of any solitary reports and rejected any role of reason in religion such as those who were called 
as  ashwiyya (literally redundant group) by their opponents.230  On the other side, some 
schol rs rejected even the  uthority of mut wātir (consecutive  reports such  s cert in Mut zilī 
scholars.  
The scope of the investigation, therefore, on the chained reports in this chapter is not 
limited to the schol rs of  hl  l-r ‘y  nd  hl  l-  dīth, bec use the theoretic l discussions did 
not occur only between these two groups. The titles of the works written on the topic of 
transmitted reports during the gap period persuasively demonstrate the significant diversity in 
the  ffili tion of the schol rs who contributed to the topic. For inst nce, ‗ s  b. Abān wrote   
book entitled ―al-R    „            -M            -S  f „  f  al-      ‖ refuting the theories of 
khabar of both al-Shāfi‗ī, who w s known   tr dition list to m ny  t th t time,  nd Bishr 
al-M rīsī,   Murji‗ī who w s known for his critical stance toward reports.231 Therefore, in 
order to examine the conflict between two general parties, it would be more accurate to classify 
the contributing scholars under reason-based and report-based scholars, with a keen eye for 
certain nuances among these two groups. 
It might be beneficial to give an outline of different approaches to the chained reports 
before the gap period. The majority of scholars including ahl al-r ‘y  nd most of the Mu‗t zil  
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came to an agreement on the importance of reports in religion from the earlier generations 
onward. Therefore, we see an increasing interest in studying reports and producing a relev nt 
liter ture from  ll these groups. M dīn  bec me   well-known center of   dīth-based teaching 
as early as the second hijrī century to the extent th t m ny students  nd schol rs tr velled from 
different territories to M dīn  to acquire knowledge of   dīth  nd th t its schol rs bec me 
known as            .232 The most prominent student of Ab   nif , Mu  mm d b.  l-  s n 
al-Sh ybānī, for inst nce, tr velled to M dīn   nd st yed there for approximately three ye rs to 
he r   dīth from Mālik, the eminent   dīth schol r of the time  nd the eponym of the Mālikī 
school as it would come to be known. One of the extant transmissions of al-M   ṭṭ  w s 
compiled by  l-Sh ybānī. In   n rr tion, he compl ins th t people in K f  were more eager to 
hear the   dīths in circul tion  mong the schol rs of M dīn  th n the   dīths of the schol rs of 
K f . This shows th t before the g p period, there h d been  lre dy  n  greement between 
different schools of thought regarding the importance of the reports. In addition, different 
groups of scholars had already developed sets of principles distinguishing authentic and 
functional reports from fabricated and nonfunctional ones.
233
 It leaves us an important 
question though: what was the difference between their approaches regarding the reports then? 
The evidence under examination of this chapter demonstrates that the problem relied on their 
different approaches to the authority of textual sources and their interaction with reason. On 
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the one side of the spectrum some scholars considered texts  s pl ying the role of ‗subject‘, and 
regarded the followers of religion as ‗objects‘ who should follow ―the spe king texts‖ which 
resulted in over emphasis on the literal meaning of the texts and holding fast to this meaning as 
a necessary requirement of piety. On the other side of the spectrum, some scholars regarded 
texts as completely silent objects and the followers of the religion as the subject who are 
responsible to issue religious principles and rules. However, the majority of the scholars tried 
to establish principles to put limits from both sides in finding the accurate role of the texts in 
religion in general and in certain matters of religion in particular. This effort and discursive 
relationship with the texts constructed the main body of principles in establishing authority, i.e. 
Islamic legal theory. Toward the end of the gap period and later on, the authority of the chained 
reports was not only accepted by the vast majority of Muslim scholars, but moreover, those 
who were arguing for different methods in the authentication of these reports eventually 
submitted to the methods of so-called traditionalists (      -      ), who were also traditionists 
(mu          . This process c n be c lled ―tr dition liz tion‖  nd the sixth section of this 
ch pter ex mines the tr dition liz tion of K fī school in det il.  
Before beginning the examination of the theories of reports in the gap period, it might 
be useful to mention certain concepts that are used to signal reports. A fixed term for the 
reports within this period was not yet in existence. Most common words referring to reports 
were athar, khabar, and       . Determining the term   dīth for the reports did not happen 
during this period. The equation of sunna with reports was supported by the traditionalists, 
especially in light of the verse th t re ds  s ―you who believe, obey Allah, the Messenger, and 
those in command among you. If you disagree about something, refer it back to Allah and the 
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Messenger‖234  and the Quranic concept of  ikma.235   Al-Shāfi‗ī,  l-Bukhārī  nd Y  yā 
al-Kinānī, for inst nce, were  mong those who b sed their  rguments on one of these two 
proofs to give the reports on the prophetic sunna the second place only after the Quran in their 
authority.
236
  
Different categories of reports emerged during the g p period  nd rem ined influenti l 
in the discussions rel ted to the ch ined reports in the following centuries. For our discussion 
in this ch pter, it is essenti l to define three c tegories. In the l ter liter ture of uṣ l  l-fiqh, two 
categories of reports are discussed based on establishing certainty:           (consecutive 
report) and          -   id (solitary report, also known as     ). The mut wātir report is 
defined as a report that has a number of transmitters to the extent that they cannot be imagined 
to collaboratively agree on lie. The transmission of the entire Quran, for instance, is accepted 
as mut wātir  mong Muslims. Kh b r  l-wā id is defined  s  ny tr nsmission th t does not 
re ch the level of mut wātir among the majority of Muslim scholars. This type of transmission 
establishes probable knowledge (    ) according to the vast majority of scholars. Most reports 
in the existing   dīth compil tions f ll into the c tegory of solit ry reports.   n fīs identify   
third c tegory between mut wātir  nd kh b r  l-wā id, the mashh r, which f lls in between 
these two categories and establishes satisfaction ( ṭ  ‟   ). This chapter traces back the 
formation of these different categories, which still affect Islamic intellectual traditions, in the 
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theoretical discussions of the period. 
The following three sections explore the discussions of the gap period on the authority 
of reports, their epistemic categories, and the conditions and interpretations of solitary reports. 
The last two sections analyze the live discussions in modern scholarship on the 
traditionalization of the K f n school  nd on the domin nce of   dīth-based scholarship that 
emerged within the gap period. 
B. The Authority of Solitary Reports 
The solitary report (khabar al-     ) is defined by al-Shāfi‗ī  s ―the report of one 
person from another until it reaches the prophet or someone before the prophet [to a 
comp nion or   successor ‖237 Even though, the distinction between solitary and consecutive 
reports is  n old topic of discussion,  lmost entire compil tions of h dīths f ll into the c tegory 
of solitary report. Therefore, the discussion on the solitary report is also a discussion on the 
theory of reports in gener l, unless there is   distinguishing l bel for mut wātir [ nd m shh r 
for   n fīs . 
In addition to the materials entailing the discussions on the authority of solitary reports 
that we will examine below, the reported titles of texts written during the period also point out 
the fact that the authority of the solitary report was one of the significant discussions of the 
time. Bio-bibliographical sources assign cert in writings to the following schol rs.   sā b. 
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Abān (         is reported to h ve written K              -     ,238 ‗Alī b. M sā  l-Qummī 
(  5        Kufī schol r  nd student of Ibn  l-Th ljī reportedly wrote   book entitled K     
         -Q     wa-al-          -khabar al-      in which he argued for the authority of 
khabar al-     .239 Dāw d b. ‗Alī (         is  ttributed two works on reports  s K     
khabar al-      and  K              -      li-al-„   .240 The latter appears to be on the 
reports th t est blish cert inty from its title.  Mālikī schol r Ab  S ‗īd  l-Q yr wānī 
(372/983), a contemporary of al-J ṣṣāṣ, is reported to h ve written al-S        f         
khabar al-      (The Indications of the Authority of the Solitary Report).241 
Notwithstanding certain criticisms directed at solitary reports, an overall categorical 
rejection was not prevalent in the first centuries of Islam. Even though some scholars pointed 
out such claims for overall rejection in their writings, a closer look at the sources reveals that 
the discussion revolves around the theoretical reliability of reports as the authoritative sources 
of knowledge. For instance, al-Sh fi‗ī mentions   group th t reject the entire reports (      ) 
in his J   „   -„   .242 His interlocutor criticizes al-Sh fi‗ī in using   report to interpret leg l 
rulings of the Quran different to the literal meaning of the text even though is only based on a 
chain of transmitters who were subject to the criticisms of even the proponents of reports with 
we k memory or unrighteousness. His interlocutor cl rifies his st nce by s ying th t ―he does 
not accept anything established based on reports, unless he would be as sure as he is about each 
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letter of the Qur n for the content of report.‖243 This argument is almost identical to the 
arguments of al-N   ām  nd Ḍirār b. ‗Amr th t we will discuss below. In f ct, this  rgument 
does not reject reports entirely, but rejects the criteria of the proponents of reports, namely ahl 
al-  dīh, for  ccepting reports. It is not  n  tt ck on reports per se, but rather a more 
comprehensive attack on accepting probable knowledge (    ) in understanding and 
interpreting the revelation, which constituted a sort of proto- āhirī st nce. Along the s me 
lines, the interlocutor of al-Shāfi‗ī underlines the perfection and clarity of the Quran when 
criticizing reports. In al-R     , al-Shāfī‗ī s ys th t no jurist dis greed on the  uthority of 
solitary reports before, which might be taken as an indication for al-Sh fī‗ī seeing these 
reactions as a new phenomenon with general attacks on the independent authority of the 
chained reports as well as excluding the opponents of the chained reports from the class of 
―jurists.‖ 244  
Before the gap period and al-Shāfi‗ī‘s de th,  l-Sh ybānī (         h d discussed the 
authority of solit ry reports under the title of ―On giving testimony in m tters of religion‖ (    
  -        f        -   ).245  Several reports that he mentions in this section have been used 
in the later literature for the authority of solitary reports. For example, he mentions that the 
prophet sent Di y   l-K lbī  lone to the Byz ntines with his letter inviting the emperor to 
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Islām. Another report w s  bout how the comp nions  ccepted only one person‘s report in 
announcing the prohibition of wine and they broke the potters of wine.
246 These two reports 
were used l ter by  l-Bukhārī  nd the second one by  l-Shāfi‗ī, where they discuss the 
 uthority of kh b r  l-wā id.247 
However, after mentioning eleven reports and his rationale for accepting one witness in 
the m tters of religion,  l-Sh ybānī concludes th t it is permissible to accept the testimony of a 
Muslim woman or man regardless of being free or slave as long as he or she is reliable 
(thiqa)
248
 (my emphasis). This shows th t wh t  l-Sh ybānī is trying to prove is not the 
necessity of using testimony of one person in the matters of religion, but r ther the 
permissibility to use it  s evidence in re ching   verdict. Cert in conditions th t he mentions 
 lso prove th t point. For ex mple,  l-Sh ybānī st tes th t the testimony of only one person for 
seeing the crescent of the month of  l-Sh wwāl should be rejected, due to cert in benefits th t 
he or she might h ve considered such  s receiving gifts for  nnouncing it. Al-Sh ybānī seems 
to have given a large room for ijtihād in evaluating individual reports, whose developed 
version we see in the theory of ‗ sā b. Abān.  
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1.                                                                     
From the l ter schol rs,  l-Juw ynī  ttributed the deni l of the authority of solitary 
reports to some fractions among the Shi‗īs (R   f ḍ) and from the Mu‗tazila who followed 
them.
249
 ‗Abd  l-Qāhir  l-B ghdādī  lso  ttributes such rejection of the  uthority of the 
solitary report to some of the Mu‗tazila (Qadariyya).250  
A vehement critique of the independent authority of chained reports before al-N   ām 
had been made by Ḍirār b. ‗Amr‘ (      5 , who is reported to h ve written   book on the 
contr dictions of   dīths entitled K           ḍ   -      .251 Ibn Rāw ndī  lso cl ims th t 
Mu‗t zilī schol rs were pr ising his book al-T      .252 In this book, Ḍirār  rgues for the 
invalidity of reports by pointing out the fact that there were supporting reports for every 
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existing group of the time within the collections of reports.
253
 The affiliation of Ḍirār with the 
Mu‗t zil  h s been contested  nd  l-Kh yyāṭ rejected his  ffili tion with the Mu‗tazila by 
claiming that Ḍirār w s   follower of J hm b. S fwān (      5 .254 
Among early the Mu‗t zilīs,  l-N   ām w s  n important figure for casting doubt on 
the chained transmissions. According to what is reported from him, instead of the chain of a 
report, the content of the report and its context were more important. If the content leaves no 
doubt for the listener, it is not important whether one person or a large amount of people 
transmit the report.
255
 Ibn Rāw ndī gives further det ils  bout  l-N   ām‘s thoughts on 
solitary report. He reports that al-N   ām did not see  ny difference between the solitary report 
of an unbeliever and a Muslim. Al-N   ām  rgued th t solit ry report of  n unbeliever might 
indicate necessary knowledge if the content of the report is something perceivable.
256
 A 
fragment from al-N   ām‘s writing sheds import nt light on his opinions  bout the reports. In 
this piece, al-N   ām h rshly criticizes those who  ccept the reports of people based on their 
reliability. Al-N   ām  rgues th t the obvious contr dictions in those reports  re evidence for 
their unreliability in what they report and gives many examples of contradicting reports by the 
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same transmitters.
257
   
Al-Juw ynī reportedly mentions in his S       -R      that before al-N   ām, Hishām 
b. al-  k m (      5 , who w s first   follower of J hm then bec me   follower of J ‗f r 
 l-Sādiq  nd M sā  l-Kā im, had not accepted solitary reports unless they had certain 
indications that establish certain knowledge to the extent that God cre tes in one‘s he rt 
knowledge of its authenticity.  For al-Juw ynī, such cl ims  re contr ry to the est blished 
ijmā‗ on the  uthority of solit ry reports.258   
There is not a uniform agreed upon opinion on the authority of solitary reports within 
the Mu‗t zil ,  s is the c se for m ny other theoretic l topics. If one h s to cl ssify different 
viewpoints reg rding the  uthority of solit ry reports, Mu‗t zilī schol rs f vor   st nce th t 
falls in between those of more skeptical scholars such as al-N   ām  nd of   dīth proponent 
such as al-K ‗bī (        . Al-Qāḍī ‗Abd  l-J bbār singles out the works of  l-K ‗bī entitled 
Naqd al-S          nd of Ab  J ‗f r  l-Iskāfī (     5   entitled al-Q ḍ         -Mukhtalifa, 
when al-Qāḍī ‗Abd  l-J bbār rejects the critiques of the Mu‗t zil  with ignor nce of h dīth. He 
 rgues th t it w s not bec use they did not know the rules discerning  uthentic h dīth, but 
rather that they did not rely on solitary reports as a source of knowledge, because in solitary 
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reports the possibility of lie, error, forgetfulness, change, and exchange remains. Therefore, 
al-Qāḍī ‗Abd  l-J bbār claims, they, notwithstanding the chained   dīths, accepted only 
evident reason, the certain sunna, and ijmā‗. 259  Al-Qāḍī ‗Abd  l-J bbār‘s st tement is 
misleading, because this generalization operates on the assumption that the Mu‗t zil  h d the 
same stance regarding solitary reports. Moreover, most likely he was referring to solitary 
reports as a source of knowledge in theology. However, it is important to see that he 
 cknowledged the f ct th t some Mu‗t zilī schol rs were comprehensively involved in   dīth 
criticism and dealt with the religious sciences for evaluating transmitters.  
In addition to Q       -       f    „  f     -       Al-K ‗bī (         is reported to 
have written K     f       t          -     which was reportedly a refutation of his teacher 
al-Kh yyāt.260  
Despite a gradually increasing involvement in   dīth criticism, Mu‗t zilī schol rs were 
known for their rational emphasis on the evaluation of transmitted texts. It is reported from 
Ab  ‗Alī  l-Jubbā‘ī (      5  th t he would accept a h dīth with a particular chain of 
transmission, and reject a different one with the same chain,  on the basis of the contradiction 
to the kitāb, ijmā‗  nd         -„    (rational evidence). 261  Ab  ‗Alī  l-Jubbā‘ī held  n 
exceptional criterion in accepting reports. It is reported that he accepted only two transmitters 
narrating from two other transmitters until the the prophet for regular legal matters based on 
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the rules of testimony; however, if the content of the report were about adultery he required 
four transmitters for the report.
262
  Stipulating at least two transmitters in every generation 
excludes the authority of a large portion of the existing reports and gives a broad capacity for 
non-textual sources.   
The sources do not give details about Murji‗ī schol rs‘  ppro ches tow rd solit ry 
reports. Among them, Bishr b. Ghiyāth  l-M rīsī (         is reported to h ve not  ccepted 
solitary reports.
263
 
As it is clear from abovementioned critiques, the reaction against solitary reports 
focused on its authentication and certain weaknesses in transmission rather than a categorical 
denial. The necessity of considering solitary reports was widely acknowledged, but giving an 
independent authority to solitary reports over reason-based sources was contested. The details 
of these arguments will be discussed in the sections below about the epistemic value of reports 
and the conditions of evaluating solitary reports.  
2. The Traditionalist Stance on the Proofs of the Authority of Solitary Reports 
As mentioned earlier, traditionalist scholars strived for establishing the independent 
authority of solitary reports in the early phase of the gap period. In response to the attacks of 
their rivals, they sought to provide proofs for the overarching authority of solitary reports 
vis-a-vis reason-based suggestions for achieving true Islamic results.  
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The famous traditionalist scholar al-Bukhārī ( 5       devotes   ch pter in his h dīth 
collection to the authority of solitary reports.
264
 He begins with the following verse from the 
Qur n  ―Yet it is not right for  ll the believers to go out to b ttle together: out of each 
community, a ṭ ‟ifa should go out to gain understanding of the religion, so that they can teach 
their people when they return  nd so th t they c n gu rd themselves  g inst evil..‖ 265 
Depending on another verse,
266
 al-Bukhārī  rgues th t ṭ ‟ifa, in spite of being understood as a 
group, might also mean one person only. He also mentions another verse that urges Muslims to 
search for truth first when a sinful person (f    ) brings news, which was later used frequently 
for the authority of the solitary report by many.
267
 It is evident that he argues that if a righteous 
person transmits something, one should accept it without further rational investigation about 
the content. This is exactly the point of the counter argument by the rationalist camp in 
evaluating reports, which will be examined in the following sections below. Throughout his 
chapter on solitary reports, al-Bukh rī rel tes cert in reports th t  im to show how the prophet 
 nd the comp nions  ccepted   single person‘s cl im  nd concludes  the ch pter with th t both 
single male and single female persons have the same authority.  
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The proofs th t  l-Bukhārī lists out in his work were in circulation and extensively used 
and articulated in the debates of scholars on the authority of solitary reports. Al-Bukhārī uses 
some reports that had been used by al-Shāfi‗ī such  s the one  bout  nnouncing the ch nge in 
qibla and by al-Sh ybānī e rlier th n th t such  s the one sending Di ya alone to the Byzantine 
emperor.
 268
  
Traditionalist scholars tended to translate the critiques of their rivals regarding the 
authority of solitary reports to a blind denial of the entire corpus of   dīths or conformist 
approaches. The traditionalist Ibn Qutayba‘s criticism of Ab    nīf  w s his reluct nce to 
 ccept   h dīth th t contr dicts his opinion.269 His critique is not limited to a local school; 
rather he criticizes an attitude known  s qiyās or r y-based thinking, because he also criticizes 
R bī‗  b. Abd  l-R  m n, who w s   M din n schol r.270 The same set of descriptions for the 
attitudes of rationalists regarding the solitary reports can be observed when Ibn Qutayba 
attacks al-Jā i  by claiming that al-Jā i  m de fun of cert in h dīths  nd f bric ted some 
others.
271
   
In the l te third hijrī century, we see more theoretic lly org nized discussions on the 
proofs of the authority of solitary reports from the side of traditionalists. Ibn Surayj (306/918) 
argues for the authority of solitary reports from the Qur n, sunn   nd ijmā‗. From the Qur n, 
he mentions the same verse (49/6) that necessitates investigation of a report if the reporter 
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(    ) is unrighteous and concludes that this verse does not only verify its authority, it also 
requires us to accept the report of the righteous without pause (tawaqquf). Ibn Surayj mentions 
 lso   r re verse in the topic th t re ds  s ―They s y th t he listens to  nything‖,272 which Ibn 
Surayj interprets as the prophet used to listen to everyone even if it were only one person and 
accept the report, such as the bedouin who bore witness for seeing the crescent of R m ḍān.273 
Another proof from the sunn ,  ccording to Ibn Sur yj, is th t the prophet sent Mu‗ādh, ‗Alī 
 nd Ibn M s‗ d to Yemen. As for the evidence from ijmā‗, Ibn Sur yj argues that any report 
the umma does not dispute should be accepted; therefore, this includes the acceptance of 
solitary report.
274
  
His student Ab  B kr  l-Kh ffāf (d. between    -60/952-70), however, takes its 
authority for granted and deals with its place in the typology of reports instead.
275
 This might 
be a result of an overwhelming acceptance of the authority of solitary reports and a shift from 
the discussions on their authority to the discussion of their place within the typology of reports 
in the first half of the fourth/tenth century.  
I will conclude this section with the statements of a late contemporary of al-Jaṣṣāṣ.  
Mālikī schol r Ibn  l-Q ṣṣār (          mentions   verse276 for the authority of solitary 
                                                 
272
 The Quran, 9:61 
273
 Ibn Surayj, al-W   ‟ „, II, 671. 
274
 Ibn Surayj, al-W   ‟ „, II, 672. 
275
 Ab  B kr  l-Kh ffāf, al-A     wa-al-khi   , 7a. 
276
 The Qur n,       ―If   f siq comes to you with news, verify it not to h rm people in ignor nce.‖ 
118 
reports in establishing a requirement for practical matters, i.e. law,
277
 and based on the same 
verse he refutes those who claim that the principle should be to pause initially until making 
sure that the content of the report is correct.
278
  
This section has demonstrated that discussions on the authority of solitary reports 
meant for the traditionalists the independent authority of solitary reports without rational 
evaluations of the content of the report. However, the rationalist scholars argued for the 
permissibility of using solitary reports and deficiency of only using chain criticism in order to 
conclude the authenticity of solitary reports.  They put the emphasis on reason and argued that 
the authority of reports is tied to this.   
C. Epistemic Categories of Reports with Respect to Certainty 
 The main questions that this section addresses are how and when the classification of 
reports based on certainty and probability began and evolved. In relation to this, how and when 
scholars argued first for a distinction between using solitary reports in law (      „amalan) and 
not in theology (         „ilman).  
One of the s lient  spects of the division  mong the schol rs in terms of the 
c tegoriz tion of reports depending on cert inty w s du l, i.e. mut wātir  nd kh b r  l-wā id, 
and triple, with the addition of the category of mashh r in between. The former was more 
common among the traditionalist circles, while the latter was more common among the circles 
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of Mu‗t zil , Murji‘ ,  nd proto-  n fīs.  
The earliest known division among the reports regarding their epistemic value is 
 ttributed to Wāṣil b. Atā (         who m de   distinction between kh b r  l-‗āmm   nd 
khabar al-khāṣṣ . Al-J ṣṣāṣ reports th t there  re those who cl im mut wātir reports carry 
acquisitive certainty rather than compelling certainty.
279
  
‗ sā b. Abān (         divides reports into three c tegories. The first c tegory consists 
of the reports whose correctness is known with compelling certainty ( ḍ     ). The second 
category includes the reports whose incorrectness is known by a compelling certainty. The 
third category encompasses the reports for which both correctness and incorrectness are 
possible. The first category refers to the mut wātir, which give certain knowledge and the 
denial of which results in disbelief. According to ‗ sā b. Abān there is not   specific 
requirement for the number of transmitters in a mut wātir report. He  dds th t even twenty 
people may not est blish mut wātir status. The second category refers statements that have 
inherent and evident indications of incorrectness based on reason, such as the one who claims 
that he saw a building without a builder. The last category refers to a solitary report or a report 
th t does not re ch the level of t wātur. This kind of reports c n be used in l w despite its 
uncertainty, if the narrator is known apparently with righteousness. If the narrator is known 
apparently with unrighteousness and lying, the report cannot be used in law.
280
  
                                                 
279
 al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fu     III, 47. 
280
 al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fu     III, 35-37. 
120 
Al-N   ām is f mously known for his claim that a mut wātir report does not 
necessarily establish certainty, because of the remaining possibility for a conspired lie. He is 
also reported to have held that a solitary report might establish certainty if the narrator knows it 
by certainty and the report carries indications of certainty.
281
 Al-Na  ām clarifies what he 
means by these indications with a few examples. According to al-Na  ām, when a person 
relates the death of his mother or father who was suffering from mortal illness, his report 
establishes certainty. Likewise, the report of a midwife who announces the birth of a baby right 
after the birth, or the report of a person who informs the death of another person in the sight of 
a funeral, will be considered correct with certainty.
282
 This approach of al-Na  ām is in 
parallel to the general approach of the rationalists in putting the emphasis on the rational 
evaluation of the reports rather than the righteousness of the transmitters.  
Al-Jā i  divides reports into three types b sed on cert inty. The first type is mut wāṭir 
reports that necessitate the one who hears it to accept it; for this type it is irrelevant whether the 
reporter is an enemy or friend, righteous or unrighteous. The second type is the reports of a 
group that cannot be accepted without investigation, yet after investigating the reporters, it 
becomes clear that they could not agree on forgery due to their disassociation from one 
another. The third type is the report of one person or two persons who could be either truthful 
or not in their reports. The truthfulness of this report is rel ted to one‘s he rt, depending on 
one‘s positive  ssumption (       -    ) regarding the reporter‘s good ch r cter  nd 
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reliability. This last type is the weakest type of all. The first two types establish certainty, while 
khabar al-      establishes only assumption (       -    ) and probability based on trust 
( ‟     ).283  
It seems that Mu‗t zilī schol rs criticized Shi‗ī schol rs for rejecting mut wātir reports. 
Ibn Rāw ndī refutes the Mu‗t zil ‘s gener liz tion  bout the Shī‗  rejecting the possibility 
t wātur  nd mentions Hishām b.  l-  k m  s one who  ccepts t wātur, and gives a list of some 
Mu‗t zīlī schol rs who also reject it. Al-Kh yyāṭ rel tes the Shī‗ ‘s rejection of mut wātir 
report to their doctrine of imām   nd as a result claims that they are not qualified to hold such 
a disputed discussion among scholars.
284
 Ashārī is  lso reported to h ve written   refut tion of 
Ibn Rāw ndī on the invalidation of t wātur.285 
Among those who claimed that solitary reports lead to certainty are al- us yn b. ‗Alī 
al-K rābīsī (  5  5  286, Dāwud b. ‗Alī (        ,  nd  l- ārith  l-Mu āsibī (     5  .287 A 
work entitled K              -      li-al-„    is  ttributed to Dāw d  nd prob bly cont ined 
his opinions on the certainty of reports.
288
 It is also reported that Ibn Khuw yz M ndād 
n rr tes this opinion from Mālik, but this is unlikely due to the f ct th t during Mālik‘s time 
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such a discussion does not appear in the sources.   
The f mous tr dition list schol r, Ab  ‗Ub yd  l-Qāsim b. S llām (        , does not 
explicitly mention a category of khabar al-wā id in his published works. However, he does 
point to the concept of mut wātir. For inst nce, he mentions cert in reports  s evidence for his 
claim on the incre se of īmān.289 Even though he describes these reports as mut wātir in this 
meaning (al-      al-           f        al-  „     what he narrates are actually different 
solitary reports with similar meanings. He probably means that all these different reports 
support the cl im on the incre se of īmān in their me ning in a way that is            what is 
later called             -al-  „  .  
A mad b.  anbal was not willing to make a distinction in the authority of reports. It is 
related that he was once asked about those who say that the [chained] report (khabar) would 
not establish certainty („ilm), but establish probability („amal), and he responded by saying that 
―he does not underst nd wh t this is.‖290 Based on this approach, the initial followers of 
A mad b.  anbal are reported to have argued for the certainty of solit ry report. However, It 
seems th t  t the time of Ab  Y ‗lā  l-F rrā ( 5        this distinction, and the idea that the 
solitary report does not establish certainty, became prevalent among different schools; hence, 
he strives to prove that A mad b.  nb l‘s opinion c n  lso be understood  long the line of the 
majoritarian opinion. This agreement over the epistemic probability of a solitary report 
reached the extent that claiming epistemic certainty of solitary reports was regarded irrational.  
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Therefore, Ab  Y ‗lā  l-F rrā first eng ges in  n  n lysis to re-interpret the dominant opinion 
within the   nb lī circles with cert in conditions to give it a theoretical foundation. As 
supporting evidence, he interestingly mentions al-Na  ām‘s simil r opinion, a well-known 
adversary of traditionalists, who argued for the possibility of certainty in solitary reports.
291
 
This is also a good example of both how the theoretic l opinions of the g p period continued to 
influence the liter ture of uṣ l  l-fiqh and of the interrelations among different schools despite 
their distinct theoretical principles.  
Al-Bukhārī ( 5       does not m ke   distinction between leg l  nd theologic l topics 
in the chapter in which he deals with the authority of solitary reports. Even though the majority 
of the reports he relates fall into the realm of fiqh, he also relates a report for assigning a 
prophet to a certain people to teach the principles of faith.
292
 
The rare examples of making a distinction between the use of solitary reports in 
practical matters and theological matters among the tradition lists c n be tr ced b ck to the 
l te thirdh hijrī century. Ab  S ‗īd  l-Dārimī (        ,   f mous proponent of  hl  l-h dīth, 
makes a distinction between using a report for a simple legal matter (     f   ḍ    ) and a 
theological matter (  ṭ     -„     wa-al-      ) and clarifies that one should be more strict 
when it comes to the matters of theology.
293
 This can be seen as an indication of the gradual 
development during which this distinction became more apparent in the second half of the 
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third hijrī century.   
Another way of reducing the authority of reports was to restrict certain categories 
within the existing collections of reports as establishing authority. Al-Dārimī eng ges in   
discussion with his opponent on Ab  Y suf‘s exclusion of the opinions of the successors from 
the definition of athar. Al-Dārimī  rgues th t the correct w y to put it is th t the dis greement 
of the successors is not a binding sunna as opposed to the sunna of the prophet or his 
companions.
294
 Despite saying that, he also claims that the opinions of the successors are still 
more binding (alzam  th n those of Ab  Y suf or his followers due to the verse in the Qur n 
that points out their virtuousness.
295
 
Traditionalist scholars, however, continued to use solitary reports in theological 
matters, despite the growing agreement on the solitary reports carrying probable knowledge, 
not cert in knowledge. Ibn J rīr  l-Ṭ b rī (         considers solit ry reports authoritative 
with regards to matters of theology such as the signs of the last day. When he was trying to 
reconcile apparently contradicting reports about who will witness the last day, he distinguishes 
himself from those who do not accept solitary reports of righteous transmitters.
296
 The fact that 
he does so without pointing out any difference in accepting solitary reports in theology or law 
might be seen as an indication that this was not an emphasized distinction of his time.  
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Different practical results of categorizing reports based on their epistemic value were 
discussed during the l te third  nd e rly fourth hijrī centuries. Ab  J ‗f r  l-Ṭ  āwī (         
makes a distinction between community report (khabar al-    „ ) and solitary report (khabar 
al-     ) and claims that the one who denies the content of the first one will become an 
unbeliever, while the one who denies the content of solitary report will not.
297
 However, he 
does not refrain from using solitary reports in his famous work on theology.
298
 This must be an 
indication of a different perception regarding the value of solitary reports in accepting the 
authority of solitary reports in matters of theology, despite their probability. However, 
al-Ta āwī seems to h ve stipul ted the necessity of cert in knowledge only for the m tter of 
excommunication. This understanding does not consider the entire realm of belief as the realm 
of certainty.  In this sense, solitary reports can be used for the matters of belief, but one would 
be able to deny them. However, if something, be it a matter of practice or belief, is established 
with the community reports that establish certainty, one is not able to deny its authority and 
content.  
Further categorization of reports based on certainty and probability developed in the 
early fourth hijrī century. Ibn Sur yj‘s student Ab  B kr  l-Kh ffāf (d. between 
340-60/952-70) divides reports into five categories depending on a mixture of certainty and the 
topic of the reports. According to this categorization 1) The reports of the prophets due to their 
dependence on miracles and 2) Mutawātir reports establish necessary knowledge and the one 
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who receives these reports is obliged to accept them. 3) Khabar al-      and 4) The reports of 
witnesses establish only probability.  Accepting 5) the reports of permission or gifts and alike 
in transactions depends on the one who receives them. One is free to accept or reject this kind 
of report.
299
  
It seems that an overarching agreement on the solitary reports establishing only 
probable knowledge was arrived at in the fourth hijrī century.  Mālikī schol r Ibn  l-Q ṣṣār 
(397/1007), a late contemporary of al-J ṣṣāṣ, st tes th t the solitary report does not establish 
certainty and requires only action („    ). He says that all jurists agreed upon this.300  Ibn 
al-Qaṣṣār  lso m kes  n  n logy between a solitary report and a witness in terms of being 
incapable to verify the truth.
301
 
The data examined in this section has shown that classification during that period of the 
existing reports based on certainty was offered by the rationalists in an attempt to restrict the 
authority of reports. This proposal was not at first welcomed among the traditionalist circles, 
who were reluctant to accept any claim that would diminish the authority of the chained 
reports. However, intense theoretical debates compelled them to accept such a division. The 
most important result of this was a majoritarian agreement on the probability of solitary reports 
that constitutes most of the compilations of reports. This agreement might seem to have 
decreased the authority of reports significantly on a theoretical level. However, another 
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majoritarian agreement that gives the authority of probable knowledge a large place in religion 
repulsed this attempt and consolidated the authority of solitary reports in the realm of law, and 
for many in the realm of belief. The practical outcome of these theoretical discussions was the 
acknowledged right of denial of a specific solitary report without accusations of 
excommunication and the necessity of looking at reports individually, as opposed to as a 
whole, to identify authenticity. This resulted in an emphasis on the conditions for accepting 
solitary reports instead of categorical rejection and theoretical attacks on reports, which is 
examined in the following section.       
D. Conditions and Interpretation of Solitary Reports 
Since there was an agreement to accept the authority of solitary reports, although in to 
different extents, the focus of the debates shifted toward the conditions and interpretation of 
the solitary reports. Two main stances were competing in the early phases of the gap period for 
accepting a solitary report. The first stance was that of the traditionalists focusing on the chain 
criticism and considering this enough to come to a judgment for the authenticity of a report. 
The second stance was that of the rationalists who consisted of ahl al-r ‘y, Mu‗t zil ,  nd 
Murji‘  focusing on the textual (matn) criticism and being more skeptical about the chain 
criticism just as the proponents of the first stance were regarding those who argue for matn 
criticism, suspecting them of invalidating reports based on their desires. The first stance 
bec me victorious  s e rly  s the second h lf of the third hijrī century. However, the second 
stance also had an impact on l ter   dīth criticism. Wh t follows will give det ils  nd nu nces 
of these two stances and their influence.   
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1. Traditionalist Ḥ                            Ḍabṭ  
Traditionalist   dīth criticism w s b sed on the theoretic l principle for the suprem cy of 
the independent authority of   dīth reports over other sources. According to them, orthodoxy 
and normativity can be established by the Quran and   dīth reports. However, bec use most 
of the text of the Quran is subject to interpretation, another more detailed textual source 
would suffice us to explore both the intended meaning in the text of the Quran and things that 
the text of the Quran does not cover. In order to be a conclusive measure for normative 
authority, these reports need to be weighted by themselves without the help of subjective 
human reasoning which is, in the eyes of traditionalists, the ultimate reason for 
disagreements in the community. Therefore, the traditionalists based the authentication of 
reports on the reliability of transmitters rather than the rational evaluation of the text of 
reports.  
Since the principles of chain criticism according to the traditionalists have been studied 
in many works, the principles of non-traditionalists are more relevant for this research. It will 
suffice us to give a few examples from the gap period, in order to show the emphasis on the 
chain criticism among the tr dition lists. For inst nce, Ab  ‗Ub yd  l-Qāsim b. S llām 
(224/838), an independent scholar with traditionalist leaning, does not accept a report as 
evidence due to a narrator in the chain who did not actually meet the person he reports from.
302
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Ab  S ‗īd  l-Dārimī (         rejects the reports of cert in people by questioning their 
righteousness. Simply following the Jahmiyya, and being an unknown transmitter to other 
scholars, constitutes unrighteousness for him. He rejects, for example, the reports of Ibn 
al-Th ljī b sed on the critiques of him in tr nsmission  nd piety, and scarcity of people who 
followed him or n rr ted from him. However, when he rejects the reports of Ab  Y suf, one of 
the famous founding scholars of the K fī-  n fī school, he criticizes him with three claims, 
namely th t Ab  Y suf w s not from among the successors, he did not pray behind those who 
criticize the Jahmiyya, and he argued for the createdness of the Quran.
303
   
2. Uṣ    Ḥ                               Ḥ            t Based on Primary 
Sources 
As opposed to tr dition list  rgument for the independent  uthority of   dīth reports in 
establishing normative authority and, hence, orthodoxy and orthopraxy, the other camp that 
consists of theologians (mostly Mu‗tazila, Murji‘    nd jurists (fuq hā‘   rgued for   more 
complex way based on stratified checks and balances within the various sources and methods 
to determine normative solutions. It seems from the discussions of the period that this camp 
applied this source methodology in evaluating reports as well. Even though they did not 
specifically label this set of criteria for ev lu ting   dīth reports as using uṣ lī criticism,  n 
analysis of these criteria reveals that they require the text of the reports to be in coherence with 
some primary sources. According to the majority of the rationalist camp, it will be still 
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permissible (  ‟    to use   dīth reports  s evidence, but not necessary (     ); this is a nuance 
between the two camps that does not find mention in the current scholarship. However, this 
distinction also changed later in favor of the arguments of traditionalists toward the necessity 
of using reports.    
From the post-g p period,  l-D b sī lists four methods for criticizing a report after 
chain criticism:
304
  
1) Comparing the content of the report to the Quran. If it coincides, it is accepted. If it 
does not, it is rejected.  
2) Comparing the content of the report to the est blished sunn  ( l-sunn   l-thābit   
either with t wātur, or istifāḍ , or ijmā‗. 
3) Comparing the content to ‗       -     ‟ (widespread practice). If the content is 
in contradiction with widespread practice, the report becomes       (isolated) and 
is rejected. 
4) Likewise, if the content of report is something disagreed upon among the 
predecessors, (salaf   nd they did not rel te     dīth  bout the topic, the report 
should also be rejected.
305
   
The data from the gap period demonstrates that these criteria were extensively 
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discussed among the scholars. The rationalist camp argued for applying some of these criteria 
after chain criticism before accepting a solitary report. While the traditionalist camp responded 
to these arguments in different ways. This section discusses these debates around text criticism 
during the gap period. 
This general method of ev lu ting reports b sed on uṣ l is theoretic lly pointed out by 
the Z ydī im m  l-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm  l-R ssī (246/860). Al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm underlines the 
bitter partition between the traditionalists and rationalists with respect to the reports and the 
need for evaluating reports based on the       f   p                      p  : 
―The a l (b sis  of sunn  th t is embedded in the words of the prophet is th t upon 
which  n ijmā‗ occurred among the people of qibla. The far„ (subordinate) of sunna is 
what they disagreed upon. The second type of the reports from the prophet that is 
subject to disagreement should be compared to the aṣl ( greed upon p rt  of the Qur‘ān, 
of ‗ ql,  nd ijmā‗‖306  
Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm suggests in   concise theoretic l statement what ‗ sā b. Abān  nd 
other re son-b sed uṣ lī schol rs det iled extensively in their works. This  ppro ch finds 
mention in the l ter uṣ l liter ture  s rejecting   report th t is in contr diction with the cle r 
uṣ l sources (  -       -mumahhida) that are non-abrogated clear texts of the kitāb, sunn ,  nd 
ijmā‗. Ibn al-Murtaḍā cl ims th t the m jority of uṣ līs  nd tr ditionists (          n) accept 
                                                 
306  l-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm  l-R ssī, M    ‗, I,    .  
132 
this principle; while aṣ āb  l-  dīth reject.307 This might be taken as another indication of how 
the developed conditions of ev lu tion of reports during the g p period rem ined beyond the 
g p period in some non-Sunnī sources.308   
Another reason-based critique of the traditionalist approach to the corpus of reports is 
made by the famous Mu‗t zilī schol r  l-Iskāfī (     5   in his al-Mi„   . Al-Iskāfī cl ims 
that traditionalists (  -              -      ) engage in the study of transmitters and 
transmission itself, instead of grasping the text of the report. Therefore, according to  l-Iskāfī, 
they f il to distinguish  uthentic reports from in uthentic ones. The following st tements of 
 l-Iskāfī demonstr te the he ted deb tes on ev lu ting reports in the e rly third hijrī century 
and the role of reason in evaluating reports: 
―O you followers of reports  nd  dherents of the n rr tions of the prophet! We knew 
that you do not have the ability to derive knowledge, reason that would solve your 
needs, and inference that would take you to the intimate knowledge. You do not accept 
tools of reasoning, but at the same time argue that your opinions more accurate. How is 
that possible while if someone mentions the word reasoning [na ar], you become like 
an angry donkey. If, as a comparison, we raise your status to the level of pharmacists 
who do not know anything but the names of drugs and are ignorant about the diseases 
and their treatments, the people of reasoning [ahl al-na   ] would be the doctors… If 
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one keeps himself away from reasoning, how would he know how to evaluate authentic 
reports [         -khabar] when he hears them?‖309  
What we have seen in the section on the authority of reports concerning al-Na  ām‘s 
critiques confirms the search for reason-based verifications other than the mere superficial 
reliability of narrators. Al-N   ām  rgues th t one should not  ccept   report unless the report 
compels one to accept it with its inherent indications, or if one has external knowledge that 
indicates the correctness of the report, or if there is an analogical sign that shows the 
correctness of the report.
310
  Al-N   ām  lso criticizes the overly optimistic expectation of the 
traditionalists that if one is trustworthy and righteous, one‘s tr nsmission will be authentic. He 
states that there are many people known for their trustworthiness but who nevertheless tried to 
trick people by playing with the narrators in the chain [      ] by claiming to narrate from 
someone they did not meet. This fact has become known, al-Na  ām continues, when some of 
these individuals in their death beds have confessed what they claimed about the reports 
throughout their lives to be lies, after having benefitted from these lies through leadership and 
consuming others‘ property.311 Al-N   ām might h ve followed Hishām b.  l- akam in his 
critiques of reports. In addition to searching for compelling evidence to accept the solitary 
reports, Hishām, like al-Na  ām, does not distinguish between the reports of believers and 
                                                 
309  l-Iskāfī,   -M „   , 203-5. 
310
 Ess, Josef . "Ein Unbekanntes Fragment Des Nazzam." (1967), in The Orient in Research published by 
Wilhelm Hoenerbaoh, 171. 
311
 Ess, Josef . "Ein Unbekanntes Fragment Des Nazzam." (1967), 171-72. 
134 
unbelievers in establishing certainty.
312
  
The effects of interrel tions between the two  ppro ches of   dīth  uthentic tions th t 
emerged in the second/eight and early third/ninth centuries can be traced in the writings of the 
late third/ninth  nd e rly fourth tenth centuries. For inst nce,  l-Dārimī,  s will be mentioned 
in the following section, does not categorically reject comparing a report to the text of the 
Quran. In the valuable introduction to his al-Khi al where he discusses theoretic lly the topics 
of uṣ l  l-fiqh, Ab  B kr  l-Kh ffāf (d. between 340-60/952-70) mentions eight criteria to 
accept a report as authentic and use it as evidence for actions („    ), five of them for the chain 
and three of them for the text of the report:  
1) All narrators in the chain must be righteous („   ) up to the prophet Muhammad; 
 2) Each narrator must mention the earlier narrator he narrates from („   f    );   
3) Each narrator must have met the person he narrates from (adrakahu);  
4) Each narrator must have directly listened to the one from whom he narrates 
(al-    „      );  
5) Each narrator must use one of the following expressions in his narration to establish 
  v lid tr nsmission  ―he told us‖ (             or ―it w s recited to us‖ (    ‟  „         ―we 
recited to him (    ‟   „       ‖  or ―it w s recited to him  nd I w s listening‖ (    ‟  „       
wa-        „ ).  
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6) The content of the report must not be irrational (               -  „    ;  
7) The content must not be abrogated;  
8) The content must not have contradicting evidence.
313
  
The sixth and eighth conditions are clear indication of the influence of the rationalist 
camp. The eighth condition entails the general principle of the rationalist camp that is to 
compare the content of the solitary report to other superior sources of the known reports and 
the Quran.  
Now I will turn my attention to the certain principles of rationalist scholars in 
evaluating reports. I will examine the ways in which they apply textual comparisons in 
addition to chain criticism.  
a. Comparing Solitary Reports                         -         -          
                      
One of the main procedures of the rationalist camp in the process of authenticating 
reports was comparing the content of solitary reports to the known reports. What I translate 
with ―the known‖ I mean         or ma„  f reports  nd the reports th t  re supported with 
ijmā‗.  We h ve seen  lre dy how the Z ydī im m  l-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm stipul ted comparison 
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of the contents of the disagreed reports to that of the agreed upon reports before. We also see 
the early theorization of what later became fixed as al-         -mash    among the  n fīs  s 
  distinct  nd intermedi ry c tegory between consecutive (mut wātir  reports  nd solit ry 
reports throughout the gap period.  Independent studies on the concept of al-       
al-mash    sufficiently ex mine the m ture form of this   dīth c tegory  mong   n fīs. The 
examination below, however, deals with this concept as it was used as a condition for 
determining the authenticity of solitary reports.   
The cl ims over ijmā‗-supported reports and ma„  f reports are not distinct from one 
another. The rendering of the known reports in the p ssive voice points out the s me v gueness 
of ijmā‗ claims: ambiguous subjects.  The subjects who know the reports are absent in the 
concept, which enables the proponents of this method to enjoy unclear arguments loaded with 
bold claims, but makes their arguments vulnerable to possible attacks from their rivals at the 
s me time.  The known reports refer to the  ccumul ted reports within the K fī schol rly 
tr dition. The e rliest ex mples of this us ge c n be seen in the writings of Ab  Y suf  nd 
 l-Sh ybānī.314  
However, it was ‗ sā b. Abān who theorized this category, as mentioned above in the 
section of epistemic categories of reports, and underlined as a condition for the evaluation of 
solitary reports.  
Al-Ṭ  āwī (          rgues th t  mong   n fī schol rs including Ab  Y suf there 
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were those who rejected using a certain report based on three criteria. According to this report, 
Ibn M s‗ d s id th t on the night of Jinn the prophet m de       ‟ (ablution) with        
(fermented fruit drink) and said that it is purifying (ṭ    ). The three criteria that al-Ṭ  āwī 
mentions are as follows: First, the report did not come through valid ways (ṭ    ) that would 
make a report evidence for those who accept the authority of solitary report. Second, the report 
did not come with an evident narration (al-    ‟   -     ) with multiple chains (          
al-       ) that obliges one to act upon it, this being because one is required to use a report, 
only when it has multiple chains. Third, there are other reports that meet the criteria of both 
sides st ting th t Ibn ‗Abbās w s not with the prophet during that night.315 The first criterion is 
directly related to the quality of the reporters in the chain, which is shared by many, especially 
ahl al-  dīth. However, he mentions th t the fin l reporter should be ev lu ted b sed on 
whether he is well-known for his knowledge about the topic that the report covers, which is a 
different type of evaluation for the reporters than that of ahl al-  dīth who ev lu te the reporter 
on whether he heard from the one who is speaking in the text, i.e.       ‗.316 The second 
criterion and how al-Ṭ  āwī puts it  re cruci l to underst nding the  n fī  ppro ch to reports. 
He uses the word         , which is the verb form of           (consecutive). Yet, it seems 
that he uses it in its literal meaning, i.e. to occur consecutively, which is in parallel with what 
l ter  n fīs c lled  l-  dīth  l-m shh r. To s y it is not incumbent to use such reports me ns 
that the jurists are free to use them or not, which is in clear contradiction with the approach of 
ahl al-  dīth who  ssign  n independent binding  uthority to reports. According to this 
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criterion that al-Ṭ  āwī points out, only those reports th t h ve multiple ch ins would h ve 
such binding authority.  The last criterion he mentions is also important, because it is another 
indication of how text criticism plays an important role in evaluating a report among 
reason-based circles.  
Hilāl b. Y  yā (  5     ,   student of Ab  Y suf, prefers reports  pproving religious 
endowments due to their abundance and ampleness (           „     in opposition to Ab  
  nīf  who b ses his inv lid tion on the reports from the Qādī Shur yh.317 
Ab  J ‗f r  l-Iskāfī, the f mous Mu‗t zilī schol r,  rgues th t the text of   report should 
remain in its literal meaning and generality. The specification (takh   ) claims for a report 
invalidate the report as evidence unless there is another proof of specification explicated in the 
text or in another authentic report. As an example, he mentions that those who support the 
virtue of Ab  B kr report th t he s id th t ―I  m not the most virtuous one of you, even though 
I bec me your le der.‖ They pl ce   specific tion  fter virtuous ―in terms of line ge‖,  nd this 
is in contradiction to the generality of the text and its literal meaning.
318
  
b. Comparing the                                  ḍ          -  ḥ        
al-   ’    
One of the distinct conditions of K fī schol rs in ev lu ting reports w s to review the 
text of the solit ry report b sed on the content of the Qur n. The liter ture of uṣ l  l-fiqh points 
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out ‗ sā b. Abān  s the e rliest person who indic ted this  s   necess ry condition for 
evaluating solitary reports during the gap period.
319
 ‗ sā b. Abān  rgues th t even if other 
conditions are met, the content of the report still needs to be compared to the Quran based on 
the reports from the prophet  s ―The tr nsmission cl ims from me will incre se in the future. 
Wh t coincides with the content of the book of God is from me  wh t contr dicts it is not.‖320 
Multiple sources claim that his contemporary Ya yā b. M ‗īn (         rejected this report 
and argued that infidels (         f bric ted this   dīth. However, in his T ‟    , he rel tes 
this report from Ab  Hur yr  with no comment.321 
Nevertheless, it seems that a discussion on the K fīs‘ criterion had been present before 
‗ sā b. Abān. In al-„     wa-al-muta„allim,   tre tise  ttributed to him, Ab    nīf  points out 
the necessity of consistency between the Quran and the reports transmitted from the prophet.
322
 
Nonetheless, he does not mention the prophetic report th t w s used by his followers. 
Al-Shāfi‗ī mentions this discussion  nd refutes the n rr tion th t the K fīs used  s evidence. 
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This narration is different in wording from the previous one, but has the same meaning. It reads 
 s ―If a word reaches you from me, compare it to the book of Allah. If it fits it, this shows that 
I said it. If it does not, then I did not.‖323 As counter evidence, he narrates another report in 
which the prophet prohibits those who receive an order from the prophet  nd s y th t ―I do not 
underst nd. If I see it in the Qur n I would follow it.‖324 
From the e rly third hijrī century,  l-Jāhi  rel tes   simil r report from Ab  Hur yr  
without a chain with some additional details as follows:  
―Verily the reports from me will incre se  fter me, just  s h ppened to the prophets 
before me. Whatever claim comes to you from me, compare it to the book of God. If it 
coincides with it, it is from me regardless of whether I said it or did not say it.‖ (Inn  
 l-  ādīth s t kthur ‗ nnī b ‗dī k mā k thur t ‗ n  l- nbiyā‘ min q blī. F -mā jā‘ kum 
‗ nnī fa-‗riḍ hu ‗ lā kitāb All hi. F -mā wāf q  kitāb All hi f -huw  ‗ nnī qultuhu  w 
lam aqulhu.) 
325
  
Al-Ja i  also relates a more common wording of the report elsewhere as "―The lie will 
dissemin te  fter me. Comp re the s yings to the Qur n.‖ (S y fsh  al-kidhb ba‗dī. F -mā 
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jā‘ kum min  l-  dīth f -‗rid hu ‗ l  kitāb All hi. ‖326 This cle rly demonstr tes th t this 
criterion w s not limited to K f n schol rs of the time.  
Another recorded response from the traditionalist camp to this method comes from 
 l-Dārimī (        .  In his refut tion written in the di lectic l deb te form t with   follower 
of Bishr  l-M rīsī, his interlocutor rel tes the  bovementioned report from the f mous jurist 
Ab  Y suf  s follows  ―S yings tr nsmitted from me will dissemin te. Those th t coincide 
with the Qur n  re from me  those th t do not  re not from me.‖ (S y fsh   l-  dīth ‗ nnī. 
Fa-mā wāf q  minhā l-Qur‘ān f -huwa ‗ nnī. W -mā khāl f hu f -laysa ‗ nnī. 327 Al-Dārimī 
does not reject the report, rather interprets it differently.  He argues that his interlocutor relates 
this report to discourage people from the reports (     ). However, he continues, this report 
points out the fact that the reports will circulate among different kinds of people including 
righteous individuals and liars, or  those who are exact (mutqin) in their memories as well as 
those who deceive (mughfil). This is something traditionalists already accepted and forced 
them to only accept reports after criticism. Even though  l-Dārimī cl ims th t his interlocutor 
uses this report to inform the over ll critique of reports in gener l,  l-Dārimī  ccepts the 
method b sed on the verific tion of the Qur n for the contents of h dīth („  ḍ   -        „    
al-Q  ‟  ). Nonetheless, according to him, only those who are well-known traditionalist 
jurists and critics (al-F     ‟   -            -      ) are eligible for such a verification 
process, such  s M ‗m r, Mālik b. An s,  nd Sufyān  l-Th wrī who  re f mous with their 
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knowledge on reports and their meaning. He attacks Bishr al-M rīsī,  l-Th ljī,  nd  l-Lu‘lu‘ī 
who used to advocate this method and reject reports based on it, and were the predecessors of 
his interlocutor, claiming that theey were incompetent in applying such a method due to their 
lack of knowledge about both the reports and the supporting evidence for the reports from the 
Quran.
328
  
The last critique of this criterion from the  hl  l-  dīth during the g p period comes 
from Ibn Baṭṭa al-‗Akbarī (        . Ibn B ṭṭa relates the prophetic report with the full ch in, 
 nd reports the critiques of  l-Sājī (          nd ‗Alī b.  l-M dīnī (        , who cl imed th t 
the  lleged prophetic report w s f bric ted. Al-Akb rī ironic lly  rgues th t this prophetic 
report contradicts the Qur n,  uthentic   dīth,  nd the est blished sunn  (sunn  māḍiya).329 
Then instead of dealing with chain criticism of the report, he lists out what he believes are 
― uthentic reports‖ th t demonstr te the incorrectness of this report.  
The discussions between both parties show that the rationalist camp insisted on this 
method as a reaction to independent authority of solitary reports and to restrict their authority 
as much as possible in establishing normativity, because they argued for a more complex and 
stratified way for determining normativity based on sources. On the other hand, the 
traditionalist camp rejected the claim of the possibility of inconsistency between an authentic 
solitary report based on chain criticism and the content of the Quran, in order to retain the 
overarching independent status of solitary reports for determining normativity. 
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3. T ’w                            
Interpretation of existing reports became more important after majoritarian acceptance 
of solitary reports. Once the gate of rejecting reports categorically was closed, interpretive tool 
was used by the so-called rationalists to decrease the authority of a particular report that is in 
contradiction with the established theological or juristic system. On the other side, the 
proponents of the independent authority of reports also had to develop interpretive 
explanations against the critiques of their opponents for apparently contradictory reports. 
These efforts resulted in the emergence of a sub-field called reconciliation of the contradictory 
reports (  ‟            f   -      ). One of the earliest examples of these critiques of 
contradictions in reports was given by al-N   ām who  rgued for the f bric tion of h dīths 
even by righteous tr nsmitters. He s id, for inst nce, ―Those who transmitted that the prophet 
s id th t ‗the best gener tion is the gener tion I live in‘  re the s me people who tr nsmitted 
th t the prophet s id th t ‗My umm  is just like r in; it is not known whether its beginning is 
better or its end.‘‖330 Al-J  i   rgues that one of the main problems of available reports is that 
they are often narrated without any information about their contexts, which makes them 
ambiguous; hence, their literal meanings are in need of accurate interpretation and 
contextualization before jumping to conclusions based on literal meanings alone.
331
  
One of the tools used for interpretation of reports was naskh, i.e. abrogation. It was not 
uncommon to solve contradictory reports that meet the aforementioned certain conditions on 
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the basis of abrogation. Yet, abrogation claims should also rely on principles and be free from 
 rbitr ry  rguments. ‘ sā b. Abān, for inst nce, reportedly used l ter pr ctices of the 
companions as the sign of abrogation when they are in contradiction with the reports from the 
prophet. He gives the ex mple of wh t Ubād  b. Al- āmit reported from the prophet for 
including banishment with the   dd punishment. Yet, due to the pr ctices of ‗Alī  nd ‗Um r in 
contr diction with this prophetic report, ‘ sā concludes th t the report must have been 
abrogated.
332
  
Another important principle was to specify the generality of a report on the basis of the 
juristic preference of its first n rr tor.  ‘ sā b. Abān is reported to h ve held this opinion  nd 
g ve Ab  Hur yr ‘s h dīth  nd his specifying ruling  s  n ex mple. According to this   dīth, 
the prophet ordered the washing of a vessel from which a dog had drunk seven times; however, 
Ab  Hur yr  himself  rgued th t the prophet emph sized recurring w shings, not   specific 
number, hence it is sufficient to wash three times.
333
 The same example appears in al-Ṭ  āwī‘s 
collection  nd he interprets Ab  Hur yr ‘s own opinion in contradiction with his report from 
the prophet as an indication of abrogation. He also states that between two contradictory 
reports the one with the most elements to it should take precedence as a response to 
traditionalists who reject the abrogation claim, yet take the report of Ab  Hur yr   nd instead 
of the report of ‗Abd All h b. Al-Mughaffil, whose report requires eight washings with the 
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eighth washing including dirt.
334
 
Mu  mm d b. Shujā‗,   re son-based follower of the K fī school, w s reported to even 
h ve  ttempted to interpret the reports th t he did not  ccept  s  uthentic. Ab  S ‗īd  l-Dārimī 
criticizes Ibn Shujā‗ for this with the following words  ―Wo to you! We defend the h dīth, but 
criticize it too [for obvious re sons   but even though you disgr ce the   dīth, then you verify 
it, interpret it and try to find ways to reconcile it (taltamis lahu l-        ) in order to maintain 
it. If this h dīth is denied (munkar , your interpret tion should be denied even more.‖335  It is 
clear that al-Dārimī w s trying to prove th t his group,  hl  l-  dīth, have accurate criteria to 
ev lu te   dīth  nd these people ( l-Thaljī  nd the like) cannot even distinguish between 
obviously fabricated reports and then they try to interpret them. We do not exactly know 
al-Th ljī‘s re son in this particular instance, but bringing to mind other similar examples, one 
can see that rationalists or more precisely those who were critical of h dīths, were engaging in 
a preemptive interpretational process for reports that might be possibly defended by some 
scholars based on certain criteria. 
This section discussed the rich debates on the conditions of solitary reports and their 
interpretation. It has demonstrated that along with the increasing role of solitary reports in the 
gap period after the majoritarian approval of their authority, the discussions intensified around 
the conditions for the authenticity of solitary reports. The traditionalist camp insisted on the 
sufficiency of looking for conditions that reveal the reliability of the transmitters in the chain., 
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while the rationalists suggested certain other conditions in relation to the text of the reports for 
accepting the authenticity of solitary reports in addition to the reliability of transmitters. The 
motives behind these two approaches can be explained with their overall approaches to the 
issue of text versus reason. The traditionalists strived to preserve the authority of reports 
independent from reason, while the rationalists strived to give a secondary role to the texts that 
attain only probability and applied their stratified method that is based on evaluating secondary 
sources with primary ones.  
E. The K fī Appro ch to Reports  W s There   Tr dition liz tion of Ahl 
al-ray?  
The K f n school, the so-called ahl al-r ‘y, h s been frequently portr yed  s h ving 
more or less  n  nti-  dīth inclin tion. This gener l cl ssific tion  ffects researchers in 
evaluating different schools, hence results in inaccurate conclusions. The common explanation 
within the field in terms of the relationship between different scholarly groups during the first 
centuries of Islam is that they approached one  nother through   synthesis between r ‘y  nd 
  dīth. The form tion of the schools is also explained with the same theory.336 However, this 
theory suffers from sweeping generalization and anachronism. If such a synthesis ever 
happened between rationalists and traditionalists, one would not argue for this after the second 
hijrī century. In this section, I will ev lu te the cl ims on the tr dition liz tion of  hl  l-r ‘y. 
In his work Authority, Continuity and Change in Islamic Law, Hallaq argues that 
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147 
Mu  mm d b. Ibn Shuj ‗  l-Th ljī (         w s the first person who  ccomplished the 
substitution of   dīth with r ‘y in   n fī leg l thinking b sed on   sentence in Ibn N dīm‘s 
(438/1047) account.
337
 H ll q tr nsl tes wh t Ibn N dīm s ys  s the following ―He w s the 
one who flipped (fataqa) Ab    nīf ‘s leg l thought upside down, brought evidence for it, 
demonstr ted its re sons  nd reinforced it with h dīth.‖338 However, the f mous B ghdādī 
Mu‗t zilī  l-K ‗bī (         uses ex ctly the s me words for Ab  ‗Abd All h b. Abī Duwād 
(240/854), the well-known chief qādī of  l-M ‘m n, ―He w s the one who fataqa Ab  
  nīf ‘s leg l thought, provided evidence for it, demonstr ted  nd reinforced it with 
h dīth.‖339 Two scholars shared the same teknonym(kunya   s Ab  ‗Abd All h, but had no 
reported relationship other than that. Therefore, if one should be given credit for 
tr dition lizing   n fism due to these words, Ibn Abī Duwād should deserve this more th n 
Ibn Shujā‗. Nonetheless, H ll q mistr nsl tes the word fataqa. Let us put the actual meaning of 
the word aside for a moment; tr nsl ting it  s ―He w s the one who turned the leg l thought of 
Ab   nīf  upside down‖ st nds contr ry to the context of the phrase that is filled with praise 
for the accomplishment of  the person in question. Therefore, I think, the actual meaning of 
fataqa should be ―m ke   bre kthrough‖ in the sense of development b sed on its liter l 
meaning,
340
 hence the me ning of the phr se should be ―He w s the one who m de   
bre kthrough in Ab    nīf ‘s leg l thought.‖ Mu  mm d b. Shujā‗ w s cert inly one of the 
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 Ibn al-N dīm, al-Fihrist, 256. 
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 al-K ‗bī, Faḍl al- „     , 105. 
340
 The literal meaning is to break, to crack, to cleave something. See al-Fīr zābādī, Q       -mu  ṭ, ―f-t-q‖, 
916. 
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import nt schol rs who contributed to the h dīth schol rship of the reason-based camp of the 
third hijrī century. Nonetheless, his influence on the tr dition liz tion of K fī-  n fī school 
was insignificant. We will discuss his contribution below.  
 One of the main elements that blurs the discussion is the fact that what is meant by the 
traditionalization of ahl al-r ‘y is vague. Is it  ccepting   dīth c tegoric lly  s   w y of 
knowledge? Is it giving more import nce to h dīth in leg l re soning  Is it  ccepting solit ry 
reports (khabar al-       in l w  Is it ch mpioning   dīths over  ll other sources in leg l 
reasoning? Is it accepting prophetic (marfu‘    dīth over other reports from the comp nions 
and successors  Is it  ccepting ch ined   dīth  s the only or the m in w y of reproducing 
knowledge in Isl mic sciences  s  hl  l-  dīth tend to do  These questions  ddress different 
 ppro ches tow rd   dīth  nd would ch nge the  nswer we look for concerning the 
traditionalization of ahl al-r ‘y. At f ce v lue, it  ppe rs th t with the current expl n tions the 
first two questions are what is meant in the traditionalization of ahl al-r ‘y. Since the 
above-mentioned portrayal of ahl al-r ‘y in ccur tely describes it as  nti-  dīth, rese rchers 
try to speak to the time it took for the categorical acceptance of   dīth and their usage in legal 
thinking. I argue that an accurate analysis for the question of whether there was a 
traditionalization of the   n fīs c n be achieved by looking at whether the significance of 
reports incre sed in H n fī leg l thinking in terms of both the quantity of reports and any 
changes in criteria for accepting reports.  If these factors, especially the latter one, resemble 
the approach of ahl al-  dīth we c n  rgue for the tr dition liz tion of  n fīs. In wh t follows 
I will try to provide such an analysis based on the accounts of proto-  n fī  nd  n fī schol rs 
about their own approaches and the perceptions of ahl al-  dīth schol rs regarding the 
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approaches of their adversaries.   
One of the important facts skipped in modern scholarship is that early reason-based 
schol rs (including   n fī founding figures from among the ahl al-r ‘y, Mu‗t zilīs,  nd 
Murji‗īs  were not unf mili r with h dīth reports and did not reject these reports categorically, 
as demonstrated above within this chapter. Narrations were always a part of the scholarship 
produced within those circles. However, they were not eager to give privileged superior 
authority to the solitary reports than existing well-known practices, widely accepted or 
well-known reports,  nd cert in r tion l principles including but not limited to qiyās th t 
evolved over time as opposed to their adversaries in the  ijāz  nd l ter in ‗Irāq. On the other 
hand, the traditionalist scholars criticized the subjectivity of reason and found it safer to stick 
to e rlier  uthorities, in order to protect the ―true religion‖  nd  chieve sound results within 
this frame. Hence, reports, including solitary reports were the best tools to derive this authority 
to solve existing legal, theological, and religio-ethical problems. The difference between the 
traditionalist and reason-based camps was this distinct approach to the existing collections of 
h dīth in terms of  uthority  nd different criteri  th t resulted from these  ppro ches in 
evaluating these reports.  
One of the discussions from the gap period that sheds some light on the approaches of 
proto-  n fīs  nd the responses of  hl  l-  dīth is the  forementioned discussion  bout Ab  
Y suf‘s exclusion of the opinions of the successors from the definition of athar. Al-Dārimī 
argues that the correct way to put it is that the disagreement of the successors is not a binding 
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sunna as opposed to the sunna of the prophet or his companions.
341
 Despite saying that, 
al-Dārimī  lso cl ims th t the opinions of the successors  re still more binding (alzam) than 
those of Ab  Y suf or his followers due to the verse in the Qur n th t points to their 
virtuousness.
342
  
As this criticism of Ab  Y suf by   member of the traditionalist demonstrates, what 
early figures of ahl al-r ‘y were trying to do is to develop  n evaluative method for existing 
reports distinct from that of the traditionalists. This method had different factors, but they all 
served to give jurists more room to enjoy ijtihād  nd to give less binding  uthority to reports. 
The main factors can be summarized as follows: First, they restricted the authority of reports 
b sed on the first spe king person in the reports. Ab  Y suf‘s exclusion of the reports of the 
successors from the realm of athar was aiming at that. He and his colleague al-Sh ybānī used 
these reports in their works though, but not as independently authoritative texts, but rather as 
supporting texts that a jurist can decide to use or not to use. Second, despite not rejecting 
solitary reports categorically, they stipulated that the text of solitary report should not 
contradict with the Quran, the established practices (sunna), and well-known reports (     f ḍ 
or        ). This condition was what constituted the main distinct approach to reports 
between ahl al-r ‘y  nd  hl  l-  dīth, bec use it w s up to the jurist to decide how exactly a 
report is in contradiction with these other sources.  
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 Ab  S ‗īd  l-Dārimī, Naqḍ, 593. 
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 Qur n,        ―All h is ple sed with the predecessors from  nṣār (M dīn n Muslims   nd muhājir 
(immigr nt Muslims from Mecc    nd with those who followed them in the right m nner. ‖ 
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The founding scholars of the K fī-  n fī school showed   signific nt interest in 
reports, which c n be e sily seen in the ext nt works of Ab  Y suf  nd  l-Sh ybānī who 
compiled their reports in their books entitled al-      and reported frequently from their 
master Ab    nīf  in these works. Zuf r b. Huz yl w s reported to h ve been from  ṣ āb 
al-  dīth  nd   s n b. Ziyād (         is reported to h ve written more th n       reports 
 bout leg l m tters from Ibn Jur yj,  nd Kh fṣ b. Ghiyāth  l-Qāḍī (         is reported to have 
narrated more than 4000 reports from his memory.
343
 As I have shown elsewhere, 
al-Sh ybānī‘s cert in works were  bund nt in report content no less th n his tr dition list 
colle gues, such  s Mālik or  l-Shāfi‗ī. B sed on his works, I  rgue th t despite having a vague 
methodology for chain criticism similar to the traditionalists, we can observe distinct aspects in 
the proto-  n fī schol rs. For example, they developed a specific interest in text criticism and 
mostly regarded it as more important than chain criticism. Another distinct aspect was the 
significance of well-known reports and the reports supported by existing practices in 
proto-  n fī  ppro ches to reports. L ter in the liter ture, this interest w s turned into   
different category between consecutive reports and solitary reports as famous report (al-       
al-mash   ).   As for the criteria for preferring one solitary report over the other, we see the 
significance of well-known reports  g in. These principles in ev lu ting   dīth did not seem to 
have changed during the gap period.  
In the remaining part of this section, I will attempt to analyze the contributions of three 
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scholars who are more likely to have role in the traditionalization of the K fī school  nd h ve 
been subjects of certain pieces research about reports  ‗ sā b. Abān, Ibn  Shujā  l-Th ljī,  nd 
al-Ṭ  āwī. However, before de ling with this, I w nt to point out the f mous K fī schol rs 
known for their knowledge of   dīths to provide   rough sketch with reg rd to their 
contributions. Identifying the contributions of the followers of the K fī tr dition to the 
discussions  nd theory of kh b r in this tr dition is not  n e sy t sk. Zāhid  l-K wthārī gives   
list of tr ditionists  nd memorizers of   dīth in   tre tise.344 However, many of the names that 
 ppe r in his list do not  ctu lly belong to the K fī tr dition. In the following list, I will try to 
provide K fī schol rs who were mentioned with their knowledge of reports in the biogr phic l 
and bibliographical accounts during the 3
rd
/9
th
 and 4
th
/10
th
 centuries: 
From the second generation: 
◆ Mu‗ llā b. M nṣ r  l-Rāzī (        345 was probably one of the 
exception l K fī schol rs who w s seen  s a reliable transmitter by the famous 
traditionists.   
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 It is published at the end of al-Z yl ‗ī‘s Na b al-R ‟  .  
345
 He w s   student of Ab  Y suf  nd h s  n ext nt work entitled al-N      . He is regarded among the 
reli ble tr nsmitters. Among tr ditionists, Ibn Abī Sh yb , Muslim b.   jjāj, Tirmidhī, Ibn Māj , Ab  Dā‘ d, 
al-N sā‘ī,  nd  l-Dār quṭnī report from him in their compil tions. See Ab   l- asan al-‗Ijlī (      5 , T      
al-          5.  Ibn Abī Sh yb , Mu annaf, I,  5 ,      VI,      VII,      Muslīm, Ṣa   , I, 384; III, 1176; IV, 
    .  Tirmidhī, Sunan, IV,      V,   .  Ibn Māj , Sunan, I,  5   III,      IV,    .  Ab  Dā‘ d, Sunan, I, 227; 
III, 445.; al-N sā‘ī, Sunan, V, 398.; al-Dār qutnī, Sunan, I, 32. 
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◆ ‗Isā b. Abān (        346  
◆ ‗Alī b.  l-J ‗d (      5  w s one of few tr ditionists of B ghdād 
affiliated with the Irāqī tr dition  nd h s     dīth compil tion.347 Even though he 
n rr tes from Ab  Y suf  nd his reports  re n rr ted by  l-Ṭ  āwī, he w s inclined 
more to the traditionist scholars of Irāq such  s  l-Shu‗b  (          nd Sufy n b. 
‗Uy yn  (        .348 Some famous traditionists including al-Bukhārī, Ab  Khātim, 
 nd Ab  Dāw d n rr ted his reports in their compil tions.  
◆ Mu  mm d b. S mmā‗  (        349 was also mentioned in the 
sources with his study in the field of   dīth. But, only   few tr ditionists mentioned his 
reports in their collections.  
• Ibn  Shujā  l-Thalji (266/880) 
From the third generation: 
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 al-S ym rī, A       A   Ḥ   f              147-54. Despite his influence on later   n fī texts, I c nnot 
identify any traditionist compiler transmitting from him. 
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 This compilation is known with various titles including al-J ‗diyyāt  nd Musn d ‗Alī b.  l-J ‗d. The 
transmission of al-B gh wī  of this compil tion h s been edited  nd published by Abd  l-M hdī ibn ‗Abd 
 l-Qādir in   doctor l dissert tion project. See ‗Alī Ibn  l-J ‗d,  ,  Ed. ‗Abd  l-M hdī ibn ‗Abd  l-Qādir Ibn 
‗Abd  l-Hādī, Musnad ibn al-J   , Tr nsmission of Abd Allāh ibn Mu  mm d  l-B gh wī.  l-Kuw yt  
M kt b t  l-F lā ,    5. 
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 See ‗Alī b. l-J ‗d, Musnad, 733-767; 896.; al-Ṭa āwī n rr tes more th n    reports from ‗Alī b.  l-J ‗d. See 
for a few examples al-Ṭa āwī, Shar    „   ‟   -       I, 221, 438, 451. 
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 He was born in 130/748 and learnt from Ab  Y suf  nd  l-Sh ybānī. He bec me   qāḍī in the western 
district of B ghdād  nd is reg rded  s   memorizer of   dīth  nd reli ble tr nsmitter (      ) and is praised by 
many including Ya yā b. M ‗īn (         al-Khaṭīb al-B ghdādī. See W kī‗, Akh      -quḍ    III, 282.; 
al-Khaṭīb al-B ghdādī, T                III, 298. Among the traditionist al-Ṭ b rānī tr nsmits from him in his 
compilation. See al-Ṭ b rānī, al-M „      -awsaṭ, III, 31. 
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• A m d b. Abī ‗Imrān (         w s   schol r of   dīth  nd   student of 
Mu  mm d b. S mmā‗  (233/848) and Bishr b. al-W līd (     5  . He w s  ppointed 
to Miṣr  s   qāḍī. He w s rel ting reports from Mu  mm d b. S mmā‗ , Ibn Shujā‗ , 
 nd ‗Alī b. Al-J ‗d from K fī schol rs  s well  s from Ibn Abī Sh yb   nd Ab  ‗Ub yd 
al-Qāsim b. S llām from tr ditionists.350  Al-Ṭ  āwī rel tes more th n    reports from 
him in S               -     . 
• B kkār b. Qut yb  (         w s   student of ilāl  l-R ‘y, who w s   
student of Ab  Y suf  nd Zuf r,  nd B kkār w s  lso one of the te chers of 
al-Ṭ  āwī.351 He related reports from Ab  Dāw d  l-Ṭ yālīsī (        ,  n e rly 
  dīth memorizer  nd   student of the f mous B ṣr n tr ditionist  l-Shu‗b  b.  l-  jjāj 
(160/777), among others. Al-Ṭ  āwī rel tes more th n     reports from B kkār b. 
Qutayba in S               -       and 17 reports in S       „   ‟   -     . 
• Abu  āzim  l-Qāḍī (      5 352  w s  lso   student of Hilāl  l-R ‘y. 
Al-Ṭ  āwī n rr tes four reports from him in S       „   ‟   -     .353   
From the fourth generation: 
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 He was born in 184/800 appointed as a governor by al-Mutawakkil to Miṣr in 246/860 and remained in his 
post for about 24 years, then was imprisoned by A m d b. T l n. See  l-Kindī  K       -      wa-al-quḍ  , 
339-40. 
352
 He le rnt from ‗ sā b. Abān  nd Ibn  l-Mus nnā  nd bec me   qāḍī He w s known for his knowledge of 
  dīth  nd w s one of the te chers of  l-Ṭa āwī.  
353
 al-Ṭa āwī, Shar    „   ‟   -       I, 310, 331; IV, 41, 250. 
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• Ab  J ‗f r  l-Ṭ  āwī (         
‗ sā b. Abān (         is prob bly one of the most f mous K fī schol rs well-known 
for his knowledge on   dīth. According to wh t  l-  ym rī relates in his work, ‗ sā w s   
friend of Ibn S mmā‗   nd Ibn S mmā‗  invited him to join the circle of al-Sh ybānī. He w s 
at first hesitant to join, because he was under the influence of traditionalist propaganda against 
the K fī tr dition on the  ccus tion of contr dicting reports.354  ‗ sā is reported to h ve written 
a refutation of al-Shāfi‗ī  nd Bishr  l-M rīsī on the topic of reports entitled   -R    „          
  -M      wa-al-S  f „  f   -      .355 Al-Ṭ  āwī cites ‗ sā b. Abān‘s interpret tion of cert in 
reports on a few occasions, but does not actually relate any report of his.
356
 In his work, ‗ s  b. 
Abān st nds more  s   theoretician and exegete of reports as a jurist than as a mere transmitter. 
In the richest source for the opinions of ‗ s  b. Abān, al-F    , al-J ṣṣāṣ also portrays him in a 
similar light, describing his theoretical statements regarding reports.
357
 Development of 
distinct approaches of the K fī school to the reports owes much to ‗ sā b. Abān. ‗ sā b. Abān 
represents a loyal adherent of the K fī school‘s methods in ev lu ting reports  nd w s f r from 
accepting the superiority of the traditionalist methods for evaluating and interpreting reports. 
He maintains the superiority of various tools of reasoning vis-a-vis the independent authority 
of the literal meaning of reports.  
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 I mentioned his contributions in the theoretic l level  bove in this ch pter. For  nother ex min tion of his 
thoughts on reports see Bedir, Murtez , "An E rly Response to Shāfiʿī  ʿ sā B. Abān on the Prophetic Report 
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Ibn Shujā‗ w s   student of   s n b. Ziyād  l-Lu‘lu‘ī (        , who w s one of the 
eminent students of Ab    nīf . He is largely known for his knowledge of Quranic recitation 
and fiqh.
358
 The   n fī histori ns  l-S ym rī  nd  l-Qur shī point out his knowledge of 
  dīth in  ddition to fiqh  nd qirā‘ ,  s well.359 Among his works, K              -      
appears like a work in which he explained his evaluating criteria for reports.
360
 However, his 
name appears only five time in al-Ṭ  āwī‘s works. In  ll inst nces, either  l-Ṭ  āwī mentions 
the opinions of Ibn Shujā‗ or Ibn Shujā‗ reports  n opinion from earlier scholars. No single 
m rf ‗ (prophetic  or m wq f (from a comp nion  report th t Ibn Shujā‗ rel tes exists in these 
works.
361
 In the bibliogr phic l records of m nuscripts, only one work of Ibn Shujā‗ is 
available, entitled K       -  ff     and catalogued with the number 05 ba 197 in Amasya 
Bey zıt   . However, I discovered in my research on this manuscript that this attribution to Ibn 
Shujā‗ is erroneous  nd the book is just   copy of  l-Bukhārī‘s section of Kitab al-K ff     in 
his al-Ṣ    . Hence, in order to tr ce the thoughts of Ibn Shujā‗ reg rding reports  nd his 
contribution, if any, to the tr dition liz tion of   n fī school, we h ve only the l ter sources 
that cite his opinions.   
Al-Ṭ  āwī (         is prob bly one of more likely candidates to look at for his role in 
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traditionalizing the  n fī school due to his works in the field of   dīth  nd  bund nt existing 
secondary studies that try to reveal his contribution to this field.
362
 He was al-Muz nī‘s 
nephew, the well-known disciple of al-Shāfi‗ī,  nd is known for his contribution to the 
liter ture of   dīth with his works such  s S       „      -       S     M         -       and 
al-Sunan al-  ‟      (his narration of al-Shāfi‗ī‘s Sunnan from his uncle al-Muz nī . He is 
also reported to h ve written   book entitled ―I      f   -        „              -K f     ‖, 
whose title implies that it was a book on the reconciliation of reports based on the methods of 
the K f n school.363 According to what is reported from him, before inclining toward the K fī 
tradition, he had been first under the influence of his uncle and used to prefer al-Shāfi‗ī‘s 
opinions until he met A m d b. Abī ‗Imrān (        ,   follower of the K fī tr dition  nd   
schol r of   dīth, who c me to Miṣr  s   qāḍī.364 Many scholars including the Shāfi‗ī schol rs 
al-N w wī  nd  l-Dh h bī mentioned  l-Ṭ  āwī  s one of the le ders of   dīth during his 
time.
365
 However, some proponents of traditionalists criticized him. For instance, al-B y  qī 
(458/1066) makes important statements when he criticizes al-Ṭ  āwī  nd his ev lu tion of 
reports: 
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When I began to write this book, one of our fellows from ahl al-‗ilm sent me   letter in 
which he complained about the book of al-Ṭ  āwī, m y All h h ve mercy upon us  nd 
him, saying that he [al-Ṭ  āwī  criticizes  uthentic reports of tr dition lists (ahl al-„    
bi-l-     h) when they contradict his opinion and he authenticates their weak reports 
when they are in parallel with his opinion. And he asked me to respond to what he 
follows in evaluation of reports (al-       wa-al-  „   ). I asked Allah to help me in 
reaching the better conclusion in this work of mine in looking at and responding to his 
evaluation methods. In fact, the answer to this scholar (al-shaykh) in most of what he 
argues for and against the reports when he equates the reports to his opinion by either 
criticizing authentic reports or authenticating weak reports exists in the word of 
al-Shāfi‗ī, m y All h h ve mercy upon him.366      
 This criticism, despite having a biased tone, includes also a claim that al-Ṭ  āwī 
derived his knowledge from traditionalists. Even though this claim might be partially true, 
bec use there were tr dition list schol rs  mong his te chers  nd he did n rr te   dīths from 
traditionists, al-Ṭ  āwī mostly relied on the reports  v il ble in the K fī tr dition  nd followed 
its method in evaluating reports. His rejection of the independent authority of reports seems to 
have been taken as preferring reports based on arbitrary reasoning by al-B y  qī  nd his 
fellow traditionalists. This quote also shows that the impact of the distinct evaluation methods 
of the K fī tr dition w s still alive during the e rly fifth hijrī century to the extent th t 
traditionalist scholars compelled themselves to respond to these methods.  
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 Al-B yh qī occ sion lly tries to respond to the cl ims of  l-Ṭ  āwī in this work. 
These refutations also show that al-Ṭ  āwī w s  pplying ch in criticism  nd w s 
knowledge ble of this type of   dīth criticism. For inst nce,  l-T  āwī criticizes a report in 
which the f mous Ibn Shihāb  l-Zuhrī reports from ‗Urw  b.  l-Zubayr, while it is apparent 
from other reports that he actually heard it from ‗Abd All h b. Abī B kr who rel ted it from 
‗Urw . Since Ibn Shihāb‘s tr nsmission from ‗Urw  is regarded as more authentic than Abd 
All h b. Abī B kr‘s n rr tion from ‗Urw , someone in the ch in must h ve removed  ‗Abd 
All h b. Abī B kr. Al-Ṭ  āwī notes th t  nd criticizes the report with t dlīs ( dding   person 
into the chain or removing a person from it).
367
 Al-B y  qī responds to this cl im by s ying 
―Wh t h ppens if he  dds someone known  nd reli ble into the ch in  A report becomes we k, 
when a reliable transmitter adds someone unknown or unreliable between him and the earlier 
narrators. If he adds someone reliable, the   dīth rem ins in its  uthenticity  s evidence.‖368 
Similarly, al-Ṭ  āwi rejects   report on the b sis th t one n rr tor is not known to have 
definitely met the person from whom he narrates. Al-B y  qī  rgues th t if the n rr tor is 
reli ble, not  ccused with t dlīs,  nd there is   possibility of the meeting of the two narrators, 
the report should be accepted according to the criteria of ahl al-‗ilm  nd fiqh, i.e. the 
traditionalists.
369
  
 Another example of how al-Ṭ  āwī disc rds   report which is sound according to 
the criteria of ahl al-  dīth w s   report on necessity to wash vessels seven times if they come 
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into contact with dog saliva. Al-Ṭ  āwī rel tes this report, but s ys th t in  nother report it is 
transmitted that the narrator Ab  Hur yr  himself ruled th t w shing such a container only 
three times is enough, which al-Ṭ  āwī sees  s  n indic tion of  brog tion.370 However, 
al-B y  qī criticizes him in  ccepting   report th t h s   lower st tus for the  brog tion of   
report that has a higher status narrated by many reliable transmitters of traditionalists.
371
 
In another topic, al-Ṭ  āwī prefers   report th t is in p r llel with the opinions of the 
founding scholars of the K fī tr dition, Ab   nīf , Ab  Y suf,  nd  l-Sh ybānī  nd rejects a 
report of the traditionalists due to the equivocal meaning of a word (qullatayn) in the report. He 
also criticizes them with inconsistency in their claims of taking the literal meaning (     ) in 
the report, while they add some other conditions to be applied to the literal meaning of the 
text.
372
 What al-Ṭ  āwī implies is th t one h s to underst nd possible me nings of the report 
beyond its apparent (     ) meaning by applying various tools of reasoning, in order to derive 
accurate rulings from it. Even though traditionalists argue for sticking to the apparent meaning, 
they fail to do so. Al-B y  qī responds to the critique of  l-Ṭ  āwī with  n  ccus tion of 
ignorance for the meaning of the word and states that his own ignorance does not decrease the 
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authority of the report.
373
 
 Another important element that is crucial to revealing whether al-Ṭ  āwī h s an 
inclination toward traditionalism and a role in traditionalizing the K fī school in his al-S     
  „   ‟   -      and S              -      is to identify the transmitters he narrates from. He 
narrates from his uncle al-Muz nī    reports  ll of which are from al-Shāfi‗ī. Another 
import nt tr dition list A m d b.   nb l is mentioned with his reports in S             
al-      many times and al-Ṭ  āwī  cknowledges his  uthority in the science of   dīth, but his 
name appears only twice in S       „   ‟   -     .374 The name of the famous traditionist 
al-Bukhārī  ppe rs m ny times  s   histori n  nd   critic of tr nsmitters in the science of ch in 
criticism with his work al-T     , rather than as     dīth compiler.375 Therefore, this shows 
that al-Ṭ  āwī he vily relied on the critiques of tr nsmitters within the tr dition list liter ture, 
obviously due to the  bsence of such works in the K fī tr dition.  
Ibn Taymiyya (728/1328) points out this distinctness of al-Ṭ  āwī where he m kes   
comment about the al-Ṭ  āwī‘s schol rship on   dīth  nd his l ck of knowledge  bout ch in 
criticism, which also supports my argument for his convoluted role in the traditionalization of 
  n fīs   
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And al-Ṭ  āwī‘s method in the critique of   dīth w s not the s me of th t of people of 
knowledge [ahl al-„    . Therefore, he n rr tes in his ―S       „      -     ‖ v rious 
reports  nd prefers mostly those th t  re in p r llel with qiyās th t he sees as evidence. 
His preferred reports are mostly criticized in their chains and are not authentic. Despite 
narrating many reports, being a scholar and a jurist, his knowledge on the chain was not 
like that of people of knowledge.
376
 
This quote is another indication of how al-Ṭ  āwī, despite his involvement in  nd 
relationship with traditionalist scholars and sharing certain criteria in chain criticism, differs 
from them with cert in other criteri  in   dīth ev lu tion, especi lly his emph sis on text 
criticism. He remained loyal to certain methods of evaluating reports developed within the 
generations of ahl al-r ‘y, however,  lso followed the liter ture of tr dition lists to   
considerable extent. Al-Qur shī notes th t  l-Ṭa āwī  lso wrote   refut tion of the famous 
follower of the K fī school ‗Isā b. Abān, which h s not survived or h s not been discovered.377 
Taking into account ‗ Isā b. Abān‘s contribution to the theory of report within the school, this 
refutation most likely aimed at certain opinions of ‗ Isā b. Abān reg rding the reports. Based on 
the data provided in the writings of al-Ṭ  āwī, we c n s fely  rgue th t while accepting the 
superior  uthority of tr dition list schol rs in reports beg n in the e rly fourth hijrī century 
with al-Ṭ  āwī, cert in principles  nd criteri  were nonetheless retained.  
The complete traditionalization of the   n fī school in the sense of  ccepting the 
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authority of traditionalist scholars, their   dīth compil tions,  nd ev lu tion criteria for reports 
over those of the K fī tr dition indeed occurred, but rel tively l ter in periods when the victory 
of the traditionalists in the field of   dīth had been by and large accepted by the scholars of the 
  n fī school. Beginning with the  th/10th century, many   n fī schol rs, especi lly schol rs 
of transoxania (M         -nahr), were increasingly labelled as traditionists in the sense of a 
  dīth schol r, tr nsmitter,  nd memorizer (  f    such  s A m d b. ‗Ismā‗īl  l-S m rq ndī 
(        , Ismā‗īl b. Y ‗q b (        , ‗Abd All h b. Mu  mm d  l-B dīlī (     55  Ab  
 l-Qāsim us yn b. Mu  mm d (  5       Ismā‗īl b. Mu  mm d  l-  jjājī (         ,  nd 
‗Alī b. ‗Abd All h  l-Tājir (          .378 These scholars seldom used the collections of 
  dīth existing in the K fī-  n fī tr dition.  
However, al-Sarakhsī (          still supported the criteria of reviewing solitary 
reports based on the Quran and mashh r sunn ,  nd criticized those who began to ignore these 
criteria and muddled the order of sources by elevating solitary reports over the Quran or 
mashh r sunn  in the l te 5th/11th century.379  
In his book N      -  ‟  , the f mous   n fī jurist  nd h dīth schol r  l-Z yl ‗ī 
(          identifies the sources  nd the  uthenticity of the   dīths used in the f mous legal 
text of the school al-M rghinānī‘s al-H     . Indeed, all of the sources he uses are the 
collections of traditionalist scholars including the Kutub al-sitt , Mālik‘s al-M   ṭṭ , A m d 
b.   nb l‘s al-Musnad, and even M      f of Ibn Abī Sh yb  who wrote one of the earliest 
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refut tions of Ab   nīf . He does not use the collections of reports of the e rlier figures such 
as al-      of al-Sh ybānī, or S       „   ‟   -      of al-Ṭ  āwī.   
I conclude this section by pointing out the influence of K fī scholars in the field of 
  dīth for the following centuries. It is true th t the K fī school  nd other  dvers ries of  hl 
 l-  dīth were gradually more influenced by the  rguments of  hl  l-  dīth especi lly in the 
superiority of the chain criticism in the evaluation methods. However, they also influenced 
traditionalist scholars in two main areas. First, they won a decisive victory in restricting the 
authority of solitary reports with establishing only probable knowledge. As discussed in the 
earlier sections, even   nb līs h d to come to  gree with this theoretic l conclusion. The 
second area was the adding of a middle category to the categorization of reports between the 
solitary report and the consecutive report. K fī schol rs, beginning with ‗ sā b. Abān, 
developed a middle category, m shh r (m ‗r f  nd must fīḍ  re  lso used , that establishes 
s tisf ction (iṭmi‘nān  between prob bility  nd cert inty. This c tegory, despite some 
modifications, was either followed or at least mentioned in the later literature.
380
 
F. The   dīth-Dominated Paradigm Shift in the Gap Period 
The analysis above demonstrated that the gap period witnessed the victory of 
                                                 
380 ‗Abd  l-Qāhir  l-B ghdādī (Ab  M nṣ r  mentions the must fīḍ report between ā ād  nd t wātur, but  
closer to t wātur. According to him, t wātur est blishes cert inty („   ) with necessary knowledge (ḍ      , but 
must fīḍ report establishes certainty with acquired knowledge (muktasab).  He mentions reports about the 
beatific vision in the here fter, intercession (sh fā‗  , stoning (r jm  for  dulterers,  nd wiping over the socks 
(khuff yn   in  blution (wud ‘   s reports th t were solit ry first, but l ter re ched to the level of t wātur  nd 
bec me must fīḍ.  See  Abd  l-Qāhir  l-B ghdādī,  K            -   , 12-13. 
165 
traditionalists in forcing their adversaries to accept the independent authority of the chained 
solitary reports with the criteria heavily based on their own. The subsequent generations of 
reason-based scholars followed heavily the literature evolved around traditionalist arguments. 
This process is described by many contemporary scholars as the great synthesis. However, 
what seems to have been the case was that the dominant school grew from a struggle. The 
questions remain why did the reason-based scholars eventually  gree with these  rguments  
Wh t is it ex ctly   dīth-dominated paradigm shift? To what extent did this paradigm become 
influential?  
In the third hijrī century, the tr dition lists strived to make chained transmission the 
common language of scholarly literature. Instead of hearing the voice of the author, one would 
hear only long chains and reports from the prophet, a companion, and a successor. 
Transmitting the knowledge of the predecessors was accepted as the safest and the most 
genuine way to preserve the core of the religion by the tr dition lists. It w s this mindset th t 
resulted in   dīth-based writing, which was disseminated in the fields of law, exegesis of the 
Quran, and even intellectual polemics.  
The political and social reasons behind the   dīth-dominated paradigm shift are not the 
subject of our investigation. Some historians have argued for the influence of the caliph 
al-Mutawakkil and his counter-mi n  movement  s the m in re son for this signific nt shift. 
Its influence is undeniable; however, the key reason must have relied somewhere close to the 
overall inclination of the majority of the Muslim society. As this research analyzed below, most 
of the Mu‗t zilī  rguments such  s the cre tedness of the Qur n were not welcomed by the 
majority. Ibn Rāw ndī informs us th t Mu‗t zilī opinions were contr ry to the ijmā‗ of the 
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umma. Therefore, the key reason was ironically not other than what reason-based scholars 
argued for vis-a-vis the  uthority of reports  ijmā‗  nd the ide  of a common denomin tor th t 
lies in the core of ijmā‗ theory. The common denomin tors th t both re son-b sed schol rs  nd 
  dīth-based scholars shared eventually led more people to incline tow rd   dīth-based 
arguments. These common denominators were the appreciation of the earlier authorities 
(especially the generation of the prophet and the companions), the need for existing reports to 
draw on the accumulated knowledge of earlier generations, and the reliability of transmitters as 
the most important condition for the authenticity of reports.  
In Islam, utopia is not a fiction; rather it is something that happened in  history. The 
ide l  ge w s the  ge of the prophet, ―the  ge of h ppiness‖ („      -  „   ) as put in Islamic 
thought, and ideal society was his society, namely his companions. As the prophet himself was 
represented as the perfect example in the Quran, his companions constituted the perfect society 
for the following Muslim generations.
 381
 Things were given value based on their nearness to 
―the utopic  ge.‖ Putting  side cert in critics of the comp nions such  s  l-Na  ām, both 
rationalist scholars and traditionalist scholars agreed on the overarching significance of this 
age. For inst nce,  l-Sh ybānī m kes the following st tement  ―The knowledge is the 
knowledge of earlier people; fiqh is their fiqh. They were more knowledgeable about the 
pr ctice of the prophet  nd they exercised more effort th n us.‖382 Along the same lines, 
al- ārith  l-Mu āsibī (     5   indic tes the role of the comp nions  nd the successors  s 
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follows  ―These  re our proofs from the kitāb,  nd the sunn ,  nd from the pr ctice of the gre t 
companions of the prophet. The successors who we are supposed to imitate and to derive from 
were also like th t. They were those whom All h ord ined us to obey in his verse ‗Obey All h 
 nd his messenger  nd ulu‘l- mr from you.‘383 They were the companions of the prophet 
Mu  mm d  nd those who c me  fter them who were sincere  nd eminent schol rs.‖384 
In an attempt to distinguish the approaches of traditionalists from those of the 
rationalists, Hallaq argues that, "The traditionalists were primarily concerned with the study of 
transmitted sources and their literal interpretation, while denying hum n re son  ny right to be 
exercised in ijtihād or in the process of leg l re soning.‖ H ll q s expl n tion is b sed p rtly on 
his restricted definition of         with      .385 However, it seems th t some mut k llims  lso 
opposed ijtihād in general while some others (some tr dition lists  nd mut k llims  denied 
only the  uthority of  n logy. For ex mple,  l-N   ām  nd J ‗f r b.  l-Mubashshir from the 
Mu‗t zil  were entirely  g inst ijtihād.386 On the other h nd, D w d  l-  hirī is reported to 
have written books against both        and        which indic tes he rejected qiyās but he did 
use some other ijtihād tools like f  wā l-khiṭāb.387 Accordingly, the distinct aspect of the 
traditionalists seems more to have been the independent authority that they give to the solitary 
reports based on their own chain criticism vis-a-vis the reason-based evaluation methods of 
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their adversaries.  
G. Conclusion 
The analysis of the developments with regards to the reports in this chapter 
demonstrated that the gap-period witnessed an intellectual, at times political, struggle between 
different scholarly groups and independent scholars: The traditionalist scholars (ahl al-  dīth , 
K fī jurists (so-called ahl al-r ‘y , Mu‗t zilī schol rs, Murji‗ī schol rs, Shi‗ī-Z ydī,  nd 
Shī‗ī-Imāmī schol rs. The wide spectrum  mong these schol rs h s gr du lly n rrowed down 
more in favor of the arguments developed by the traditionalist scholars. Certain scholars, 
especially from the K fī School, attempted to challenge these arguments by developing 
distinct approaches to the reports with their methods and categorizations, and were successful 
to an extent in the theoretical categories of reports and their epistemic value at least. However, 
three big scholarly achievements led the traditional discourse of ahl al-  dīth to  victory in 
terms of the authority within the realm of reports. First, they persuaded other scholars to equate 
chained reports with the authority of prophetic sunna. Second, they won the argument against 
the so-c lled r tion list c mp consisting of K fī jurists ( hl  l-r ‘y , Mu‗t zilīs,  nd Murji‗īs in 
that the literal meaning of the chained solitary reports narrated by the reliable transmitters 
should have independent authority over the tools of independent reasoning in evaluating the 
reports. Finally, once they produced sub-genres rel ted to   dīths, in  ddition to the  bund nt 
compilations of   dīth, such  s  the errors of   dīth („       -      ), reconciliation of 
contr dictory   dīths (  ‟      -mukhtalaf al-      ), and more importantly the critique of 
transmitters (     wa-al-  „    or T        -     ), the criteria and methods of tr dition lists 
bec me predomin nt  nd  uthorit tive. This development eventu lly compelled so-c lled 
169 
r tion list schol rs to de l with these genres  nd  cknowledge the  uthority of their  dvers ries 
in the field of   dīth. 
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CHAPTER III 
Consensus (I   „): Whose Agreement Matters? Why? 
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A. Introduction 
Ijmā‗ is bro dly defined  s ―the un nimous  greement of Muslim scholars of a 
generation after the death of the prophet on a religious matter ‖  nd is considered the third 
source of Islamic law in the literature.
388
  Much disagreement appears regarding its 
definition, its requisite conditions (e.g., the identity of the participants in ijmā‗ and the nature 
of the matter agreed upon) and even its very authority at least in the early sources, which are 
the subjects of the following examination in this chapter.  
Unfounded ijmā‗ claims raised doubt about the possibility, value, and conditions of 
ijmā‗. These same unfounded ijmā‗ claims also considerably contributed to the subsequent 
development of the theory of ijmā, its definition, conditions, and frequency of its occurrence. 
By the 4th/10
th
 century, the principle of     „, or consensus, had become widely 
recognized  s the third of the prim ry ―sources‖ (u   ) of Islamic law after the Quran itself 
(     ) and the practices and sayings (sunna) of the Prophet Muhammad as transmitted in the 
      . Indeed, by the 4th/10th century, it was widely held that disagreeing with     „ could 
lead to the ch rges of  ―unbelief‖ (kufr).  But how did     „ come to have such authority in 
Islamic law?  What were the scholarly discussions that led to the concept of     „ evolving 
into the formulation in which it came to be so widely accepted?  Although there is a great 
deal of modern scholarship on various aspects of     „,there has not yet been a thorough 
study of the development of this concept in the gap period between al-Shāfi‗ī‘s R      and 
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the writings of al-Jaṣṣāṣ, that is, between the early period in which     „ was a rather 
restricted idea and the later period when it had gained nearly universal acceptance.
389
  
I will argue here that understanding the developments in legal thought regarding the 
principle of     „ in the gap period is critical to understanding both the historical evolution of 
the very concept of ijmā‗ and its eventual acceptance as one of the primary sources of Islamic 
law. The second half of the third and early fourth hijrī centuries witnessed the emergence of a 
particular genre devoted to scholarly agreements in theology or law such as the works of Ibn 
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contributions h ve been m de before  nd  fter, Ahm d H s n‘s T   D c       f I   „ still stands out as the 
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al-Mundhir (319/931), al-J wh rī (circ   5      ,  nd Ab   asan al-Ash‗ rī (         390 
and the corresponding genre of juristic disagreements (       f   -„      or ikhti  f 
al-f     ) such as the works of al-Ṭa āwī (321/933), al-M rw zī (    906), and al-Ṭ b rī 
(310/923.)
391
 During the s me period, we see   signific nt pl ce given to ijmā‗ in leg l 
theoretical works, to the extent that it became the topic that appears first in the legal 
theoretical manuals.
392
 In the final analysis, the gap period was formative in shaping the 
nature of the genre of Islamic legal theory overall, and placing the ijmā‗ as the third source of 
the law.  
 In this chapter, I will therefore:  
(1) provide an historical overview of the origins of the concept of     „ in the early 
period in the writings of Ab    nīf , Mālik, al-Sh ybānī, Ab  Y suf,  nd  l-Shāfi‗ī and 
touch upon subsequent developments in the 4/10
th
 and 5/11
th
 centuries;  
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(   discuss in det il the deb tes surrounding the concepts of the ‗Inf llibility of the 
Umm ‘  nd the ‗Authority of  I   „‟ in the gap period; and, finally,  
(3) treat the various definitions of     „ articulated by writers within that period, 
particularly the various attempts to delimit who must participate in     „ for it to be 
authoritative: All Muslims? A majority of Muslims? All or a majority of scholars (     ‟)? 
All non-heretical scholars?  The scholars of Mecca and Medina?  The members of the first 
generations of Muslims (al-Salaf)? Or as Ibn Surayj and Shī‗  claimed could a single scholar 
speak with the authority of     „ if he spoke the truth? 
(4) led by sections 2 and 3, I delve into a reflection on the concept of al-salaf which 
emerged from the debates of the infallibility of the umma and the participants in ijmā.    
I will conclude with a summary of these developments and argue that they are highly 
significant for an understanding of U      -Fiqh from the 4th/10th century onward. 
B. Historical Outline: Early Centuries and Beyond 
The earliest works written before al-Sh fi‗ī th t discuss ijmā‗  nd give   speci l v lue 
to it were by Ab    nīf , Mālik, al-Sh ybānī,  nd Ab  Y suf,  lbeit there  re sever l 
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transmissions referencing earlier people in the later literature.
393
 In al-Fiqh al-akbar 
attributed to Ab    nīf , the author speaks out the most important things to know about 
religion as the faith in Allah, the basic rulings and practices, the crimes and punishments, and 
finally the issues that are subject of agreement and that are subject of disagreement among 
the umma.
394
 Ab    nīf  here offers a more practical view of agreements and 
disagreements. This statement also entails the implicit vague idea that one should refrain 
from going against the agreements of the umma. This idea presumably arose in the first 
century of Islām  fter the de th of the prophet and remained as the main foundation of vague 
ijmā‗ cl ims to the present time.  
Mālik‘s use of  greements confused schol rs. Even though some of his  greement 
claims can be understood referring to more universal agreements, he usually argues for local 
M dīn n  greement which is understood  s „            -M      and considers it 
authoritative for every Muslim. His idea of giving a special status to the M dīn n pr ctice for 
determining normative doctrines and practices can be seen clearly in his letter written to 
L yth b. S ‗d. In this letter, Mālik suggests M dīn n pr ctice, which he describes usu lly  s 
―the  greed upon pr ctice‖ (al-amr al-       „      ) and is understood  s M dīn n 
consensus by later scholars, as the true source of normativity, due to the special status of 
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M dīn  with respect to preserving the pure doctrine  nd pr ctices of Islām. As it is  pp rent, 
Mālik  ctu lly defines norm tivity  s the preserved pure doctrines of religion. All his 
opponents seemingly shared this definition of normativity. His suggestion is different (from 
Abu H nīfa and Layth b. S ‗d whom we mentioned, and from al-Sh ybānī and al-Shāfi‗ī 
whom we will mention) in restricting the possibility of preserving pure doctrines and 
pr ctices in M dīn . However, Mālik does not cle rly define wh t ex ctly he me ns by ―the 
 greed upon pr ctice of M dīn ‖  nd prefers to keep it v gue.395 It was these vague claims 
of normativity that were targeted by al-Sh ybānī, Ab  Y suf  nd al-Shāfi‗ī as early as the 
l te second hijrī century.  
In his refutation of Maliki doctrines al-Ḥ     „          -M     , al-Sh ybānī refutes 
 ll these v gue cl ims of Mālik  nd  hl  l-M dīn  by  ccusing them with establishing 
arbitrary rulings in religion.
396
 Simil rly Ab  Y suf criticizes  l-Awzā‗ī for his arbitrary use 
of ―ahl al-„   ‖ by comp ring it to M dīn n use of ―maḍat al-sunna‖ (this practice was 
followed) without valid evidence.
397
 Al-Shāfi‗ī was also against these arbitrary agreement 
claims and required   definition of ijmā‗ from his opponents.398 A close examination of their 
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works demonstrates that they use such claims of scholarly agreements in order to support 
their point of view in leg l m tters. In such ex mples they use phr ses like ―m jority of 
schol rs‖ (    „     -„                -„ lm).399 
There is enough evidence that there existed the concept of ―the consensus of the 
umm ‖  nd jurist even tried to define it. Al-Sh ybānī argues, ―the true  uthentic n rr tion is 
the one which is closer to what the all Muslims hold [as practice]‖ and that one should not 
contradict to the umma.
400
 According to al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Sh ybānī‘s words concerning ijmā‗  s 
―wh t Muslims consider good is good‖ point out the authority of consensus of later ages in 
addition to the consensus of the companions.
401
  Despite all these implications, we do not 
see   cle r det iled discussion of ijmā‗ encompassing different types and conditions in the 
writings of al-Sh ybānī. Rather al-Sh ybānī reiterates the fact that ―Kitāb  nd  ny n rr tion 
from the prophet or from one of his comp nions.‖ are higher than the consensus of the 
umma, which implies an understanding of consensus extending beyond the generation of the 
companions.
402
  
We see more elaborate treatment of the subject in the writings of al-Shāfi‗ī. In the 
dialectical debates on ijmā‗,  l-Shāfi‗ī is in   respondent position criticizing his interlocutor‘s 
already established theory.  The identitiy of his interlocutor is not clear, but the interlocutor 
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must h ve been   schol r from ‗Irāq. 403   Different stages and details of al-Shāfi‗ī‘s 
underst nding of ijmā‗ h ve been studied by m ny over the l st few dec des; for our topic it 
suffices to mention the limits of ijmā‗ discussions of his time to underst nd l ter 
development accurately.
404
    According to the Irāqi opponent of al-Shāfi‗ī, an established 
underst nding of ijmā‗ was to consider the impossibility of agreement except upon 
established sunna even if they did not mention a narration explicitly from the prophet.
405
 In 
other words, ijmā‗ would h ve the s me level  s the  greed upon sunna and cannot be based 
on personal opinion, since there would be no agreement on personal opinions.
406
 The Irāqi 
interlocutor of al-Shāfi‗ī carefully assigns textual basis for seemingly non-textual, 
opinion-based agreements. Also, he  sserts th t ijmā‗ comes before every other source, since 
it is preserved from error and it leads to certainty. It is important that al-Shāfi‗ī also 
distinguishes this ijmā‗ from jum l  l-f rā‘iḍ, namely self-evident teachings of Islam such as 
daily prayers and fasting in Ramaḍān th t  re b sed on successive tr nsmission  nd  re 
known even by lay people.
407
 Ijmā‗ in his l ngu ge is the  greement of schol rs.408 Lay 
people („      h ve to follow the  greement of these schol rs. Also if there is  n ijmā‗ 
among scholars, it is a clear sign th t this ijmā‗ occurred in e rlier gener tions  s well  nd no 
need for textual proof. The Iraqi opponent points out that the more  ccur te qiyās is the one 
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closer to these agreements, a point made by al-Sh ybānī above.409 Even though it seems an 
established source in his l ngu ge, he stretches his description of ijmā‗  nd  ccepts, for 
inst nce, the  greement of m jority  s ijmā‗, then f ils to  nswer al-Shāfi‗ī‘s questions on 
how to define m jority  nd whether one should consider schol rs of k lām  mong the 
p rticip nts of ijmā‗ some of whom rejected rajm (stoning) punishment for adultery [from 
al-kh wārij .410  
Al-Shāfi‗ī‘s view tow rd ijmā‗ is complex and nuanced. He seems to reject  ny ijmā‗ 
claim theoretically except what is called jumal al-f      in     „   -„   .411 He implies that 
ijmā‗ cl ims b sed on the m jority of schol rs  re just rhetoric l cl ims which h ve no 
ground, since there is no way to know which opinion is held by the majority and usually 
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these claims do not reflect reality.
412
  He champions uninterrupted chain of narrations from 
the prophet over the claims of scholarly consensus or practice.
413
 However, he also makes 
the s me ijmā‗ cl ims in the sense of the  greement of the schol rs to b ck up his leg l 
opinions.  He mentions ijmā‗  s   v lid source  fter kitāb  nd sunna, and before a binding 
report and analogy based on this kind of reports.
414
 In short, during al-Shāfi‗ī‘s time, there 
w s   theory of ijmā‗ est blished  t le st in Irāq differenti ting it from successive reports 
(         ), defining it exclusively with the agreement of scholars, even majority of scholars 
and considering it as the first source above anything else in terms of leading to certainty, i.e. 
the fundamental source of orthodoxy and orthopraxy. On the other hand, we see that a 
reaction, mostly from the traditionalists, emerged against ijmā‗, on the ground of its 
definition, conditions, and authority.   
If we look at the post-gap period, It seems that from Andalusia, with the writings of 
the  āhirī ibn  azm (456/1063), to Samarqand, with the works of al-P zd wī (         , 
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the principle that someone who rejects an agreed upon matter in religion can be accused of 
unbelief  (kufr  w s well est blished in the e rly fifth hijrī century.415 From the gap period, 
as early as the time of the caliph al-M ‘m n, there is evidence in the work of  l-Kinānī th t 
the phrase     „   -umma was being used with disbelief claims.416 From the late third hijrī 
century, al-Kh yyāṭ (         mentions ijmā‗  s  n indic tor of the norm tive teachings of 
Islam in marriage and criticizes Shī‗  in the matter of temporary marriage.417 Ibn Surayj 
(         gives   more explicit link between ijmā‗  nd orthodoxy  fter mentioning the 
authority of the consensus of the schol rs, he  rgues th t   ijmā‗  ctu lly c n be est blished 
with only one schol r if he s ys the ―truth‖ (al- aqq , since the  ctu l me ning of ijmā‗ is 
―true opinion.‖418 Al-Ash‗ rī c lls those who  greed upon the principles in his theology  s 
ahl al- aqq (the people of the truth). Interestingly enough, in about one hundred year later, 
Shī‗ī schol r  l-Shaykh al-Mufīd also referred to the agreement of the people of the truth, but 
this time the term represented Shi‗ . 419  In M „       -sunan, al-Khaṭṭābī (          
differenti tes between those who reject   consensus on   ―well-known‖ religious m tter by 
common people such as five times daily prayers or prohibition of wine can be considered as 
unbeliever, and those who reject a consensus that only scholar is expected to know such as 
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marrying a woman and her aunt at the same time cannot be accused with disbelief.
420
 The 
problem remains as to how the idea of consensus acquired such value in determining 
normativity in Islam. What follows examines different stages of this process through 
formation of the idea of infallibility of the umma and debates on the authority of ijmā‗. After 
th t I will focus on the different types of ijmā‗ th t developed during the g p period. 
C. The Authority of Ijmā‗ and The Idea of Infallibility of the Umma  
As we have seen in the previous chapter, each claim for authority was expected to 
have   textu l b sis. Ijmā‗ w s not  n exception.  The proponents of ijmā‗tried to support the 
 uthority of ijmā‗theoretically with certain Quran verses. For the  uthority of ijmā‗ two 
verses of the Quran were in circulation  during the gap period. The first one was from the 
chapter  l-Nīsā   
If anyone opposes the Messenger, after guidance has been made clear to him, and 
follows a path other than that of the believers, We shall leave him on his chosen path– 
We shall burn him in Hell, an evil destination.  
Ibn al-Murtaḍā st tes th t  l-Shāfi‗ī  nd ‗ sā b. Abān were the first two schol rs who 
represtented this verse for the  uthority of ijmā‗.421   
The second verse was from the chapter of al-B q r   s follows  ―We h ve m de you 
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[believers] into a middle (wasaṭ) community, so that you may bear witness before others and 
so th t the Messenger m y be r witness before you.‖  This verse was represented  s 
evidence by Ab  ‗Alī  l-Jubbā‘ī  nd  l-K ‗bī.   
The centr l element in the doctrine of ijmā‗ is the claim for the infallibility of the 
umma. Even though some scholars tried to establish the authority of this source with the texts 
from the Quran, it is hard to believe, and even harder to establish that the earliest generations 
of Islam had the idea of infallibility of the umma. Thus, Ab  Hāshim  nd  l-Gh zālī refuted 
the  rguments for the  uthority of ijmā‗ b sed on  bovementioned verses.422 This is not to 
say that the earliest generations of Islam did not see themselves in a specific status. They 
thought that they represented the truth, or more precisely that they had it, since they had the 
last revelation. One cannot fail to see, also, that they were motivated by this revelation, 
which also has certain passages that give a special status to the followers of the prophet 
Muhammad. However, the first generations were far from having a theoretical idea of an 
infallible umma directly from those texts.
423
 It was rather a source invented out of need. The 
question remains why and when did the scholars invent the idea of the infallibility of the 
umma and what was the need for infallibility? What does it mean? In which matters was the 
umma infallible and who represents the umma? 
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The rise of the idea of the infallibility of the umma has been taken for granted in 
modern scholarship. Schacht and those who followed him were of opinion that the idea of 
general consensus of community arose naturally without foreign influence, but the idea of the 
consensus of schol rs origin ted from the principle of ―opinion prudentium‖ in Rom n 
law-the view shared by those who enjoy good judgment in a certain area, prudence being 
characteristic of equitable and reasonable judgment-.
424
 Schacht claimed that it was 
al-Shāfi‗ī who formul ted ijmā‗  s the strict un nimity of the umma on certain fundamentals 
and rejected the idea of an ijmā‗ limited to schol rs‘.425  
In the literature of uṣ l al-fiqh, if we put aside some verses praising the Muslim 
umma,
426
 the main source providing authority for ijmā‗  nd the ide  of the infallibility of the 
umma is   dīth, especially the   dīth th t s ys ―my community does not  gree on error.‖ To 
know when exactly this phrase began to circulate among people would provide us also 
beginnings of   ―the theoriz tion of the inf llible umm .‖ Such     dīth does not appear in 
the works written in the 2
nd
/8
th
 century. The closest narration to such an idea is possibly what 
al-Sh ybānī n rr tes from the prophet  s ―wh t Muslims consider  s good is good  ccording 
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to All h‖427, which later became one of the main narrations shown as evidence in the 
literature.  Al-Sh ybānī is  lso reported to h ve mentioned ―Wh t Muslims see as good‖  s 
one of the sources of Islam, which was also used by al-Jaṣṣāṣ to attribute the idea of universal 
consensus (    „       - „   ) to al-Sh ybānī.428   
Mālik does not mention such a   dīth in his   dīth compilation. Al-Shāfi‗ī s ys th t 
―the majority of scholars do not agree on something against the sunna of the prophet, nor on 
error,‖429 but does not attribute this idea to the prophet. Al-Shāfi‗ī‘s interlocutor, possibly 
Ibrāhim b. ‗Ul yy  (        ,430 in J   „   -„    cl ims th t he considers ijmā‗  s ―the 
 greed upon sunn ‖ for which there is no possibility of error,  nd it does not stem from r ‘y.   
However, he does not relate a prophetic report for this idea. One of the earliest compilers of 
  dīth, Ibn Abī Sh yb  (  5  5   n rr tes   simil r phr se in four different n rr tions  ll 
from Ibn M s‗ d in which Ibn M s‗ d  nswers   question  bout wh t to do during gre t 
divisions  mong the community  s ―You should stick to the community. Allah does not allow 
the community of Mu  mm d to  gree on misguid nce.‖431 Some other compilers including 
A mad b.  anbal (241/856)432, Dārimī ( 55     433, Ab  Dāwud (  5     434, Tirmīdhī 
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(279/892)
435
 narrated   dīths having similar meanings from the Prophet Muhammad; 
however, the exact version that became famous in the literature of uṣ l al-fiqh was narrated 
in Ibn Mā‗j ‘s (         Sunan.436  Interestingly, the other   dīth, ―What Muslims consider 
good is also good according to God,‖ w s n rr ted  s the words of Ibn M s‗ d by m ny 
scholars including A mad b.  anbal,437 which seems more likely, that is, that Ibn Masud is 
the ultimate source of this statement.
438
 Beginning with al-Jaṣṣāṣ, many uṣ l scholars have 
mentioned the h dīth both from the prophet and Ibn M s‗ d.439  All these approve that the 
central narrations used as evidence for the authority of ijmā‗ were not in circul tion in the 
first two centuries, when the idea of infallibility of community arose. This idea was not based 
on textual evidence, rather later scholars used textual evidence for establishing retroactive 
basis. 
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Al-Kh yyāṭ discusses the infallibility of the umma and assigns it to umma in ―wh t 
the umma narrates from the prophet.‖ He  sks   rhetoric l question to Ibn Rāw ndī whether 
he accepts this doctrine and answers himself that he has to accept it, because of the doctrine 
of the infallibility of the imām who is   member of umm .440 This idea becomes the 
found tion for reconcili tion the doctrine of ijmā‗ with the doctrine of imām  in Shi‗ī 
tradition beginning with the fourth/tenth century. The rich discussion provided by al-Kh yyāṭ 
in al-Inti    shows us  n import nt rel tionship between the ide  of t wātur  nd ijmā‗  hence 
a key factor laying in the joint origins of the idea of infallible umm  in k lām  nd fiqh.  
D. Attacks on the Authority of Ijmā‗ 
In the first h lf of the third hijrī century, the theory of ijmā‗  s prob bly est blished 
by some r tion list ‗Irāqis received serious criticisms including the core ide  of ijmā‗, i.e. 
infallibility of the umma, an idea al-Shāfi‗ī w s not  g inst. There is enough evidence th t 
the theory of the infallibility of the umma was well established during the time of al-Na  ām, 
a contemporary of al-Shāfi‗ī who makes no reference to al-Shāfi‗ī, but does mention the 
  dīth ―my community will not  gree on error.‖ It means that this saying was in circulation, 
but was considered as a prophetic   dīth in the first h lf of the third hijrī century. Ibn 
al-Rāw ndī (         is s id to h ve indic ted th t except for al-Na  ām (c .       5   nd 
his followers,  ll of the Mu‗t zil   ccepted ―it is not possible for umm  to  gree on error.‖441 
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One of the most repeated sentences in the literature of Sunnī legal theory when the authority 
of ijmā‗ is discussed is th t ―al-Na  ām, kh wārij (secedes   nd some of r wāfiḍ (shi‗   deny 
the authority of ijmā‗.‖ In  ddition to his deni l of qiyās, Ibrāhīm  l-Na  ām is well-known  
for his deni l of ijmā‗.442 As for the reason, since we do not have the direct words of 
al-Na  ām, different explanations have been suggested. al-Na  ām is said to have denied the 
possibility of   true consensus on   m tter th t is not known by necessity.‖443 Even if it was 
possible, according to what is reported view of those who deny the authority of ijmā‗ in the 
literature, since all the participants are individually liable to error, they could all also agree on 
error.
444
 The closest source that provides his thoughts on the matter is al-Jā i ‘s writings, 
where al-Na  ām said that it is possible for the Muslim community, as is for other earlier 
communities, to agree on error, despite what had been narrated in the   dīth.445 Furthermore, 
in respect to ijmā‗, al-Na  ām argues that the way in which the Quran was transmitted was 
exactly the same as with earlier revelations. Al-Kh yyāṭ (         reports from J ‗f r b. 
 l-Mub shshir (         th t he  ccepts kitāb, sunn   nd ijmā‗  s the sources of his leg l 
thought in his books. However,  ccording to wh t Ibn Rāw ndi reports, J ‗f r did not 
consider r ‘y-based-ijmā‗ valid. J ‗f r, Ibn Rāw ndī cl ims, accused the companions and the 
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successors with erring, because they agreed on the beating of wine-drinker.
446
 al-Kh yyāṭ 
(         himself  lso sees ijmā‗  s   v lid source, yet without giving much detail.447 
In the Shī‗ī tradition, the development of the theory of consensus followed a 
somewhat discursive process. We should  lso distinguish Z ydīs from Imāmīs  nd Ismā‗īlīs. 
Z ydī schol rs were  mong the e rliest supporters of ijmā‗. The Z ydī schol r al-Qāsim b. 
Ibrāhīm  l-R ssī (    860) gives  n over rching  uthority to ijmā‗ over other sources of 
re son (‗ ql , kitāb,  nd r s l. He  rgues th t it is ijmā‗ th t  divides agreed upon uṣ l of 
these sources from dis greed fur ‗ part of them.448 Al-Nāṭiq bi-al- aqq (424/10     lso 
discusses the theory of ijmā‗ in his uṣ l work  nd supports its  uthority extensively following 
the  uthority of Ab  Hāshim  l-Jubbā‘ī (          nd Abu ‗Abd Allah al-Baṣrī (        .449  
However, for Shi‗ī-Imāmīs, this theory was difficult to accept, but was impossible to 
reject at the same time for Shī‗īs. Apparently, despite cert in positive implic tions in the third 
hijrī century, the initial response was rejecting the theory that transfers the singular authority 
of the imām to the whole community; however, they faced the criticism that they cannot 
reject the idea, because the imām w s  lso   member of the umma.450 This criticism is 
apparent in al-Kh yyāṭ‘s l ngu ge. He  sks Ibn al-Rāw ndī   rhetoric l question that is 
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whether he accepts this doctrine and answers himself that Ibn  l-Rāw ndi has to accept it, 
because of the doctrine of the infallibility of the imām who is   member of the umma.451 
This idea becomes the foundation for the reconciliation of the doctrine of ijmā‗ with the 
doctrine of the imām  in the imāmī school of Shī‗  beginning with the fourth/tenth century.  
In one of the earliest Shī‗ī-Imāmī uṣ l sources, al-Tadhkira, al-Shaykh al-Mufīd 
(413/1022) does not mention ijmā‗ among the sources of law. The text editor explained this 
with the fact that al-Shaykh al-Mufīd did not consider ijmā‗ as an independent source.452 
However, al-Shaykh al-Mufīd does mention the concept of ijmā‗ on various occasions, for 
instance he claims that through ijmā‗ it should be evident that ‗Um r  ppostated once due to 
his suspicion about the prophethood of the prophet Muhammad during the Khaybar event 
and that through ijmā‗ Ab  B kr confessed the invalidity of his caliphate by saying that he 
needed guidance from other people, while the umma agreed that the imam does not need 
another imam.
453
  
Another Shī‗ī scholar from the late fourth and early fifth hijrī century, al-Sayyid 
al-Murtaḍā (          does mention ijmā‗  nd even reconciles it with the idea of the imām  
 nd discusses m tters relev nt to ijmā‗ to the same extent as in al-Jaṣṣāṣ‘s discussion. He 
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points out th t one should refr in from m king  rbitr ry cl ims of ijmā‗ if there is 
disagreement.
454
 According to him the difference between them [Shī‗ ] and the people of 
al-ijmā‗ is in re soning (  „   ) and evidence.455 Another Shī‗ī scholar of the fifth century, 
al-Shayk al-Ṭ sī (          mentions ijmā‗  s  dded by some people to the fund ment l 
sources in uṣ l al-fiqh and repeats what al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā theorized e rlier in reconciling 
ijmā‗ with the imām.456 
From Shī‗ī schools, Ismā‗īlīs  re gener lly represented  s h ving rejected the theory 
in its entirety. One of the most extensive accounts for the counter-proofs of the deniers of 
ijmā‗ from the g p period is provided by  l-Qāḍī  l-Nu‗mān ( 5       in his I      f      
al-        . In his critiques, he targets first the ambiguity of the meaning of umma that 
could mean a particular group or even only one person.
457
 Then he goes on to explain the 
umm  with Ibrāhīm, since he is described as umma by himself in the Quran,458 and his 
blood-related descendants among whom the Prophet Muhammad and his descendants, the 
imams, of course.
459
 Even though al-Qāḍī  l-Nu‗mān s h rsh l ngu ge tow rd the defenders 
of ijmā‗ implies that he is against the theory in its entirety, what he does is to reconcile the 
established theory based on the theory of the imām  by reinterpreting the meaning of the 
umma.  
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By the end of the gap period, it appears that the authority of ijmā‗ was 
overwhelmingly established among the majority of schools and/or independent scholars. 
Shī‗ī scholars who had rejected or had been reluctant to accept this doctrine, had to reconcile 
it with their own source methodology due to the great influence of the supporters of ijmā‗ 
and the theoretical basis of ijmā‗. Ibrāhīm  l-Na  ām from the Mu‗t zil  w s the only one 
who rejected the theory in its entirety.  
E. Different types of ijmā‗  Those who constitute Ijmā‗   
In the works of the 9
th
 and 10
th
 centuries, we see discussions on whether every 
member of the umma is me nt in the doctrine of ijmā‗ al-umma or whether the 
scholars/mujtahids represent the umma. Is ijmā‗ restricted to the comp nions or Muslims of 
every age? Should every person from ahl al-qibl  t ken into  ccount in ijmā‗ both those who 
follow the truth and those who follow the innov tion  C n only one person constitute ijmā‗  
In what follows, we will examine how the scholars of the gap period discussed these 
problems. 
As it is clear from al-Shāfi‗ī‘s writings, during his time the types of ijmā‗ were 
preserved consensus of everyone on jumal al-f rā‘iḍ   concept close to mut wātir in 
meaning, the consensus of the companions, and the consensus of the majority of scholars in 
different cities of Muslim world. We see that discussions continued over these types and new 
topics were added to the topic throughout the 9
th
 and 10
th
 centuries.  
The debates over the participants in ijmā‗  re rel ted, in one way or another, to the 
definition of the umm  or j mā‗ . The idea of the infallibility of the agreement of the umma 
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began with the idea that one should not contravene the umma. Accordingly, the question of 
who represents the umma also mostly determines who has the authority in expressing the 
orthodox beliefs and pr ctices in Islām. Therefore, even those who rejected the theory of 
ijmā‗  ltogether, al-Qādī  l-Nu‗mān for inst nce, h d to reformul te the definition of umm . 
After  tt cking the w ys th t the supporters of ijmā‗ interpreted the concept of umm  in the 
verses and prophetic reports they brought up as evidence, he concludes that the umma and 
j mā‗   re the cert in descend nts of the Prophets Ibrāhīm, Ismā‗īl  nd Mu ammad, namely 
the imāms, b sed on wh t he n rr tes from the Imām J ‗f r b. Mu ammad.460 His early 
contemporary al-K ‗bī (         defines umm   s those who confess the prophethood of 
Mu ammad and regard his teachings as true.461 While a group from ahl al-h dīth reportedly 
defined umma as those who believe jumal al-f rāiḍ.462 
In the first h lf of the third hijrī century, we see  n emerging restrictive response, 
similar to what we have seen in al-Shāfi‗ī‘s  rgument tion, tow rd suggested types of ijmā‗ 
by r tion lists of  ‗Irāq. Al-Shāfi‗ī w s opinion of restricting ― ctu l‖ ijmā‗ with jum l 
al-f rāiḍ, though he considered the inferred shared opinions of the earlier scholars of cities as 
v lu ble, he refr ined from l beling it  s ijmā‗. Ahl  l-h dīth, going  long simil r lines, w s 
inclined to restrict the theory of ijmā‗. Al-Kinānī (     5   mentions ijmā‘ of the 
companions of the prophet several times in al-Ḥayda where he compiles his debates with 
Bishr b. Ghiyāth  l-M rīsī (        ,  s   source one should not contr dict  fter the kitāb 
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and the sunna.
463
 A mad b.   nb l (     55  is s id to h ve held th t ijmā‗ is the consensus 
of the companions, since after them no consensus occurred.
464 He even went beyond th t  nd 
l beled those who cl im ijmā‗ on individu l c ses  s li rs.465  
‏However, the broader theory of consensus entailing all scholars or a majority of them 
seems to have found supporters outside the rationalists of ‗Irāq,  s well. Eventu lly, this type 
of ijmā‗ determined the st nd rd definition of ijmā‗ in the l ter leg l theory. Though 
considered from ahl al-h dīth, al-Qāsim b. S llām (          nd al- ārith al-Muhāsibī 
(     5   mention ijmā‗ in the sense of the inferred agreement of the majority of scholars.466 
Also, we see   concrete ex mple of the use of ―the consensus of the umma‖ in al-Muhāsibī‘s 
writings, where he accuses a group of reciters (al-     ‟), ascetics (al-      ) and some 
kh wārij  s ―rebels‖ with renouncing ―the ruling of the umma.‖467 Al-Jā i ‘s ( 55      
writings h ve enough evidence for the ide  of ―the consensus of the umma‖ in gener l 
terms.
468
  
Another discussion on the p rticip nts in ijmā‗ th t continued during this period w s 
concerning the cl im on the consensus of M dīn   nd Hijāz. As we mentioned  bove, 
al-Sh ybānī and al-Shāfi‗ī were the ones who criticized this claim in the second half of the 
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second hijrī century. Though it is known more with Mālik, this claim goes back to the 
successors‘ (T bi„ n  er   nd bec me  n est blished w y of  rgument  mong M dīn n 
scholars in the early second century. In the third century, we see some supporting ideas from 
the followers of Mālik for M dīn n consensus  nd some others for hijāzi n consensus. 
Sa n n (     5  , the compiler of al-Mudawwana, stipul ted th t Mecc ns  nd M dīn ns 
together constitute ijmā‗.469 Somewh t surprising support to the consensus of Hijāz w s 
given by the famous traditionist al-Bukhārī ( 5      . He discusses the topic in his K     
al- „      and remarks that the scholars should agree on what has been agreed upon in Mecca 
 nd M dīn .470 In this sense, al-Bukhārī s w th t the gener l ijmā‗ c n occur only through 
 ccepting norm tive v lue of hijāzi n ijmā‗.  
As time went on, Mālikī scholars had to face the critiques by the supporters of the 
general theory of ijmā‗  nd seemingly were forced to interpret M dīn n consensus somewh t 
less authoritative than general consensus. Apparently, there appeared a disagreement with 
respect to authority of M dīn n consensus. A group of schol rs continued to consider it  s 
authoritative such as the Baṣran scholar A mad b. al-Mu‗ dhdh l (between    -40/846-54), 
who w s   follower of M dīn n schol r ‗Abd  l-Malik b. al-Mājish n (        , the f mous 
jurist of M dīn  in his time Ab  Muṣ‗ b A m d b. Abī B kr (     5  ,   Ab   l- asan ibn 
 bī ‗Um r ( 5      ,  nd   group of M ghribī (northwest Afric n  nd And lusi n  
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Mālikis.471 As e rly  s the e rly third century, Mālik‘s followers seem to h ve begun 
classifying M dīn n consensus into two kinds  s tr nsmission-b sed  nd ijtihād-based 
consensus, and majority of Mālikīs including the Egyptian jurist Ya yā b. Buk yr 
al-M khz mī (        ,  nother Egyptian Ab  Y ‗q b  l-Rāzī (        , And lusi n jurist 
al-Qāḍī Ab  B kr b.  l-S līm (         ,  nd B ghdādī judge Ab  B kr  l-Abh rī (  5   5   
have not mostly argued for the authority of the latter since then.
472
 This shift can be seen 
cle rly in the writings of  Ab  ‗Ub yd  l-Jub yrī (         in his al-Tawassut,473  and Ibn 
al-Qaṣṣār (          in his al-Muqaddima,474 Qādī Abd  l-W hhāb (          wrote   
treatise in which he defended the theory of general consensus against attacks on its authority 
due to the fact that it relies upon solitary reports. He concluded that its authority is based on 
collaborative narration in doctrine even if not in text,
475
 a point crystallized concerning the 
authority of ijmā‗ in the more mature uṣ l m nu ls, such  s those of Gh zālī (5 5        nd 
 midī (         . Al-Jaṣṣāṣ sees this claim for M dīn n consensus  s   l ter innov tion th t 
had not existed even during the time of the successors.
476
 
Despite his strong arguments, al-Shāfi‗ī‘s suggestion of restricting ijmā‗ to the 
strictest sense of ijmā‗ w s  pp rently not  ccepted even by his followers, the scholars rather 
discussed ijmā‗ in bro der terms.  Even  āhirīs of the second h lf of the third centuries, 
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who were influenced by the writings of al-Shāfi‗ī by and large  and who went further in 
restricting ijtihād by rejecting  n logy  ltogether, seem to have criticized al-Shāfi‗ī‘s 
 ppro ch for not giving its deserved role to ijmā‗ in his theory.477 In  āhirī underst nding 
ijmā‗ h s to be b sed on reports, more precisely restricting ijmā‗ to the comp nions‘  er  
and rejecting the idea of ijmā‗ of every  ge.  āhirī evidence for restricting ijmā‗ with the 
companions is in parallel with their general historicity claim that is the verses that signal out 
infallibility of the umma were revealed about the companions directly, whoever say that they 
are more general than that should establish evidence.
478
 Ibn Ḥ zm st tes th t ijmā‗ occurs in 
only evident things (        -f    ḍ) such as five daily prayers or fasting in Ramaḍān  he 
rejects the ide  th t ijmā‗ might occur in individu l c ses for the things a contradicting 
opinion is not known and labels those who make such claims as liars.
479 He  lso points out 
Bishr b. Ghiyās  l-M rīsī  nd  l-Aṣamm among the earliest scholars who were attacking this 
idea.
480
 
Ibn Surayj (306/918) clearly indicates that the participants of ijmā‗  re the schol rs, 
not the lay people.
481
 His disciple Ab  B kr  l-  yr fī (         repe ted this argument.482 
However, it was Ibn Surayj who went against the restriction of the eponymous figure of 
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Shāfi‗ī school with his independent  nd interesting ide  th t even with one schol r‘s opinion 
ijmā‗ c n be est blished, because he defines ijmā‗  s the true opinion.483 This is in parallel 
with what was narrated from al-Na  ām. This is prob bly one of the most interesting 
opinions from a Shāfi‗ī/proto-Sunnī scholar of this period. The reconciliation of Shī‗ī 
schol rs between the  uthority of im m  nd ijmā‗ is rel tively known more  nd outside from 
shī‗īs only al-Na  ām h s been cited for his defining ijmā‗ " with  ny opinion b sed on   
valid evidence."
484
 Gh zālī expl ins this definition of  l-Na  ām,  nd  midī follows it, with 
trying to refrain from what had become common among scholars as "it is prohibited to 
contr dict ijmā‗"485 In other words, the effect of the word "ijmā‗" bec me stronger th n its 
meaning to the extent that those who reject the common meaning had to load another 
meaning to the word. Nevertheless, Ibn Surayj's definition needs a more detailed explanation, 
since Ibn Sur yj does not reject the common me ning of ijmā‗, i.e. consensus, and further, he 
tries to establish the authority of ijmā‗ with the s me  rguments of common supporters of the 
doctrine of ijmā‗. Ibn Sur yj b ses this cl im on Ab  B kr‘s decl r tion of w r  g inst B n  
H nīf  when they rejected his z kāt request. Ijmā‗ was established, according to Ibn Surayj, 
since Ab  B kr held the truth in his request.486 His example is meaningful. It seems that Ibn 
Surayj was responding to an idea that had been already established. As discussed above, Shī‗ī 
scholars' used the idea of "holding truth" when they reconcile the  uthority of ijmā‗  nd 
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imām,  n ide  th t no one would dis gree due to the result  nd purpose of consensus. 
Simil rly to wh t Gh zālī s id  bout f mous principle  mong schol rs "not to dis gree with 
ijmā‗", equ tion of ijmā‗ with "truth"  nd flipping its definition with its result h d  lre dy 
become common among scholars. Ibn Surayj was, probably, responding to Shī‗ī argument by 
accepting their general theory, but discerning his idea with an example taken from Abu Bakr 
who was not a much-respected companion among the shī‗īs.  
Another discussion concerning the p rticip nts of ijmā‗ w s whether schol rs who 
h ve ―heretic‖ beliefs should be included  mong the p rticip nts of ijmā‗. This discussion 
existed already in the writings of al-Shāfi‗ī who asked his interlocutor whether the kh wārij, 
the only group that denied the punishment of stoning, should be considered as a part of 
umm  in ijmā‗ cl ims. His interlocutor tends to include them  s the p rticip nts of ijmā‗  nd 
al-Shāfi‗ī seems to have held that they are part of the umma.487  This discussion continued 
in the following two centuries and we see that two distinctions were made on the basis of 
heresy  nd unbelief,  nd k lām  nd fiqh. Some schol rs s w th t  s long  s   scholar 
cert inly did not become  n unbeliever, he should be considered in ijmā‗, since he would be 
still from ahl al- all wa-al-„    whose report about himself is acceptable.488 Ab  M nṣ r 
al-Māt rīdī (         cl imed th t ―Ahl  l-sunna says that the approval or disapproval of the 
innov tors, Q d rīs, R wāfiḍ ,  nd Kh wārij  re not considered in ijmā‗ on   leg l topic, 
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even they  re considered in   theologic l topic.‖489 Z rk shī cl ims th t this opinion h s 
been narrated from the eponymous scholars including Mālik,  l-Awzā‗ī, Mu ammad b. 
al- asan and of ahl al-h dīth, which is unlikely since such   distinction does not  ppe r 
during their times.
490
 Ab   asan al-Ash‗ rī points out two different opinions on whether 
disagreement of people of astray (ahl al-    ) should be taken into  ccount in ijmā‗ cl ims  
on consensus  fter   dis greement,  nd whether ijmā‗ is possible if there is   dis greement on 
a similar case in his M         -I         .491 Ab  B kr  l-  yr fī (         repe ts the 
attitude toward excluding heretics from the p rticip nts of ijmā‗ b sed on the f ct th t those 
group  re not qu lified to be considered in ijmā‗ on   leg l m tter.492 Al-Qādī  l-Nu‗mān 
also points out that due to its purpose, one cannot claim that the community of error (ahl 
al-  ṭil) can be considered  mong ijmā‗ p rticip nts, bec use ijmā‗ le ds to truth  nd the 
community of error cannot have it.
493
 However, he questions this inherent claim of the 
supporters of ijmā‗  nd criticizes how they l bel cert in groups with heresy  nd legitimize 
their judgments  g inst those through ijmā‗.494  
The majoritarian consensus was one of the discussions of the time. As indicated 
earlier, al-Shāfi‗ī's interlocutor did not insist on the strict consensus in which every member 
of umma participated. Al-Shāfi‗ī was criticizing this attitude due to the fact that minority 
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might have the truth. From proto-Sunnīs, Mu  mm d b. J rīr  l-Ṭ b rī (         is reported 
to have held that if there is only one contradicting scholar to the rest of the scholars, this 
contradiction is not t ken into  ccount  nd the opinion of the m jority est blishes ijmā‗.495 
App rently, b sed on this definition of ijmā‗,  l-Ṭ b rī cl ims th t al-Shāfi‘ī contr dicted 
with more th n four hundred ijmā‗ c ses.496 Another form of majoritarian ijmā‗  s  ccepting 
ijmā‗ of‏  the first four caliphs is reported from a  proto-  n fī judge Ab   āzim.497 
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ rejects the idea of majoritarian consensus and calls those who accept it  ashaw.498 
Al-Qādī  l-Nu‗mān also mentions majoritarian consensus and labels those who accept as "the 
m jority of the h sh wiyy   nd n wāṣib."499 Since ahl al-h dīth  nd  āhirīs tend to restrict 
ijmā‗ with the  ge of comp nions, those who  ccept m jorit ri n consensus should h ve been 
a different fraction. Even though al-Qādī  l-Nu‗mān seems attributing the idea to the 
majority of proto-Sunnīs with the term "n wāṣib," it is not clear who were those people 
mentioned by both al-Jaṣṣāṣ and al-Qāḍī.  
In the first h lf of the fourth hijrī century,  nother Al-Shāfi‗ī al-Kh ffāf (d. between 
340-60/952-   , reportedly   disciple of Ibn Sur yj, lists out different types of ijmā‗ in six 
categories: 
The first one is ijmā‗ in which l y people  nd schol rs  re equ l such  s the 
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number of pr yers  nd units (r k ‗āt  of e ch pr yer  nd f sting Ramaḍān.The 
Second one is ijmā‗ of schol rs, l y people  re not considered in this kind such  s 
ijmā‗ on the  mount of blood money (diya) and on the amount of blood money of a 
concubine is half of the amount of blood money of free woman. The third one is the 
ijmā‗ of the comp nion(s  th t occurs through both s ying  nd pr ctice. The fourth 
one is their ijmā‗ on   m ter b sed on r ‘y. The fifth one is ijmā‗ of every  ge (    „ 
al- „   .) The sixth one is when a companion expresses an opinion and this spreads to 
the extent th t  n opponent of this ide  is not known  nd it becomes ijmā‗.500 
It appears that in the fourth century these categories, though probably having a 
hierarchy, were commonly accepted.  The most detailed examination of the fourth century 
was provided by al-Jaṣṣāṣ. In his examination, he points out different attitudes of jurists and 
theologians, as well. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ states that authority of Ijmā‗ of the first gener tion is  ccepted 
by all jurist and majority of theologians.
501
 Ijmā‗ of the every  ge is accepted by   n fīs  nd 
most of the other jurists.
502
 He st tes th t there  re two gener l types of ijmā‗ the first one is 
ijmā‗ on jum l  l-f rāiḍ in which both scholars and lay people participate and the second one 
is ijmā‗ of the schol rs.503 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ also mentions that he has not heard a discussion from 
early   n fī  uthorities on  whether ―people of  berr tion‖ (ahl al-ḍ    ) should be 
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considered in ijmā‗ or only ―people of truth‖ (ahl al- aqq) should be considered.504 It 
indicates that this discussion was introduced by non-  n fīs during the g p period. Also, it 
seems th t restricting p rticip nts of ijmā‗ with orthodoxy bec me prev lent, bec use 
al-Jaṣṣāṣ shares the opinion of his predecessors that we mentioned earlier on this topic. 
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ rejects the ide  of ijmā‗ of the m jority with strong words  ttributing this ide  to 
al- ashaw.505 He states that if this agreement is not unanimous,  the truth might be with the 
minority which completely inv lid tes inherent truth cl im of ijmā‗.506 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ discusses 
al-Kh ffāf‘s third  nd fourth c tegories,  lbeit in   bro der sense not restricting with the 
comp nions  nd concludes th t ijmā‗ might be b sed on report  s well  s on r ‘y.507 He also 
discusses the sixth category of al-Kh ffāf th t opinion of   comp nion upon which no 
dis greement tr nsmitted c n be considered ijmā‗  nd n rr tes the dis greement of   n fī 
schol rs within the m dhh b concerning the topic. According to Ab   asan al-Karkhi (340/ 
 5   this ide  c n be tr ced in the rulings of Ab  Y suf, but al-K rkhī does not see it  s   
v lid principle, while Ab  ‗Um r  l-Ṭ b rī  nd Ab  S ‗īd  l-B rd ‗ī mentions this  s   v lid 
principle to the extent that it overrides analogy in the hierarchy.
508
   
In the l te fourth tenth century, ijmā‗ bec me the common term for any scholarly 
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agreement in the matters of theology, law, exegesis of the Quran and even language.
509
 In the 
fifth hijrī century it seems th t there some suggestions for hier rchy  mong different types of 
ijmā‗  ppe red in terms of the cert inty v lue of ijmā‗. P zd wī is s id to h ve cl ssified 
ijmā‗ into three levels. The first level which holds the degree of cert inty (   „  like kitāb or 
mut wātir kh b r is the consensus of the comp nions  the second level which holds the 
degree of serenity (iṭ  ‟  n  like m sh r h dīth is the consensus of l ter gener tions   nd the 
third level which holds the degree of probability ( an)  like khabar al-wā id is the 
consensus upon on an earlier disagreement.
510
 
One of the discussions rel ted to ijmā‗ w s whether  n ijmā‗ could  brog te   
revelation-based ruling. Al-Qāsim b. S llām (         does mention ijmā‗ of both old  nd 
new scholars on abrogating the will to legal inheritors,
511
 though he clearly indicates that 
ijmā‗ is just   sign of prophetic sunn  here.512 ‗ sā b. Abān (        , one of the e rliest 
  n fī schol rs who wrote on leg l theoretic l topics, sees th t wh t people  re on,513 which 
al-Jaṣṣāṣ interpreted  s ijmā‗, c n be t ken  s   sign of  brog tion between two contr dicting 
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reports.
514
 Even though one can claim that al-Jaṣṣāṣ s  rgument  bout ‗ sā s opinion suffers 
from strained interpretation, it shows, at least, two things: First, scholars saw a direct link 
between wh t h ve become f mous  mong people  nd ijmā‗  second, ijmā‗ g ined  n 
authority to the extent th t it could  brog te the Qur n  s long  s ijmā‗ is b sed on   text 
during al-Jaṣṣāṣ's time. In the late third century, it seems that abrogation of the Quran by 
ijmā‗,  s long  s ijmā‗ is b sed on   text, w s  ccepted, though there is evidence th t there 
were those who tried to refrain from calling it abrogation and preferred to say 
―eff cement.‖515 
F. The Role of al-S l f on the Doctrine of Ijmā‗ 
We discussed the role of the idea of preserving what was emerged during the time of 
the companions on developing a narration-based  language  in the religious sciences of 
Islam in the second chapter.
516
 One of the most important results of historical conflicts 
beginning with the c liph te of ‗Uthmān517 was emerging different groups who began to 
accuse some of the companions of the prophet with apostasy or unbelief. It became a 
common pr ctice to curse on ‗Alī from the pulpit in Frid y pr yers during ‗Um yy ds. 
Kh wārij  ccused both ‗Alī  nd Mu‗ wiy , while R wāfiḍ  (Shī‗    ccused  lmost  ll 
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companions except a few who supported ‗Alī.518 This harsh attitude toward the companions 
by both the political authority and certain groups caused a counter response appreciating the 
first generation of Muslims in any cost. This response became a standard for normativity 
claims in Islam and effected overall Islamic thought ranging from authority of narrations 
from e rlier gener tions to t qlīd of e rlier schol rs th t resulted in form tion of schools. The 
fact that the perfect community, utopic society in a sense, for Muslims was the first 
generation of the Muslims who witnessed the revelation in the past paved the way for the 
idea that the true understanding and interpretation of Islam was available to them. Therefore, 
the true Islam, the orthodox Islam so to speak, means the pure and preserved teachings of 
Islām  s pr cticed by this gener tion. Al-Sh ybānī expresses this ide   s follows  ―No one 
came more knowledgeable than the first-generation. All the knowledge belongs to them, since 
they were more knowledgeable of the practice of the prophet, may Allah bless him and his 
family, and closer to him in their effort than us.‖519 
This ide   lso  ffected the doctrine of ijmā‗ in  ppreci tion of  l-salaf for the claims 
of normative doctrines to the extent that some scholars argued that the consensus was truly 
only possible limited to the time of the companions. As we mentioned earlier, some 
suggested that even though al-Shāfi‗ī claims the opposite, the conditions that he brought up 
for consensus actually indicate the consensus of the companions only. Here we will discuss 
to wh t extent this ide  w s effective in emerging ijmā‗  s   source  nd ch r cter of ijmā‗ 
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between ijtihād  nd t qlīd.  
Al-Kinānī (     5   mentions ijmā‘ of the comp nions of the prophet several times in 
al-Ḥayda where he compiles his deb tes with Bishr b. Ghiyāth al-M rīsī,  s   source one 
should not contr dict  fter the kitāb  nd the sunn .520  The f mous theologi n Ab   asan 
al-Ash‗ rī (         provides   good ex mple of the connection between the  uthority of 
salaf and the idea of consensus in his treatise al-R                -thaghr. In his tre tise, Ab  
 asan al-Ash‗ rī (        , cl ims th t he lists out 5   greements of the predecessors 
(al-salaf) on the principles (al-uṣ l , upon which they were comm nded to follow during the 
time of the Prophet Muhammad.
521
  Though the editor suggested that the term al-salaf is 
used ambiguously. It appears from the title that with al-salaf, he seems to have meant the 
companions and with al-khalaf he must have meant those righteous people who came after 
this generation.  Putting aside only a few of them, the principles that al-Ash‗ rī cl ims 
resulted out of consensus of the companions in this treatise are actually his theological 
principles written in the form of ―the first consensus‖, ―the second consensus‖ so on  nd so 
fort. These principles are obviously written against the theological principles of Mu‗t zil  or 
Muslim philosophers. What al-Ash‗ rī tries to do is to represent his theology  s the s me of 
that of the companions; therefore, these principles, he argues, represent orthodox beliefs and 
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those who do not follow them  re heretic innov tors. Ijmā‗ referring to the  ge of the 
companions was being used again in al-Ash‗ rī‘s l ngu ge serving for the cl im of the 
orthodoxy in favor of a particular belief/opinion among different opinions of the later times. 
Al-Ash‗ rī does not even bother himself to support his cl ims with evidence for whether 
these agreements actually occurred during the time of the companions. This might be due 
largely to the fact that this treatise was written particularly upon request of the people of 
al-thaghr, who already accepted his authority and were not probably eager to see that kind of 
evidence. A similar use of ijmā‗ al-umma together with apostasy claims appears in his 
          -           a few times.522  
Al-Z rk shī gives   signific nt re son for excluding kh wārij from the p rticip nts of 
ijmā‗  ―they  re not qu lified to be considered in ijmā‗, bec use they do not h ve   source to 
derive from due to the fact that they accused our predecessors from whom we derived the 
principles of our religion.‖523 
G. Conclusion 
The first generation of Muslims after the Prophet Mu  mm d‘s de th did not h ve to 
struggle with many questions regarding how their religions should govern their life, because 
the majority of the answers were readily available due to the established practices and lack of 
problems. However, the disagreements among people built up over time corresponding to the 
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dissolution of unity of the community after internal conflicts beginning with the caliphate of 
‗Uthmān  long with the exp nsion of Muslims to the extent th t cert in things in the 
established practices began to be challenged.   Disagreements began to appear even in 
things on which establishing a second opinion should have been really difficult due to 
const ntly repe ted pr ctices such  s the words in c ll for pr yer,  dhān, th t must h ve h d 
been repeated five times a day.
524
 These significant differences reached over the line of what 
had been respected as scholarly opinions. It was not uncommon to see one group cursing on 
‗Alī, while  nother one cl iming his divinity or prophethood.  The civil w rs  mong the 
companions created the debate on the situation of the grave sinner, because intentionally 
killing of a Muslim is considered a great sin. Since various groups accused different 
companions, the reliability of the companions as a whole was questioned by some. Some 
from later generations must have questioned how they could rely on the companions who 
killed one another in what they transmitted from the prophet? Some Shī‗ī groups apparently 
extended this questioning to their reliability on the transmission of the Quran itself, since 
even the first two c liphs, Ab  B kr  nd ‗Um r who usurped ‗Alī‘s right for c liphate held 
the power and must have altered the text of the Quran by adding certain passages or 
removing certain others. These attacks created a backlash from the majority of the 
community and established the idea of infallibility of the first Muslim generation who 
witnessed the revelation as a whole in transmitting the fundamentals of religion including the 
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words of the Quran despite the fact that they might have been able to make mistakes or sins. 
This idea was supported with the numbers of companions based on the fact that if one would 
have tried to alter the religion, other would have prevented it happen, and it was motivated 
with verses of the Quran praising this generation.  
Ijmā‗ cl ims  ppe r to h ve been m de for two different purposes between use  nd 
misuse in the gap period. The first purpose, as the term implies, was to create a neutral, 
unbiased arbiter over schism that emerged among diverse groups. Within the body-politic of 
Muslim community, the lowest common denominator was needed to determine the values of 
diverse beliefs and opinions, because of the excessive disagreements. The extent of these 
disagreements were indicated by the Shī‗ī schol rs th t ―every group rel te something from 
the prophet contradicting what another group narrate from him. Since we are obliged to 
follow what the prophet brought, there must be  n imām ord ined by God, who is free from 
changing or distorting and able to inform us what we need to know and do for our 
religion.‖525  The second purpose, based on the first one, was to use ijmā‗ cl ims to 
ch mpion one‘s own sect school by cl iming norm tive st nce b sed on orthodoxy. 
Therefore, ijmā‗ w s used both to overcome schism  nd to serve to schism  t the s me time.   
One of the significant results of this examination is the evidence it provides about the 
character of uṣ l al-fiqh. Ijmā‗ w s not only   leg l term,  s opposed to wh t it bec me l ter. 
In the deb tes, for inst nce, between Ibn Rāw ndī  nd al-Kh yyāṭ where both sides accuse 
                                                 
525
 al-Kh yyāṭ, al-Inti   , 158. 
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the other with rem ining outside of ijmā‗, they discuss both theological and juristic matters 
including the position of the grave sinner and the number of daily prayers.
526
 This 
demonstrates that uṣ l  l-fiqh emerged as a source methodology shared by different Islamic 
disciplines. 
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 al-Kh yyāṭ, al-Inti   , 163-65. 
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An logy, Leg l Re soning,  nd Imit tion (Qiyās, Ijtihād  nd T qlīd): The 
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A. Introduction 
One of the most heated discussions we see in the literature of the gap period was the 
re son‘s capacity in deriving religious rulings and whether these rulings were certain (   „ ) 
or probable (     ). A spectrum—encompassing the position of thinking that reason arrives 
at new solutions, the position of limiting law to what textual sources indicate, and positions 
in between—was formed. Scholars of the time chose a stance within that spectrum.  
In this chapter, I will examine the development in the gap period of the two forms of 
legal reasoning identified  s ijtihād  nd qiyās in the l ter liter ture. The chapter will show 
that, even though legal reasoning is discussed under the rubric of         (exertion for the 
derivation of ruling) in the later literature of uṣ l  l-fiqh,  nd ijtihād w s   known term even 
before the gap period, the debates of the time were overwhelmingly occupied with qiyās, 
which later was considered the fourth fundamental source of Sunnī Islamic law. Therefore, I 
will focus more on the development of qiyās  nd rel ted deb tes, in order to reveal the reason 
behind the emphasis on qiyās during th t period and the different aspects of it as gradually 
developed until it became recognized by the majority of Sunnīs. I will first give a brief 
survey of the use of qiyās before the g p period. The go l of this survey is to allow the 
specific developments that occurred during the gap period to be identified easily. I will then 
turn my attention toward the debates on the authority of qiyās,  nd specific topics including 
elements  nd types of qiyās,  s these progressed within the period. Finally, I will deal with 
other discussions on ijtihād  nd        (imitation), especi lly the effect of t qlīd in the 
formation of schools.  
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Ijtihād bec me   fixed term encomp ssing different types of leg l re soning including 
      (analogy),   ‟  (independent-educated reasoning), isti     (juristic preference of 
exception over the rule due to a compelling reason), or isti     (interest-based legal 
reasoning) in the late uṣ l  l-fiqh. However, this over rching  greement on the term ijtihād 
seems not to have occurred during the gap period. Scholars used all these different concepts 
 nd  mong them the term r ‘y w s more like  n umbrell  term for others. We  lso see th t   
specific composite word th t combines both ijtihād  nd r ‘y bec me common in the gap 
period as           -  ‟ . Qiyās  mong these types of re soning, however, occupied the leg l 
theoretical discussions between the supporters of it and those who were critical about it.  
The discussion of t qlīd w s  lso rel ted to the discussions of ijtihād  nd qiyās. The 
adherence of ahl al-  dīth to e rlier  uthorities w s const ntly criticized under the  ccus tion 
of t qlīd by their r tion list  dvers ries such  s Mu‗t zil , Z ydiyy , Murji‘ , or  hl  l-r ‘y. 
However, the scholarly circles that evolved around teacher-student relationships  mong these 
r tion list groups led to the  dherence of the developed opinions b sed on ijtihād. The 
students n rr ted the opinions of their m ster te chers. This re lity gr du lly p ved the w y 
for t qlīd  ccus tions in   neg tive sense. As   result, t qlīd w s condemned  s the opposite 
of  ijtihād, but  dherence to the  ccumul ted knowledge of e rlier schol rs within   cert in 
group w s c refully distinguished from t qlīd  nd justified. The following sections will 
examine these discussions in detail. 
B. Qiyās before the Gap Period 
Qiyās  s   method in Isl mic l w went through different st ges before its 
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fully-developed form in the mature Islamic legal theoretical works. However, in its simplest 
meaning as comparing new cases to old ones based on similarity, it had been known in the 
pre-gap period as an application that the companions did not hesitate to apply. One of the 
earliest examples of this application appears in what had been narrated from the letter of 
‗Um r b.  l-Khaṭṭāb to the governor Ab  M sā  l-Ash‗ rī  s   recommend tion in solving 
problems if there is no direct solution in the Quran or sunna.
527
 There is no categorical 
critique of this application reported from the first century of Islam. In the liter ture of Isl mic 
leg l theory the first refut tion of qiyās is attributed to al-Naẓẓām (ca. 230/845). We will see 
that al-Naẓẓām h d predecessors. It seems that once this application turned into a famous 
method of ahl al-r ‘y under the he ding of r ‘y  pplic tions in the second hijrī century, the 
opponents of r ‘y beg n to criticize qiyās as a continuation of their general critiques of r ‘y.  
Al-Qādī  l-Nu‗mān n rr tes   few discussions between J ‗f r  l- ādiq (      5   nd 
Ab    nīf  ( 5      , in one of which J ‗f r criticizes Ab    nīf  by s ying ―it w s s t n 
who made qiyās for the first time and erred, when he compared his nature to the nature of 
Adam.‖528 There  re some other reports by the s me token from J ‗f r  nd e rly Shi‘ī 
imāms. Yet the critiques were not limited to them. Some early figures associated with ahl 
al-ḥ dīth  re  lso mentioned  mong those who criticized the use of qiyās openly. Ibn 
Qut yb  rel tes th t  mir al-Sh ‗bī (        ,   K f n successor well-known with his 
                                                 
527 Al-Sh ybānī, al-Ḥujja, II, 570. 
528
 al-Qāḍī al-Nu‗mān, I      f  158. 
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  dīth-b sed thought, s rc stic lly  nd pejor tively  tt cked qiyās.529 However, K f  w s 
the center of qiyās  pplic tions due especi lly to the presence of Ab    nīf   nd his 
students. Extensive use of qiyās in the works of al-Sh ybānī gives sufficient evidence for 
early development of this method in pre-gap period.
530
 Al-Shāfi‗ī‘s discussion of qiyās 
represents a crucial stage that affected the debates of the gap period to a considerable extent. 
Since this work discussed his contribution earlier
531
 and there are important studies
532 
devoted to expl ining  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s underst nding  nd  pplic tion of qiyās, it suffices to 
mention the limits of his influence in the gap period throughout the chapter.  
All these developmental stages show that the pre-mature form of qiyās  pplic tions 
h d been  pp rent in religio-leg l thought  s e rly  s the time of the comp nions  nd the 
jurists h d  lre dy begun to develop cert in conditions  nd principles to free qiyās 
applications from arbitrary rulings before the gap period. However, in addition to criticisms 
of r ‘y, there h d been schol rs,  lbeit few in number, who criticized use of qiyās or showed 
explicit dist ste tow rd it in the second hijrī century. It is s fe to  rgue th t the g p period 
can be seen just  s   continu tion of these different  ttitudes with signific nt  nd more 
nu nced contribution by both sides, i.e. the proponents  nd opponents of qiyās.  
                                                 
529
 Ibn Qutayba, „U      -        I, 45; Ibn Qutayba  G       l-      , II, 651-52. 
530 For further investig tion of qiyās  s   source of l w  ccording to Al-Sh ybānī see Ahmet Temel, Imam 
M       ‟     -Hücc  A    E     E         ş  ‟  D       , unpublished MA thesis, 96-110. 
531
 See Chapter 1.  
532
 See F hd b. S ‗d J hnī,   -Q     „       -I      -S  f „ , Riyāḍ  Jāmi‗ t Imām Mu  mm d b. Su‗ d 
 l-Islāmiyy ,            Soner Dum n, Ş f  ‟                ş   Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam 
Araştırmaları Merkezi (İSAM), 2009. 
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C. Debates on the Authority of Qiyās during the Gap Period 
1.                                   tazila 
The deniers of qiyās  re cl ssified in Sunnī legal theoretical works mostly as 
al-Na  ām, Shi‗ā,  āhirīs  nd some of Kh wārij. Ibrāhīm  l-Na  ām (c .       5  is 
portrayed as the first person who rejected the authority of qiyās  nd even went further to 
condemn the comp nions who  pplied qiyās.533 A study aiming to reconstruct al-Na  ām‘s 
book al-Nukat through largely later citations through another lost book U      -f     by 
al-Jā i  proved this point.534  According to this work, al-Jā i  narrated from al-Na  ām th t 
he h d st ted th t ―the comp nions  pplied qiyās either by  ssuming erroneously  th t it w s 
valid  for them or they did this as dictating rulings to make themselves leaders, 
comm nders,  nd predecessors [to be followed .‖535 As a matter of fact, al-Na  ām m kes   
clear distinction between theological and legal matters concerning the authority of qiyās. He 
sees th t the  pplic tion of qiyās  s inevit ble in m tters of theology such  s divine rew rd 
and punishment, divine justice or injustice, and affirming or rejecting similarity between God 
and his creation; however, it is not allowed, according to al-Na  ām, in leg l m tters  nd 
                                                 
533
 al-Jaṣṣāṣ mentions him as the first person See al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fu   , IV, 23. 
534 See Josef v n Ess, D s Kitāb  n-N kt  des N    m und seine Rezeption im Kitāb  l-Futyā des Ǧā i : eine 
Sammlung der Fragmente mit Übersetzung und Kommentar von Josef van Ess. Abhandlungen der Akademie 
der Wissenschaften in Göttingen / Philologisch-historische Klasse, F. 3, 79. 1972. 
535
 Josef van Ess, D   K       -N        . ‗Abd  l-Qāhir  l-B ghdādī mentions this from  l-Na  ām in   
slightly different phr se  s ―Those who issued judgment b sed on r ‘y from the companions either supposed it 
w s permissible for them  nd did not know th t issuing judgment b sed on r ‘y w s prohibited  or they desired 
to be remembered with dis greements in order to be  ssigned  s the le ders of different schools [m dhhāhib .‖ 
See ‗Abd  l-Qāhir  l-B ghdādī, al-Farq beyn al-firaq, 134. 
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inheritance laws.
536
  
Al-Na  ām rejects qiyās because, he argues, the law-giver sometimes equates the 
rulings and cases where reason can find differences and distinguishes cases that reason can 
judge as similar. For instance, the law-giver decreases half units of the four-unit-prayer, but 
not for two-unit prayer for the  traveler despite their resemblance; while he ordains the same 
amount of expiation for three different violations (murder, intercourse during a Ramadan 
day, and  ihār [vowing not to touch one‘s wife  s if one‘s mother  , despite their 
distinctness.
537
 This reasoning is in parallel with what had been narrated from him as 
distinguishing reason-based matters from revelation-based matters regarding the application 
of qiyās  nd his condemn tion of r ‘y  pplic tions of the comp nions. 
 However, this restrictive understanding of revelation in legal matters seems to 
contr dict the gener l principle of the Mu‗t zil   bout  usn (good) and qub  (evil) and is 
closer to the Ash‗ rī st nce with respect to the topic of   ‟    (causality) in a     (rulings).538 
Al-Sh hristānī n rr tes th t  l-Na  ām did hold th t one must  ct in  ccord with what is 
good and what is bad on the basis of reason before revelation.
539
 The contradiction arises 
from cyclical explanation of causality app rent in the writings of some Mu‗t zilī schol rs. 
Al-Juw ynī expl ins  l-Na  ām‘s deni l of qiyās with   similar reasoning. He states that 
                                                 
536
 al-Na  ām n rr tes the word of ‗Um r  s ―If this religion c me by qiyās, it would h ve been wiping the 
under of the khuff yn [le ther socks of sorts  inste d of their top‖  nd s ys th t this opinion valid only for legal 
matters [a kām  not theologic l m tters. See Josef v n Ess, D   K       -N      22. 
537
 al- midī, al-I      IV, 7-8. 
538
 Ap ydın, Yunus, TDV İ     A      p       s.v. ―T ‘lil‖ İst nbul  TDV, XXXIX, 5  . 
539
 Sh hristānī, al-Milal wa-al-nihal, I, 58. 
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according to al-Na  ām, God did not ord in qiyās for us b sed on the principle of  l-aṣla  
(God necessarily does everything for the best); hence, we know through his silence that he 
knew that qiyās is not  dv nt geous for his servants.540  Al-Sh hristānī, in expl ining the 
reason for al-Na  ām‘s deni l of qiyās, n rr tes th t for  l-Na  ām the only v lid source 
est blishing rulings would be the opinion of  n innocent imām.541 However, since this 
opinion is not attributed to him in other sources and because of his other critiques of every 
single caliph among the first four caliphs, this attribution is probably erroneous.  
By taking into account al-Na  ām‘s gener l emph sis on free thinking, I  rgue th t 
al-Na  ām s w theologic l m tters  s unch nge ble  nd cert in, where qiyās  nd re soning 
would provide better understanding in reaching the truth by comparing matters one to 
another, hence this would maximize free theoretical thinking in theology independent from 
textual sources; however, he considered legal matters as changeable and non-transferable, 
because transferring them to new cases would add new commands and prohibitions that 
would minimize freedom in actions, in addition to the existing commandments and 
prohibitions in the textual sources.
542
  His denial of solitary reports also seems to have had 
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 al-Juw ynī, T      , III, 155-56. 
541
 Sh hristānī, al-Milal wa-al-nihal, I, 57; A study dealing with al-Na  ām‘s life  nd thoughts tried to 
underst nd the deni l of qiyās with this  ttributed ide  of innocent imām  nd  rgued th t  l-Na  ām might h ve 
been influenced by the writings of Ibn Muq ff ‗ in which Ibn Muq ff ‗ suggests th t only imām c n put  n end 
to the leg l dis greements stemmed from solit ry reports or person l opinions (r ‘y . See Mu  mm d  Abd 
 l-Hādī Ab  Rīd h, I           S        -N        -          -            -f    f    ,  l-Qāhir h  
M ṭb   t L jn t  l-T  līf w -al-Tarjamah wa-al-Nashr, 1946, 29-30. 
542
 al-Na  ām‘s  nd Mu‗t zil ‘s gener l inclin tion tow rd drinking n bīdhz is  nother indic tion of this 
argument. See below for how the f mous Mu‗t zilī schol r  l-Jā i  treated the matter of drinking nabidh. 
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the same reason.
543
  
A group of B ghdādī theologians reportedly followed al-Na  ām in rejecting the 
authority of qiyās.544 However, instead of condemning the companions, they tried to explain 
the application of the companions in a different way. They argued that the qiyās  pplic tions 
of the companions were in the manner of arbitration between the litigants to resolve 
problems, not in the manner of reaching to a certain judgment and adjudicating their 
conclusions.
545
 Al-Na  ām rejects this expl n tion by s ying th t ―this c nnot be defended 
through arbitration, because arbitration is different from ruling. How can one say this, while 
‗Umar was saying that he ruled [       ḍaytu .‖546  
Apparently this tendency of rejecting the authority of qiyās  nd more gener lly 
reason-based ruling in legal matters grew stronger over the course of the e rly third hijrī 
century  mong some Mu‗t zilī theologi ns. The problem w s how to expl in numerous 
narrations that indicate the applications of the companions b sed on qiyās. Some theologians 
strived to preserve their respect toward the companions by explaining their application in the 
manner of arbitration rather than establishing a rule, but al-Na  ām rejected this explanation 
as well. It seems that al-Na  ām did not even put the  uthenticity of these n rr tions in 
question despite his known unconformity regarding solitary reports, instead he took it for 
granted and openly condemned those companions.  
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 See Chapter III for the detailed analysis on his denial of solitary reports. 
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 al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fu   , IV, 23. 
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 al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fu   , IV, 24. 
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 Josef van Ess, D   K       -N      22. 
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Unraveling the identity of these particular B ghdādī Mu‗t zilīs who rejected the 
authority of qiyās would provide   cle rer underst nding.547 Al-Kh yyāt mentions J ‗f r b. 
Mub shshir (         with l ud tory words th t ―He [J ‗f r  relied on the  pp rent me ning 
of the kitāb, sunn   nd ijmā‗,  nd refused to issue rulings b sed on r ‘y or qiyās.‖548 
al-Kh yyāṭ‘s words  bout J ‗f r also signify an understanding of piety related to adhering 
exclusively to the texts by rejecting r ‘y  nd qiyās during his time. J ‗f r is also reported to 
have written a refutation against A       -  ‟  wa-al-     , which probably included his 
 rguments for the rejection of qiyās. 549   Among B ghdādī Mu‗t zilīs, J ‗f r b.  arb 
(236/850)
550
 and Mu  mm d b. ‗Abd All h  l-Iskāfī (     5    re  lso reported to have 
rejected qiyās.551  Nonetheless, some other B ghdādī Mu‗t zīlīs,  mong whom Bishr b. 
al-Mu‗t mir (      5 , the founding n me for the school of B ghdādī Mu‗t zil   Ab  B kr 
al-Aṣam (201/816), and Al-Na  ām ‘s uncle Ab   l-Hudhayl al-‗Allāf (          re reported 
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 People and ideas appear confusing to some extent in the mature legal theoretical works. Even though 
al-Qāḍī Ab  Y ‗lā ( 5         ttributes the opinion th t qiyās is not permissible by re son, but it is permissible 
by revelation l w (sh r‗ n  to B ghdādī Mu‗t zilīs including  l-Iskāfī (     5   , J ‗f r b. Mub shshir 
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he attributes the entire rejection of qiyās in both theology  nd l w to  ashaw and   hirīs. Ab  Y ‗lā  ttributes 
the ide  th t qiyās is not permissible by both re son  nd revel tion to Dāwud b. ‗Alī. See Ab  Y ‗lā, al-„U   , 
IV, 1282-3; and al-J      , al-      , II,  . For other works th t  ddress those people who rejected qiyās in 
general in     „      (leg l m tters  see  lso Ab  Is āq  l-Shirāzī, al- ab ira, 419. 
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 al-Kh yyāṭ, al-Inti ar, 89. 
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 al-Kh yyāṭ, al-Inti ar, 81. 
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  lu T ymiyy , al-Musawwada, 390.; 
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 al-Sh wkānī, I        -f      II, 94. 
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to have accepted the authority of qiyās.552   
It seems th t the strict re ction  g inst the  pplic tion of qiyās in leg l m tters must 
have appeared in Baṣra with al-Na  ām,  nd  lso rem ined limited with him and probably 
some unknown members of his circle in Baṣra.553 It also appeared among certain theologians 
of B ghdādī Mu‗t zil  from the third gener tion of the B ghdādī school,554 since there is no 
report from Thumām  b. Ashr s (         or Ab  M sā (         concerning the authority 
of qiyās. J ‗f r b. Mub shshir‘s student al-Kh yyāt (          lso seems to h ve rejected 
qiyās from his  forementioned words  bout the deni l of qiyās of his te cher. Yet, his student 
Ab  Qāsim  l-B lkhī (        ,  lso known  s al-K ‗bī, mentioned qiyās in his ext nt works 
with no rejection.
555 
Ibn   zm mentions two other individu ls who rejected qiyās -‗ sā  l-Murād  nd Ab  
‗Ifār- in  ddition to J ‗f r b.   rb, J ‗f r b. Mub shshir,  nd  l-Iskāfī.556 Since there is no 
information  bout them in the sources under these n mes, they m y be ‗ sā b. al-Haytham 
al-  fī, the disciple of Jā‗f r b.   rb  nd Ab  ‗Affān  l-Na  āmī, the disciple of 
                                                 
552
  Ibn  azm, al-I      VII,    . Ibn ‗Abd  l-Barr (562/1167) narrates also from the uṣ l work of Ab  
al-Qāsim ‗Ub yd All h b. ‗Um r (5         th t he s id th t even Ab   l-Huz yl  nd Bishr b. Mu‗t mir 
rejected al-Na  ām‘s idea and accepted the  uthority of qiyās. See Ibn ‗Abd  l-Barr, J   „         -„     II, 
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 It is prob ble th t Ab  ‗Affān  l-Na  āmī w s one of them. The following p r gr ph discusses some 
possible followers of al-Na  ām. 
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  Ibn Murtaḍā mentions them in the  th level of Mu‗t zil . See Ibn Murt ḍā,           -  „          -  . 
555 Al-Juw ynī mentions  l-B lkhī  s the le der of some B ghd di n Mut zilis who rejected qiyās. See 
Juwayni,   -T      , III, 155. However,  l-B lkhī does mention qiyās in his works.  
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 Ibn  azm, al-I      VII, 203. 
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al-Na  ām.557 Al-Juw ynī mentions th t the m jority of Shi‗ā, Ibāḍiyy , Azāriq ,  nd the 
majority of Kh rijīs except  l-N jdāt rejected the authority of qiyās.558 
This tendency  mong some Mu‗t zīlī schol rs, however,  pp rently did not spre d 
over even the m jority of Mu‗t zīlī schol rs. For inst nce,  l-Jā i  (255/869) who was a 
student of al-Na  ām  nd the only student of his through which we have access to 
al-Na  ām‘s opinions, did not follow his te cher strictly on this m tter. When he st tes the 
legal sources upon which prohibitive and permissive rulings are established, he mentions 
―correct  n logies‖ (al-          -mu    )  nd ―true re son‖  mong the v lid sources.559 
Even though al-Jā i  rejects prohibition of        (a type of fermented drink made of dates 
or grapes), which w s ruled b sed on qiyās  ccording to some scholars of the time, his 
reasoning w s b sed on the  rgument th t this prohibitive ruling w s b sed on   f lse qiyās 
rather than rejecting the authority of qiyās  ltogether.560 The indications of its falsehood 
according to al-Jā i  were first the fact that when the law-giver  prohibits something, he 
also permits other similar kinds such as permission of eating goat, sheep, and camel, despite 
the prohibition of pig  the second w s the dis greement  bout the ruling of n bīdh th t goes 
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 See  Ibn Murtaḍā,           -  „        78-9. 
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 al-Juw ynī, al-        II, 7. 
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 al-Jā i , R       IV, 277. Even though al-Jā i  mentions al-          -mu      which literally means the 
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 There is  lso   prophetic report prohibiting every intoxic ting drink th t re ds  s ―every intoxic ting is 
prohibited‖ (Kullu muskirin        ) 
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back to the earlier generations.
561
 From Baṣr n Mu‗t zilīs Ab  ‗Alī  l-Jubbā‘ī (  5   5   nd 
his son Ab   āshim (          re frequently cited  s h ving v rious opinions reg rding the 
 pplic tion of qiyās, some of which will be discussed below.562  
2. Ahl al-ḥ       T                          w         
Even though the authority of qiyās is gener lly  ccepted  mong the l ter   nb līs, 
many reports transmitted from A mad b.  anbal, the heroic leader of ahl al-  dīth, 
demonstr te his reluct nce in  ccepting qiyās  s   v lid method. U      -sunna, a work 
attributed to A mad b.   nb l, begins with the following st tement on the definition of ―the 
roots of sunn  ‖  
According to us, the principles of the sunna are adhering to what the companions 
of the Prophet were practicing and obeying them; abstaining from innovation 
which is aberration, and from debating in the matters of religion. The sunna that  
entails signs of the Quran explains the Quran and                               
cannot be used a source of analogy, [since] there is no role to reason, or personal 
desire, because it is just something to be obeyed and for which personal desire 
should be put aside.
563
 [Emphasis mine]  
In certain legal topics, A mad b.   nb l points out th t he  b ndons qiyās for the 
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sake of the reports from the companions.
564
 In another report, he states th t qiyās is 
comp ring something to the origin l, when one m kes qiyās, he does nothing but dism ntle 
the original.
565
 
A simil r  ttitude c n be observed in  l-Bukhārı ‘s al-Ṣa   . Al-Bukhārī devotes   
sub-chapter to ―the condemning of independent opinion (  ‟ ) and the burden of analogy 
(     ) in which he relates only two reports‖ (bāb mā yudhk ru fi dh mmi  l-r ‘y w  t k lluf 
 l-qiyās .566 The first narration is the following prophetic   dīth  ―All h does not t ke  w y 
knowledge by taking it away directly from the people, but He takes it away by the death of 
the scholars till when none of them remains, then people will take as their leaders ignorant 
persons who, when consulted, will give rulings without knowledge [on the basis of ra'y]. So 
they will go  str y  nd will le d the people  str y.‖ The second report is from   comp nion, 
Sahl b.  unayf, who suggests people to condemn independent opinion and to favor religion 
instead.
567 These two reports show th t  l-Bukhārī w s following the  rguments of ahl 
al-ḥ dīth in condemning independent opinion  nd qiyās, though he did not delve into the 
det ils of qiyās. It is  pp rent th t he w s reg rding the reports  s the sole source of 
authoritative knowledge, i.e. sunna, after the Quran (which he also emph sized in the title of 
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his ch pter  s ‗to hold f st the kitāb  nd sunn ‘ . However, he preferred to describe this 
stance with dhamm (condemning) as opposed to a more categorical refutation such as radd 
(refuting).  
Another traditionalist al-Qāsim b. Sallām (         does not openly reject qiyās, but 
he also does not support it explicitly in his books. A few examples even show that al-Qāsim 
b. S llām w s reluct nt to use this method  nd tended to keep c ses sep r te where other 
scholars apply Qiyās. For instance, in the case of whether the saliva of predators makes water 
uncle n  he reports th t Mālik b. An s  nd M dīn ns m de  n  n logy between the pred tors 
 nd c ts  nd  rgued th t the s liv  of pred tors does not m ke w ter uncle n  while Sufyān 
al-Thawrī  nd ‗Irāqīs m de  n  n logy between the pred tors  nd dogs  nd  rgued th t the 
saliva of predators may make water unclean, hence it is reprehensible. Al-Qāsim b. S llām 
makes the following statement about these analogical reasoning:  
―I do not think applying qiyās for one of the views is  ppropri te here. Both c ses 
about dog and cat are reported from the prophet separately. If one inclines to one of 
them, one would leave the other, while one of them does not deserve to be followed 
more than the other. Therefore, in the case of their saliva, there is nothing reported 
from the prophet, hence it became something disputed in which one should refrain 
from using it for cleaning unless there is necessity.‖568   
Qāsim b. S llām follows the s me  ppro ch in criticizing his opponent who makes 
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analogy between who is in debt of animals and who is in debt of money in excluding the 
amount of debt from alms-giving (z kāt  by s ying th t ―he makes analogy between them, 
but the sunna separated the two cases.”569 He also criticizes his ‗Irāqī opponent in  pplying 
qiyās between two origin l c ses with the following st tement   
Fundamental rulings (     ‟ „  of Islam cannot be a subject of analogy for one to 
 nother… If you reg rd s le (   „) as the original case [major term] and charity 
(sadaqa) as the new case [minor term] in order to apply an analogy; I can regard the 
charity as the original case and the sale as the new case. This is not right. Each 
obligatory ruling (farḍ) has its own aspect and detailed rulings.570  
Even though this l st quote does not inv lid te qiyās entirely, it definitely shows his 
reluct nce  nd restrictive  ttitude tow rd qiyās. 
Two different  ppro ches tow rd qiyās embodied within the arguments of two 
traditionalist scholars paved the way for distancing from reluctant approach toward either a 
more inclined approach, or a complete rejection. These two scholars were al- ārith 
al-Mu āsibī (     5   and al- us yn b. ‗Alī  l-K rābīsī (  5  5  .  
Among the members of ahl al-  dīth in the first half of the thirh hijrī century, the 
famous ascetic al- ārith al-Mu āsibī differs from his fellow traditionalists concerning the 
authority of qiyās. He neither rejects its authority, nor does he condemn it. Al- Mu āsibī 
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indic tes th t qiyās c n be used for the matters       c       pp  c       f          
permissible                           the text of kitāb, sunn , ijmā‗  l-umma and apparent 
derivation (       ṭ bayyin) from textual sources.571  
The only other person from the first half of the third hijrī century mentioned among 
the deniers of qiyās in the sources is al- usayn b. ‗Alī  l-K rābīsī, a follower of al-Shāfi‗ī 
 nd one of his disciples who tr nsmitted his ―old opinions‖ in the m dhh b.572 Yet, beside 
al-Jaṣṣāṣ, there is no other source indicating his rejection of qiyās. The only other piece of 
evidence is that al-K ‗bī mentions th t Dāwud b. ‗Alī  l-Aṣb hānī listed  l-K rābīsī  mong 
the q d rīs in his book, which  l-K ‗bī interpreted  s h ving   Mu‗t zilī inclin tion.573  This 
attribution must have been related to the fact that he is also represented as the first person 
who claimed that the recitation of the Quran is created, even though the wording of the 
Quran is uncreated. Al-K rābīsī is followed by Ab  Th wr (     5  , Dāwud b. ‗Alī 
(        ,  nd Hārith  l-Mu āsibī (     5   in this reg rd. This opinion  bout the 
creatednees of the recitation reportedly triggered the enmity between al-K rābisī  nd A mad 
b.  anbal (241/855), who had been close friends before.574  
This particular stances of al-Mu āsibī and al-K rābīsī, in f ct, hint beforehand how 
the reluct nce tow rd the  pplic tion of qiyās  mong  hl  l-  dīth resulted in two different 
approaches among traditionalists in the second h lf of the third hijrī century. Some 
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traditionalists were inclined more tow rds qiyās in leg l m tters despite their reserv tions in 
the realm of theology. Some others, later to be called as  āhirīs, completely rejected the 
authority of qiyās. 
Ibn Qutayba (276/889), the prolific defender of ahl al-  dīth in the second half of the 
third hijrī century, for example, mentions qiyās  s   v lid method  nd distinguishes it from 
r ‘y th t is inv lid.575 However, probably influenced by the reluctance of earlier scholars of 
ahl al-  dīth, Ibn Qutayba borrows the argument of al-Na  ām and points out the 
unreli bility of qiyās due to m ny c ses th t resemble one  nother, yet h ve different rulings 
in religion. He gives the examples of cutting off the hand of a thief if he steals only ten 
dirham, but not the hand of a usurper when he usurps ten-hundred-thousand dirham; and the 
waiting period („    ) is three menstrual periods for free women, while it is one menstrual 
period for female slaves.
576
 Elsewhere he ret ins this lighter reluct nce tow rd qiyās when 
he defends ahl al-  dīth by s ying th t ―Those who  dhere to the book of God  nd the sunn  
of his prophet illuminate themselves, open the door of maturity, and request the truth from its 
source. No one can blame ahl al-  dīth with this, bec use they do not est blish  nything in 
religion based on isti     (juristic preference), qiyās, na ar (reasoning), the books of the 
ancient philosophers  nd the l te people of k lām.‖577  All these critiques of qiyās of Ibn 
Qutayba should be understood as a reaction to ahl al-r ‘y who deploy qiyās  nd accept 
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transmitted reports only if they are in parallel with reason in the matters of fiqh.
578
 Ibn 
Qutayba points out this difference of attitudes toward   dīth with respect to fiqh between  hl 
al-  dīth  nd  hl  l-r ‘y when he responds to the critiques of  the opponents of ahl al-h dīth 
 bout   h dīth th t comm nds killing bl ck dogs by s ying th t ―Things like that cannot be 
comprehended based on na  r, qiyās,  nd re son. Wh t the prophet s id, or   comp nion of 
his who witnessed him and listened to what he said should be followed. They [our 
opponents] also do not rule out things like that unless there is a narration from the prophet or 
  comp nion  or  n  uthentic report from e rlier books, bec use it is not   m tter of f rāiḍ 
[law of inheritance] or sunan [legal rulings].
579‖ Another distinction he m kes is between 
theological matters, which he calls u     and juristic matters with respect to the  pplic tion of 
qiyās. He explicitly states that if ahl al-k lām deploy qiyās, n  ar, or isti sān in the topics of 
fiqh that would not matter, but they use these methods in theology, where disagreements are 
not allowed.
580
   
Murji‗ī schol r Bishr b. Ghiyās  l-M rīsī (         is reported to h ve cl imed th t 
qiyās is  pplic ble only if the umm   greed upon the effective cause of the actual case.581 
Since his name does not appear among the denier camp, it is safe to assume that he accepted 
the authority of qiyās. However, how this restriction stands in his over ll underst nding of 
qiyās is not cle r from ext nt works cont ining reports  bout Bishr b. Ghiyās.  
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3. Z                           T                                             
Tow rd the second h lf of the third hijrī century, the deb tes over the authority of 
qiyās re ched its pe k with the  ppearance of al- āhirīs. We see  bund nt writings both 
supporting the authority of qiyās entitled  s          -     ,582  and rejecting its authority 
entitled as ibṭ     -     ,583 written during th t time. Dā‘ d b. ‗Ali (         is prob bly the 
second most cited person among the deniers of qiyās  fter  l-Na  ām. As   member of  hl 
al-  dīth, Dāwud‘s rejection might h ve h d different re sons th n th t of  l-Na  ām  
however, the relationship between these reasons has remained untouched in the present 
scholarship. In the genre of uṣ l  l-fiqh, al-Jaṣṣās implies th t Dāwud did use the reasoning 
of al-Na  ām  nd the B ghdādī theologi ns in their rejection of qiyās  s   source,  lbeit with 
a great deal of confusion. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ expl ins how Dāwud b. ‗Alī rejected qiyās in the 
following rigorous words:  
Then an ignorant man from this rubbishy group ( ashaw  followed them in rejecting 
qiyās  nd ijtihād by picking up something from  l-Na  ām‘s  rguments  nd 
something from B ghdādī theologi ns‘  rguments, even though he did not know wh t 
al-Na  ām s id, nor wh t those theologi ns s id in  ddition to his ignor nce  bout the 
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 rguments of the supporters  nd the deniers of the qiyās. He put himself in the level 
of animals even worse  by claiming that there is no role for reason altogether in 
understanding religious sciences. As god almighty mentioned
584
 ―they  re like 
animals, even worse than them.
585
  
Elsewhere al-Jaṣṣāṣ indic tes th t Dāwud‘s rejection of qiyās  nd r ‘y relies on his 
general rejection of reason. This reaction against reason reaches to the extent th t Dāwud, 
according to al-Jaṣṣāṣ, claimed that the indications existing on Earth or in our selves do not 
prove the existence of God or monotheism; rather he knows this through reports.
586
  
Therefore, according to al-Jaṣṣāṣ, people like him  re not worth being considered in ijmā, 
because they would not be regarded as scholars.  
This demonstr tes th t despite using their re soning to   cert in extent, Dāwud‘s 
rejection differs from e rlier rejections of qiyās with his over ll rejection of reason in 
religious matters both theological and legal.  The motive for the rejection also appears to 
differ with th t of Mu‗t zilīs, who rejected the qiyās. As we h ve seen e rlier, the rejection of 
qiyās by Mu‗t zilī schol rs  w s due l rgely to their demand for  ruling-free space in the 
realm of actions together with their strict distinction between theology and law in 
transitionary nature.  Even though the motive of adherence to the revelation as a sign of 
piety does not seem to operate explicitly in al-Na  ām‘s thinking, v rious reports describing 
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J ‗f r b. Mub shshir  nd J ‗f r b.   rb imply such   motive in their thinking. Dāwud‘s 
motive seems to have originated from his strict adherence to the texts, especially to the 
chained-reports. Dāwud‘s thinking of religion and religious sciences is completely based on 
the idea that the religion provides the answers, and the duty of scholar is just to narrate what 
the answer of religion is. We will see below the details of this, what I call, perfected-religion 
based  āhirī thought of Dāwud  nd his son Ab  B kr b. Dāwud.  
Another scholar mentioned among the  āhirīs who rejected the authority of qiyās w s 
Mu  mm d b. Ishāq Ab  B kr  l-Qāshānī (        . Al-Qāshānī was an interesting figure, 
who had been first al- āhirī  nd h d written  bout inv lidity of qiyās, then  reportedly 
became a al-Shāfi‗ī  nd wrote books entitled K       -     „    D     f    ṭ     -      and 
K              -       ccording to Ibn N dīm‘s  ccount.587 However, other sources do not 
mention this conversion and list him among  āhirī schol rs despite his critiques of Dāwud.588  
Al-N hr wānī (         is  lso mentioned together with  l-Qāshānī in rejecting qiyās unless 
the efficient cause („    ) is mentioned evidently in the textual sources.589 The opinion that 
considers this kind of  pplic tion of qiyās just  s   gener l text th t needs to be implemented 
                                                 
587
 al-Jaṣṣās mentions th t  l-Qāshānī relied upon   verse ―Does it not suffice for them th t we h ve sent   book 
to you to be recited to them‖ [   5   in his  tt cks to the  uthority of qiyās. See al-Jaṣṣās, al-Fu     IV, 32. See 
also al-Z rk shī, al-Ba r al-mu     VII, 28-9;. Ibn al-N dīm, al-Fihrist, 263.; al-Qāshānī is  lso mentioned 
together with Dāwud in the c mp rejecting qiyās. See Ab  Y ‗l ā, al-„U     III, 861.  
588
 He is mentioned  s belonging to Dāwudī school in Hadiyyat al-„   f  . Ism il P ş   l-B ghdādī,  Hadiyyat 
al-„   f  , II, 20. al-Shirāzī  lso mentions him  mong  āhirī schol rs  nd st tes th t  nother  āhirī Ab  
al- asan Ibn al-Mughalliṣ (324/936) reportedly responded to al-Qāshānī‘s critiques of Dāwud in al-Q   „ 
li-al-muta        -ṭ   „. See Ab  Is āq  l-Shirāzī,           -f     ‟  176. Probably following al-Shirāzī‘s 
account Ibn  ajar also calls him as a  āhirī schol r. See Ibn  ajar,  ab      -muntabah, III, 1147. 
589
 Ab  Is āq  l-Shirāzī, al- ab ira, 436; See also al-Gh zālī, al-Musta f   I, 302. 
234 
whatever it entails also is attributed to al-Na  ām, 590  though as mentioned above, 
al-Na  ām‘s deni l  ppe rs to ent il leg l m tters in gener l without any restriction in his 
reported words. Also, this distinction between explicitly mentioned effective cause and 
non-mentioned c use does not  ppe r in the e rly third hijrī century.  
This scholarly camp which opposed the authority of qiyās did survive for a long time. 
Ab  ‗Abd All h Mu  mm d b. ‗ sā  l-M ghrībī (         , who is  reported to h ve st ted 
th t qiyās is prohibited by revel tion591 represents the f ct th t this tendency  g inst qiyās 
survived until Ibn  azm, who is frequently portrayed in recent studies as the one who 
revived this  āhirī  rgument.592 
4. Shi                  
The deni l of qiyās in Shi‗ī tr dition seems to h ve resulted l rgely from the 
fund ment l doctrine of imām . Since there is the  uthority of the imām, who c n ord in  nd 
prohibit religious rulings, qiyās w s not needed. As for the re son of rejection, Shi‗ī  
schol rs pointed out the f ct th t the different  pplic tions of qiyās  re the m in c use for 
disagreements among Muslims, which is discouraged, even condemned in the Quran.
593
 The 
understanding of perfected religion with the Qur n  nd sunn  th t includes the pr ctices of 
the im ms  s well seems to h ve been oper ting  mong Shi‗ī circles in denying qiyās. L stly, 
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the evidence also shows that there was a general rejection of effective cause for the 
prohibited and permitted actions in Islam.  
The earliest figure among the Shi‗  to whom  ttributed the critiques of qiyās  nd r ‘y 
were J ‗f r  l- ādiq (      5  who m de the following st tement, ―The people of qiyās 
demanded knowledge through qiyās which took them further  w y from the truth. The 
religion of All h c nnot be obt ined through qiyās.‖594 He also reportedly answered a 
question whether one is allowed to use reasoning (na ar) if there is no text in the book of 
God or in sunna in the negative by saying th t ―If you hit the truth based on reasoning you 
would not have got reward, if you did not hit it, you would have lied on behalf of Allah.‖595  
His son M sā Kā im (         is reported to h ve severely criticized Ab   anīf  when 
responding to a question asked by Mu ammad b.   kīm, who w s indirectly trying to get 
permission for the  pplic tion of qiyās. M sā s id th t Ab    nīf  used to s y, ―‗Alī s id 
th t, but I s id this… All h is not  ccount ble for how he prohibited and permitted things.‖596 
After him, Hishām b.  l- akam (179/795), who is also reported to have written K     
al-  f  , reportedly a book on Islamic legal theory, is reported to have indicated that 
knowledge as a whole is necessary, i.e. a priori, it appears only after na ar (rational 
consideration) and          (rational deduction.)597 Al-Ash‗ rī mentions this opinion as one of 
the eight different opinions for the authority of qiyās  nd re soning th t  ppe red in the 
                                                 
594  l-Kul ynī,   -K f   I, 57. 
595  l-Kul ynī,   -K f   I, 56.  
596  l-Kul ynī,   -K f   I, 56-57. 
597
 al-Ash‗ rī, M         -I         ,52. 
236 
tr dition of Rāfiḍīs (S  „  . However, al-Ash‗ rī also states that the majority of Rāfiḍīs held 
th t ―qiyās  nd re soning do not le d to cert inty, hence God did not comm nd to deploy 
them.‖598  Ab  S hl  l-N wb khtī (         is reported to h ve written   book entitled 
K       ṭ     -qi   .599  
The Ismā‗īlī schol r  l-Qādī al-Nu‗mān (351/962) provides an extensive account for 
the rejection of qiyās  nd r ‘y in his work I      f        -        . The arguments he 
brings up are almost identical with those of  āhirīs.  He mentions600 well-known  verses 
 bout the completeness of religion such  s ―We did not neglect  nything in the kitāb‖  nd 
―This d y h ve I perfected your religion for you  nd completed my f vor unto you,  nd h ve 
chosen for you Islām  s religion.‖601 After mentioning a few other verses  nd   h dīth, 
al-Qādī al-Nu‗mān  ccuses the supporters of r ‘y, n   r  nd qiyās with  scribing rulings to 
God without knowledge.
602
 He continues his methodic critiques by  tt cking his opponents‘ 
arguments from the Quran  nd h dīth,  nd then he uses these arguments against them on the 
basis of weakness and incapability of human beings and the absence of authority for 
prohibiting and permitting things without revelation.
603
 According to al-Qādī al-Nu‗mān, the 
strongest  rgument of the supporters of qiyās is the well-known formul  ―even the deniers of 
na ar (re soning  h ve to use re soning to deny it.‖ Hence, he devotes   signific nt  mount 
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to establish that he does not deny its authority b sed on re soning, but b sed on the kitāb  nd 
sunna.
604
 Ultimately the discussion goes back to  usn and qub  and al-Qādī al-Nu‗mān 
strives to prove th t ―we know good  nd evil by the report, not through re son‖,   st nce 
closer to that of al-Ash‗ rī in  usn and qub .605 The role of ‗ ql (re son , he s ys,  is to 
obey what is revealed by God and the people of the reason (ahl al-„     are those who obey 
the word of God and sunna of the prophet.
606
 Al-Qādī  l-Nu‗mān deploys another known 
 āhirī  rgument th t the revel tion expl ins itself, thus it does not need re son. The duty of 
scholars is to transmit the knowledge ( amalat al-„   ) not to derive it or deduce it.607  
Al-Qādī al-Nu‗mān divides the opinions pertaining to the authority of qiyās into three 
categories: (1) accepting its authority in both theology (taw īd   nd l w (rulings); (2) 
accepting its authority only in theology, not in law; and (3) rejecting its authority in both 
theology and law.
608
 By citing frequently the verses like ― sk those who  re the people of 
remembr nce‖609  nd ―obey those who  re in ch rge (      -amr, ‖610 he points out the 
 uthority of imām r ther th n re soning.611 Another argument, with which we are familiar 
from al-Na  ām  is th t God ord ined different rulings for simil r  ctions   nd the s me 
                                                 
604
 al-Qāḍī al-Nu‗mān, I      f  141-44. 
605
 al-Qāḍī al-Nu‗mān, I      f  144. 
606
 al-Qāḍī al-Nu‗mān, I      f  149. 
607
 al-Qāḍī al-Nu‗mān, I      f  150-51. 
608
 al-Qāḍī al-Nu‗mān, I      f  155-56. 
609
 The Quran, 16:43 and 21:7. 
610
 The Quran, 
611
 al-Qāḍī al-Nu‗mān, I      f  156. 
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ruling for different actions.
612
  
Al-Qādī al-Nu‗mān also points out the subjectivity of the  pplic tion of qiyās by 
saying that every group or person identifies different aspects as the effective cause for the 
same problem, for instance in interest; hence, each one attributes the truth to himself or his 
group without being able to provide a certain cause that everyone accepts.
613
  
Another core theological and legal-theoretical discussion also brought about in 
qiyās-rel ted deb tes is whether God‘s rulings h ve the effective c uses. As will be 
mentioned below, some deniers of qiyās tend to  ccept th t if the effective c use is explicitly 
mentioned in the textual sources. In this case, according to them, this text should be regarded 
a general („   ) text and other cases should take the same ruling due to the generality of the 
text, not bec use of qiyās. However, the ide  of rejection of qiyās lies in the rejection of 
c us lity in God‘s rulings. Since there  re no effective c uses in the prohibitions or 
commandments of God, it is not possible to compare one case to another on the basis of the 
effective cause. Al-Qādī al-Nu‗mān rejects causality and supports his argument with the 
well-known changes between the rulings of Islam and the rulings of the earlier revelations. 
For instance, he mentions that wine, which is prohibited in the Quran, was not prohibited in 
earlier revelations of the people of book, while animal fat, which is permitted in Islam was 
prohibited in the e rlier revel tions. Then he  sks ―So, w s wine not intoxic ting  nd bec me 
                                                 
612
 al-Qāḍī al-Nu‗mān, I      f  158. 
613
 al-Qāḍī al-Nu‗mān, I      f  160. 
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intoxicating later? And what changed in the effective c uses of  nim l f t ‖614  
In al-Tadhkira, a work attributed to al-Shaykh al-Mufīd (         , qiyās  nd r ‘y 
are mentioned as invalid and not leading to knowledge, or establishing truth; therefore, they 
cannot specify a general text and cannot generalize a specific text.
615
 Whoever relies on 
qiyās or r ‘y,  ccording to the  uthor of this text, h s gone  str y.616   
Al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā (          st tes th t qiyās is not   v lid source, even though 
rationally it would be possible to be a source, if God ordained so.
617
  Al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā 
first rejects the idea that the preference (       ) of the prophet or of a scholar was valid for 
establishing a legal ruling and there was no need for revelation for every legal ruling, which 
                                                 
614
 al-Qāḍī al-Nu‗mān, I      f  171. 
615 Sh ykh  l-Mufīd, al-Tadkhira, 38. Wilfred Madelung attributed al-Tadhkira to Ab  Ṭālib Yā yā b. 
al- us yn  l-Nāṭiq bi al-  qq,   Z ydī imām  nd rejected the  ttribution to al-Sh ykh  l-Mufīd. However, the 
content of the recent publication of   -M     f         -fiqh by  l-Nāṭiq bi al- aqq shows that the two books 
could not be written by the same person due to the vast differences between the two texts with respect to the 
sources of law as well as style. See al-Nāṭiq bi- l-  qq, Y  yā ibn  l- us yn,   -M     f         -fiqh, edited by 
‗Abd  l-K rīm A m d J d bān. 2013. 
616 Sh ykh  l-Mufīd, al-Tadkhira, 43. 
617
 al-Sayyid Murtaḍā, al-D    „   II,  5 . Ab   l- usayn al-Baṣrī  lso rel tes this opinion  bout possibility of 
qiyās being   v lid method to Muw ys b. ‗Imrān. See Ab   l- usayn al-Basri, al-M „     , II, 57. Elsewhere 
al-Baṣrī gives more det ils  bout this st nce  nd mentions th t Ab  ‗Alī  l-Jubb ī used to see it is permissible to 
apply qiyās only for the prophets if Allah ordained them, then abondoned this opinion. Muways saw that it 
permissible for both the prophets and other scholars, if Allah ordained them. Al-Sh fi‗ī s w th t this permissible 
for only the prophet depending on the confirmation from God. Al-Qādī ‗Abd  l-J bbār rejected the ide  
 ltogether. See Ab   l- usayn al-Baṣrī, al-M „     , II, 329. Al-R zī mentions the topic  s whether it is 
possible for God to s y for   prophet or   schol r  ―Rule, you would rule only with truth.‖ He mentions Muw ys 
 nd the m jority of the Mu‗t zil  for the opposite opinions reg rding the m tter, but  ttributes suspension for 
permissibility or prohibition of this to al-Sh fi‗ī. See  l-R zī, al-Ma      VI, 137. 
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he attributes to Muw ys b. ‗Imrān 618    Murji‗ī-Mu‗t zilī friend of  l-Jā i , and his 
followers.
619
 Al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā identifies five different re sons th t led to five positions 
th t emerged  mong the deniers of qiyās   
(1) Qiyās r tion lly c nnot be   v lid w y to re ch to the knowledge of legal 
rulings, due to the fact that it depends on probability ( ann), or that it leads to 
contradiction in legal rulings. 
(2) Qiyās is inv lid, bec use there is no w y to know, cert inly or even 
probably, the actual cause of the original ruling, due to the absence of indication and 
marking that necessitate certain ruling. 
(3) Those, including Ibrāhīm  l-Na  ām, who think th t it is r tion lly 
possible for qiyās to be   source, but it is not v lid due to the f ct th t the leg l rulings 
were ord ined in different w ys [despite simil rities , which demonstr tes th t qiyās 
is not applicable.  
(4) Those, including some of the followers of Dāw d who think that it is not 
permissible to think that God ordained a ruling in a lower expression [lack of clarity], 
                                                 
618  l-K ‗bī, Bab dhikr al-M „          .,  l-Q di ‗Abd   l-J bbār, Faḍ    - „          .   l-Kh yyāṭ st tes th t 
one should hold  ll five principles of  l-Mu‗t zil  to be c lled Mu‗t zilī. Since Muways is known for his 
rejection of al-manzila bayn al-manzilatayn, the Mu‗t zil  do not consider him Mu‗t zilī. See  l-Kh yyāṭ, 
al-Inti        -  .  Al-Dār qutnī mentions th t  l-Jāhi  n rr ted Muw ys‘s ide s in his U      -f    , which 
was probably the source of al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā,  s well. See  l-Dār qutnī, al-M ‟    f wa-al-mukhtalif, IV, 
2166. 
619
 al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā, al-D    „   II, 658-69. 
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while he was able to ordain it in a superior expression [including every element in the 
ruling]. 
(5) Those who think that it is possible both rationally and 
religiously for qiyās to be v lid, but there is no evidence for its authority, while there 
is evidence for its invalidity.
620
  
5.                           -        
The third group who denied authority of qiyās as indicated in Sunnī legal theoretical 
liter ture w s the Khārijīs. We have little information about their motives and reasons in their 
rejection of qiyās  s is the c se pretty much  bout  ll their contribution, if  ny, to the 
intellectual history of Islam. Al-Ash‗ rī  ssigns two different positions to Kh rijīs. The only 
group who rejected ijtihād in leg l m tters w s  l-Azāriqa. The majority of them, including 
al-N jdāt,  ccepted ijtihād  l-r ‘y.621  He also states that al-Azāriq  followed only the 
apparent meaning of the Quran (        -Quran , which implies  n inclin tion  g inst ijtihād 
 nd qiyās.  
Ibn  l-N dīm  ssigns two works entitled K       -     „    A   H   f  f -al-  ‟  and 
K       -     „      -S  f „  f    -    s to Ab   l-Faḍl  l-Qur tl sī, who reportedly lived in 
‗Akb rā‘   city between B ghdād  nd M wṣil in the east of Tigris river.622 It appears from 
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 al-Sayyid Murtaḍā, al-D    „   II, 674-75. 
621
 al-Ash‗ rī, M         -I         , I, 110. 
622 Ibn  l-N dīm, al-Fihrist, 291. 
242 
the titles th t  l-Qur tl sī w s criticizing the use of r ‘y (re soning   nd qiyās by  tt cking 
the most f mous proponents of these two methods during the second hijrī century.  
6. T                                   rd and Early 4th                 
Despite the f ct th t the opponents of qiyās  mong Mu‗t zilī schol rs decre sed 
signific ntly tow rd the end of the third hijrī century, the liter l tr dition lists (l ter to be 
called as  āhirīs   tt cked this method by borrowing the  rguments of e rly Mu‗t zilīs. The 
proponents of qiyās were in the position of responding to these  āhirī  rguments concerning 
qiyās. From the l te third  nd e rly fourth hijrī century, Ibn Sur yj de ls with the authority of 
qiyās first  nd mentions four verses  nd a prophetic report to establish its authority.623  
However, it is reported th t he w s  lso opinion of th t qiyās is   v lid tool through re son 
(„   ).624 Ibn Sur yj defines qiyās  s ―the deriv tion by comp ring the new c se (far‗  to the 
original case (a l) due to the common similarity between them.‖625 Ibn Surayj is also 
reported to h ve  ccepted the restriction of textu l sources by ―obvious qiyās‖, (al-      
  -      though not by hidden qiyās (al-      al-   f ).626 
Ibn Surayj reportedly mentioned a debate in his treatise I        -     , according to 
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 The Quran, 4:83; 2:26; 3:89; 3:90. Ibn Surayj relates the following   dīth ―Wh t is reported from the 
prophet when he said to al-Kh th‗ mīyy   ―Wh t would you do, if there w s   debt on you f ther [who h d 
died .‖ She s id  ―I would p y for him.‖ The prophet responded, ―The debt of All h deserves more to be p id.‖ 
Seemingly, Ibn Surayj attributes applying analogy to the prophet himself. See Ibn Surayj,   -W   ‟ „, II, 
676-77. 
624
 al-Z rk shī, al-Ba r al-mu     I, 184. 
625
 Ibn Surayj, al-W   ‟ „  II, 676. 
626
 al- midī, al-I      II, 337.; al-Rāzī, al-Ma    , III, 96. 
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which the deniers of qiyās  sked the supporters in leg l theoretic l terms ―Tell us, is qiyās   
farḍ (obligatory) or nadb (recommended). If you say it is nadb, you would adjudicate 
something that does not exist in religion, if you say it is farḍ, we do not find it.‖ Ibn Sur yj 
responds to this by saying, ―It is obligatory (farḍ), because Allah commanded us to provide 
the living expenses of our wives, including food, and he commanded us to fast for killing 
game [in the sacred place], and taking jizyah, but he did not clarify the amounts of all these, 
hence we are obliged to use our reason to decide for their amounts. Since it is the action 
[method] to implement the command of Allah, it is not called aṣl nor far‗.‖627 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ also 
points out th t   question  bout whether qiyās is  n  ṣl or f r‗ posed by Dāwud b. ‗Alī is  n 
indic tion of his ignor nce, then simil rly he s ys th t qiyās c nnot  be subject to such   
question, because it is just a tool of whoever uses it. The correct question should be ―Is 
accepting authority of qiyās or jurisdiction through qiyās  ṣl or f r‗ ‖628  
Another Shāfi‗ī from the l te third  nd e rly fourth hijrī century, Ab  B kr  l-  yr fī 
(         pointed out how the deniers of qiyās  re confused between syllogism (      
f -al-„        ) and analogy (      f -al-    „).  According to him, they misunderstood these 
two things and once they saw that analogy does not lead to certainty they rejected it.
629
  
Al-Māt rīdī (        , the f mous  an fī theologi n from the s me period, rejects 
the cl im of the deniers th t qiyās me ns  rguing for something upon which one does not 
                                                 
627
 al-Z rk shī, al-Ba r al-mu     VII, 35. 
628
 al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fu   , IV, 95. 
629
 al-Z rk shī, al-Ba r al-mu     VII, 82. 
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have knowledge, which is contrary to the meaning of a verse in the Quran  nd w s used by 
the deniers of qiyās frequently .630 It apparently suffices for him to refer the application of 
qiyās  nd r ‘y to the comp nions of the prophet  nd to exclude the re lm of ijtihād from the 
meaning of the verse.
631
  
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ first tries to provide a textu l b sis for ijtihād in the sense of using reason to 
assign certain amounts for certain rulings whose amounts were not clarified in the textual 
sources
632
 and  and identifying the direction of qibla for prayers.
633
  
D. Development of the Elements of Qiyās 
Four elements of qiyās  re discussed in the later mature works of Islamic legal theory: 
a l (the old case)  f  „ (the new case),  ukm al-a l (the rule of the old case)  „     (ratio legis).  
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ does not devote   sep r te topic discussing elements of qiyās, but he uses  ll these 
terms per se in his definition of qiyās.634 Even though Ibn Abī  ātim cl ims th t  l-Shāfi‗ī 
also had the idea of aṣl  nd f r‗ in qiyās, these terms  re missing in  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s works.635 A 
recent study on qiyās in Sh fi‗ī‘s underst nding demonstr ted th t Sh fi‗ī did not use these 
terms consistently per se. Yet, he deployed descriptive concepts instead of these developed 
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 The Quran,        ―Do not st nd out  bout something you do not h ve knowledge‖ 
631
 al-Māt rīdī, T ‟            -sunna, VII, 46. 
632
 The Quran,        ―Mothers sh ll suckle their children for two whole ye rs  (th t is  for those who wish to 
complete the suckling. The duty of feeding and clothing nursing mothers in a seemly manner is upon the father 
of the child... If they desire to we n the child by mutu l consent  nd ( fter  consult tion, it is no sin for them‖ 
For the other verses that al-Jaṣṣāṣ mentions: 2:236, 2:241, 2:144, 2:220, 2:229, 33:49. 
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 al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fu   , IV, 25. 
634
 al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fu     IV, 17. 
635
 Ibn Abī Hātim,  dāb  l-Shāfi‗ī w  M nāqibuhu, I,    . 
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terms. Instead of a l he mentions ―                        ‖ (ruling of All h  nd his 
messenger); instead of the term f  „, he uses ―nazilatun‖ (the new c se), and as for the„     he 
prefers ―  „  ‖ (me ning .636 This shows th t the terminology  round the elements of qiyās 
developed in the gap period.  
The most fund ment l element of qiyās is ‗ill . In wh t follows, I will try to ex mine 
historical development of this concept and to find answers for questions like why it was 
needed by legal theorists, who used this term first, and who contributed to its development.  
Literally „     means illness, sickness, disease, defect, cause, reason.637 This word had 
been used only in these liter l senses until the third hijrī century,638 after then it turned into 
four different terms in four different sciences  gr mm r, h dīth, k lām,  nd uṣ l  l-fiqh.  
In gr mm r, ‗ill  w s used to me n the linguistic c use of different st tes of verbs, 
nouns and adjectives in the system of case endings ( „   ). In his al-Iḍ   f  „       -na w, 
al-Z jjājī (        ,  fter sep r ting gr mm tic l ‗ill , th t is inferred, from r tion l ‗ill , 
that is necessary, divides the causes of grammar (na w) into three kinds from more general to 
more specific as instructive cause (al-„       „       ), analogical cause (al-„              ), 
                                                 
636 Soner Dum n, Ş fii‘nin kıy s  nl yışı,  5. ch.  l-Shāfi‗ī,  l-Risāl , 5  . 
637
  „-l-l] See Kh līl b. A mad, K       -„     I, 88; al-Fīr zābādī, Q       -mu  ṭ, 1035. 
638
 See for ex mples Mālik, Muwaṭṭ ‟  II, 155; al-Sh ybānī,        I, 272; al-  n‗ānī, Mu annaf, I, 295. 
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and argumentative cause (al-„       -jadaliyya).639 In addition to al-Z jjājī‘s work, Abu ‗Ali 
al-Baṣrī Quṭrub (206/821), Ibn al- ā‘il (        ,  nd Ibn  l-W rrāq (          re reported 
to have written books entitled K       -„     f -al-na w.640  
In the tr dition of h dīth, ‗ill  w s used to describe   defect or   mist ke in   
seemingly authentic chain of transmission in parallel to its main literal meaning. We see 
 bund nt use of the term in the works of h dīth during the third  nd fourth hijrī centuries.641 
This concept turned into the n me of   specific genre within the sciences of h dīth to which 
‗Alī b. Al-M dīnī (  5     , A mad b.  anbal (241/855), Muslim b. al-  jjāj (      5 , 
al-Ashram (270/883), al-Tirmidhī (        ,‗Abd All h b. Mu ammad al-B lkhī (        , 
Ibn Abī Sh yb  (        ,  l-Kh llāl (        ,  l-B gh wī (        , Ibn Abī  ātim 
(327/938), al-Dār qutnī ( 85/995) are reported to have contributed with  their books entitled 
K       -„     or „I      -      .642    
In k lām, „     became the key concept explaining causality among the theologians of 
                                                 
639
 For ex mple, for the sentence of ―Indeed Z yd is st nding‖ (inn  Z yd n qāimun مئاق‏اديز‏نإ), the question of 
―why is the noun Zaydan written as manṣub here ‖  sks for the instructive c use, which is ―since it is preceded 
by inna‖. The question of ―why inn  m kes the following word m nsub‖  sks for  the  n logic l ‗ill , which is 
―since inn   nd its sisters repl ce tr nsitive verbs and become effective like them making the following noun 
object (m f‗ l . All other nu nced questions  fter this level such  s ―which kind of verbs these letters (inn   nd 
its sisters  repl ce  P st, future or present verbs ‖  sk for the  rgument tive cause.See al-Z jjājī, al-     f  „     
al-na w, 64-65. 
640 Ibn  l-N dīm, al-Fihrist, 78, 111,; al-Bābānī, Hadiyyat al-„   f  , I, 448, 470; II, 209 
641
 al-Tirmidhī, Sunan, VI, 230; al-B zzār, Musnad, I, 184, 196, 208; III, 36; VI, 273; VIII, 25; X, 180; Ibn 
Khuzayma, Ṣa   , I, 25; II, 54, 57, 150; IV. 322; al-Ṭa āwī. Shar    „   ‟   -       III, 142. 
642
 Ibn N dīm, al-Fihrist, 320, 322, 325; al-Dh h bī, S      „      -        XIV,  5   Ziriklī, A„     IV, 118; 
Ka  āl , M „      -      f    V,      Kātib Çelebi, Kashf al-       II, 1440; al-Bābānī, Hadiyyat al-„   f  , I, 
48, 670, 684; II, 19, 432 
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the third hijrī century.  Ab   l- asan al-Ash‗ rī (         lists ten different opinions 
reg rding whether ‗ill , in the sense c use, comes before the effect (  „   ) or together with 
the effect.
643
 He mentions the names of Bishr b. al-Mu‗t mir (      5   nd  l-Iskāfī 
(240/854) among those who contributed to the topic, who lived in the late second and early 
third centuries. The main theological discussion was whether potency (istiṭ „   is the ‗ill  of 
the action (f „ ).644  Al-Tujjār (      5 ,   theologi n of  l-Mujbira, is reported to have 
written K       -„     f -al-istiṭ „ .645           
It seems th t ‗ill  beg n to emerge  s   concept of uṣ l  l-fiqh, as early as the late 
second and early third centuries. Even though al-Shāfi‗ī mostly prefers   „   inste d of ‗ill , 
he  lso uses ‗ill  close to its terminologic l me ning in al-Umm,646 and his M dīn n 
interlocutor uses ‗ill   s   c use of ruling in   deb te n rr ted in al-R     .647 One of 
al-Shāfi‗ī‘s contempor ries, Y  yā b.  d m (         is reported to h ve used the term ‗ill  
as the reason for a prohibition.
648
 The use of ma‗nā to me n r tio legis continued well until 
al-Jaṣṣāṣ. Even though al-Jaṣṣāṣ uses ‗ill  more, he uses m ‗nā,  s well. He  lso mentions, 
for inst nce, m ‗nā when he divides r tio legis in   text two kinds  s obvious-apparent 
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 al-Ash‗ rī, M        II, 289-90. 
644
 Ibrāhīm  l-N jjārī cl ims th t potency is the ‗ill  of the  ction, while ‗Ubbād b. Sul ymān rejects th t. See 
Ash‗ rī, M        I, 390. 
645
 al-Bābānī, Hadiyyat al-„   f  , I, 304, 
646
 al-Shāfi‗ī, al-Umm, I, 27, 59, 95, 306; II, 105,188,  247; III, 17, 53, 199; IV, 198; V, 62; VI, 147, VII 15, 
214, 345. 
647
 al-Shāfi‗ī, al-R       535. 
648
 al-Ṭa āwī, Shar     „   ‟   -     , I, 384. 
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(jaliyyun        ) and hidden-concealed (   f              ).649  
The use of the term ‗ill  to me n r tio legis  ccrued during the third hijrī century. 
Al-Jaṣṣās reports from Ab  B kr  l-Aṣ mm (        , Bishr b. Ghiyāth (          nd Ibn 
‗Ul yy  (        ,  ll from ‗Irāq, th t they  rgued that there is a single ‗ill  inherent in e ch 
textual case (a l  en bling qiyās for every new c se (       ).650 Another confusing use of 
that period is using a l to me n ‗ill . Bishr b. Ghiyāth reportedly s id, ―Qiyās c n only be 
performed on an agreed upon and known a l.‖651 An early   n fī jurist, ‗Isā b. Abān 
(220/835) is reported to have written a book entitled K       -„     f -al-fiqh.652  Al-Jā i  
(255/869) uses the term exactly to mean ratio legis when he explains permissibility of 
consonance in poetry due to ―the  bsence of ‗ill ‖  s opposed to e rly prohibition by the 
prophet bec use of its use by the cl irvoy nts during jāhiliyy  (the time of ignor nce .653  
He repe tedly uses the phr se ―When the ‗ill  is removed the ruling of prohibition is 
removed.‖654  Al- ārith al-Mu āsibī (     5   uses the term ‗ill  when he discusses the 
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 al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fu     IV, 73. 
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 al-Jaṣṣās, al-Fu     IV, 295. 
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 al-Jaṣṣās, al-Fu     IV, 146. Al-Jaṣṣās underst nds this  s to  gree upon   text th t h s ‗ill  (  „   ). See 
al-Jaṣṣās, al-Fu     IV, 147. 
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 Kātib Çelebi, Kashf al-       II, 1440. Katib mentions Ibn Abī  i tim‘s book  s al-„       -      f         
al-fiqh. 
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 ―ميرحتلا‏لاز‏ةلعلا‏تلاز‏املف‏،مهنم‏ريثك‏رودص‏يفو‏مهيف‏اهتيقبلو‏،ةيلهاجلاب‏مهدهع‏برقل‏رهدلا‏كلذ‏يف‏يهنلا‏عقىف‖ 
―The prohibition took pl ce  t th t time, bec use their time w s close to the time of ignorance whose effect 
rem ined within them  nd m ny  ges from them. When the ‗ill  is removed the ruling of prohibition is 
removed.‖ See  l-Jā i , al-Bayan wa-al-        I, 241-42. 
654
 al-Jā i , al-Bayan wa-al-        I, 241-42. al-Jā i  uses ‗ill   lso in a general sense meaning the necessary 
reason for the existence of result. He, for instance, says that envy does not perish unless the thing envied that is 
‗ill  of envy perishes. See  l-Jā i , al-R   ‟    I, 345. 
249 
types of  brog tion  nd s ys th t if the ruling of   verse depended on   ‗ill   nd this ‗ill  does 
not exist anymore, the verse should be deemed as abrogated.
655
 This all shows that the word 
‗ill  beg n to repl ce the word m ‗nā for the concept of r tio legis in the first h lf of the third 
hijrī century.  
Wael Hallaq gives a historical outline of this concept by examining its stages in the 
writings of al-Shāfi‗ī,  l-Fārābī, Abu  l- usayn al-Baṣrī,  nd  l-Gh zālī.656 Hallaq argues 
th t   sophistic ted  nd det iled theory of ‗ill  emerged by the end of the third ninth century 
and the beginning of the fourth/tenth century, after modifying the principles of analogy, 
deduction, and induction in the works of Greek logic that were translated in the first decades 
of the third century.
657
 Our research confirms this conclusion for the time of the developed 
theory of ‗ill   however, the cl im for the influence of Greek logic should be discussed in 
det il. Aforementioned textu l evidence showed th t the word ‗ill  to me n r tio legis h d 
been there even in the works of al-Shāfi‗ī  nd some other works of the l te second  nd e rly 
third centuries. Also, al-Fārābī (     5   uses the term al-  „     -      (the general 
me ning , which w s   modified use of e rlier jurists, inste d of ‗ill  in  n logy (       ).658 
Al-Fārābī reports th t the people of his time used the term ‗ill  for the middle term (al- add 
al-aw aṭ) in the application of the inference of absent through present (al-              -       
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„      -   ‟  ).659 This shows th t using the term ‗ill  in re ching   judgment of  n  bsent 
matter had been there before al-Fārābī presented his terminology  round syllogism  nd 
analogy to the extent that he had to use this term in addition to his own term, which was a 
literal translation of the middle term as al- add al-aw aṭ.  
This common use of synonyms, e.g. ‗ill , al- add al-aw aṭ and al-  „   for the 
middle term;  nd homonyms, e.g. qiyās for both syllogism  nd  n logy   nd ‗ill  for both 
ratio legis and the middle term, created confusion to the extent that some jurists needed to 
point out  nd cl rify the distinction in the l te third  nd e rly fourth hijrī centuries. Ab  B kr 
al-  yr fī (        ,  s we mentioned  bove, expl ins the re son for rejection of qiyās  s 
confusing r tion l qiyās th t is syllogism with leg l qiyās, which is  n logy.660 Al-Jaṣṣās 
provides  n extensive expl n tion  nd  ttempts to cl rify leg l ‗ill  by sep r ting it from 
r tion l ‗ill . He defines r tion l ‗ill   s the m ‗nā whose presence necessit tes the presence 
of judgment like the movement of something necessary to judge that the thing is moving.
661
 
However, despite c lling them ‗ill , leg l ‗ill s, he st tes, do not necessitate the presence of 
the m ‗l l. They  re c lled ‗ill  met phoric lly. They  re  ctu lly       (indicants) of  
religio-legal judgments.
662
   
From the l te second  nd e rly third hijrī century, the   n fī theologi n Ab  M nṣ r 
al-Māturidī (          lso mentions ‗ill  of rulings several times in a fully developed 
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meaning.
663
 He, for inst nce, s ys th t ―rulings  re est blished b sed on ‗ill , if ‗ill  of   
cert in ruling is  nnulled this ruling becomes void,  s well.‖664 Māturīdī  lso st ted th t if 
‗ill  f ils in concomit nce (iṭṭ     , ‗ill  becomes null.665  
Al-Ash‗ rī‘s (          ccount demonstr tes th t three different st nces reg rding the 
c us lity of leg l rulings were fully cryst llized during the l te third hijrī century   
1- Those who held that Allah ordained and prohibited things however he willed not 
b sed on   ‗ill . They, therefore, rejected qiyās. 
2- Those who argued that even though Allah prohibited something without ‗ill  
(‗ibādāt , he prohibited  lso things b sed on ‗ill  where   qiyās c n be  pplied if there is a 
causal textual case (a     „    , th t h s  n ‗ill  concomit nt (taṭṭarid) within the new case. 
3- Those who s id th t All h ord ins  nd prohibit things b sed on only   cert in ‗ill  
of interest
666. If the two things  re simil r in   me ning, qiyās c n be applied due to this 
common meaning.
667
  
The question rem ins why these jurists needed to develop   theory of ‗ill  during th t 
time. As we discussed in the preceding sections above, the late third century witnessed 
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heated debates over the authority of leg l qiyās. These critiques of qiyās, some of which were 
compiled in al-Qādī  l-Nu‗mān‘s ( 5       work, prob bly p ved the w y for strict 
conditions  nd typology on the b sis of ‗ill . Inst bility of the resembl nce th t lies in the 
core of qiyās w s  t the center of the critiques. A passage from al-Qādī  l-Nu‗mān‘s  ccount 
provides us further cl rific tion  bout the re sons for the development of the theory of ‗ill   
Then we  sked the people of qiyās its me ning. We found them s ying ‗resembl nce 
of something to  nother thing  likening one  nother, one ruling to  nother ruling.‘ We 
tell them th t ‗this resembl nce or likening you  re t lking  bout must be   
comparison between two different things. If [they say that] they share every aspect, 
meaning, and cause, they would invalidate their case because there is absolutely 
nothing in the world resembling another thing in every aspect in those matters of 
prohibition  nd permission where you deploy  n logy. If they s y th t qiyās 
resembles two things if they share only certain aspect, despite some other distinct 
aspects, they would also invalidate their case, because everything in the world 
resembles one  nother in some  spects, differs in others… However, All h 
differentiated the rulings and gave distinct rulings for different things… If they s y 
that we consider two things that share more aspects than others, we would ask they 
might share many aspects, but they might have different rulings, for which aspects 
you would transfer the ruling of something to another, despite the fact that there is no 
limit known for defining few or many aspects? Hence, those who argue on the basis 
253 
of ‗m ny‘  spects or ‗cert in  spect‘ h ve no evidence. 668  
It is clear from this quote and similar arguments against the applications of qiyās th t 
the proponents of qiyās developed the theory of ‗ill  in response to these critiques. Inste d of 
superfici l simil rity th t might be subject to the  tt cks of  rbitr riness,   common ‗ill  w s 
required between two c ses in order to  pply qiyās.  
P rticul riz tion of ‗ill  (takh    al-„    ) was another discussion that developed in the 
late third and early fourth centuries. It means that the ratio legis can be particular in certain 
cases, in other words, it might exist, but might not carry the ruling of original case to some 
new cases. This discussion is closely connected to the difference between the 
p rticul riz tion of ‗ill   nd division of ‗ill   s textu l (man   a) and derivational 
(mustanbaṭa) are discussed in the writings of al-Jaṣṣās.669  
Inconsistent use of original and new cases (a l and far„) in analogical reasoning was 
also subject to criticism. As we mentioned earlier, al-Qāsim b. S llām w s criticizing his 
‗Irāqī opponent in  pplying qiyās between two origin l c ses mentioned by the texts by 
s ying ―fund ment l rulings (     ‟ „  of Islam cannot be subject to analogy for one to 
 nother… If you m ke s le (   „) the original case and charity (sadaqa) the new case in 
order to apply an analogy; I can make the charity the original case and the sale as the new 
case. This is not right. Each obligatory ruling (farḍ) has its own aspect and detailed 
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rulings.‖670 
E. Varieties of Qiyās   
Al-Shāfi‗ī divides qiyās into two types  In the first type,   „   (‗ill   of something is 
identical and obvious with what is in the text (a l); therefore, every scholar must agree on the 
first type. While the second type is based on similarity and is open to disagreements.
671
  
Al-Shāfi‗ī  lso  dds  nother type of qiyās b sed on cl rity  nd strength. He points out 
what later known  s the superior qiyās (        -      that is known as a fortiori inference as 
follows:  
The strongest type of qiyās is when All h, in his book, or his messenger prohibit a 
little amount of something; it is known that a large amount of it is also prohibited. 
Likewise, if a little amount of ritual practice is praised, a large amount of it deserves 
to be praised more so. Similarly, if God allows a large amount of something, a lesser 
amount of it should be even more permissible.
672
  
Even though al-Shāfi‗ī mentions this  s   type of qiyās, he  lso notes th t some 
schol rs consider this  s the me ning of the text unrel ted to qiyās,   point articulated in later 
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legal discussions, especially between  āhirīs  nd qiyās supporters. 673  al-Shāfi‗ī w s 
probably referring to Irāqī jurists  nd some other qiyās deniers such  s  l-Na  ām, bec use 
late   n fīs do not consider this  s   type of qiyās. Al-Jaṣṣās reports th t  l-Na  ām rejected 
this being   kind of qiyās  nd r ther s id th t it is inferred from the me ning of the general 
text.
674
  āhirīs  lso do not c ll this qiyās  rather, for them it is the meaning of the text.  
It seems th t the l te typology  s qiyās  l-‗ill   nd qiyās  l-sh b h on the b sis of 
strength of qiyās w s not there during the g p period. R ther, the question was what kind of 
simil rity should h ve been t ken into  ccount in deciding the ‗ill  of   ruling. Different 
approaches to this question later crystallized under this typology.  For instance, even though 
we h ve seen th t Ab  B kr  l-Aṣamm (2        held th t there is   single ‗ill  for e ch 
ruling, he  lso considered form l simil rity  s ‗ill . By form l simil rity, he means belonging 
to a category such as dhikr. Dhikr is a term that encompasses words of exaltation such as 
―All hu  kb r‖ or encompasses the recitation of the Quran such as al-Fāti a. Against the 
consensus of jurists Aṣamm would argue that reciting the Fati a could not be obligatory, 
because it so much resembles pronouncements such  s ―All hu  kb r‖ or ―sub ān  r bbiy  
 l-‗ zīm‖ etc.  
Al-Jaṣṣās reports sever l of his  pplic tions of this type of qiyās  
There are those people who consider only similarity in form and essence between the 
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old case and the new case. And there are those who consider their similarity with their 
parallel rulings. For the former, for inst nce the opinion of Ab  B kr  l-Aṣamm that 
avoiding the last sitting of a prayer does not invalidate the prayer, because there is an 
agreement that avoiding the first sitting does not invalidate the prayer. There is 
nothing else, to him, more similar to the last sitting than the first sitting of prayer in a 
given prayer. Hence, [al-Aṣ mm  rgues th t  it is necess ry to m ke qiyās between 
them. He also rejects the obligatoriness of recitation of the Quran in prayer based on 
the agreement that other repetitive recitations (      ) such as the ones said during 
bowing, prostration, the first sitting, and the beginning of prayer are not obligatory in 
prayer. Therefore, the recitation of the Quran should not be obligatory, because it is 
also a repetitive recitation (dhikr . Likewise, ex lt tion of All h (t kbīrāt  in the 
beginning of the prayer should not be obligatory, since other exaltations in the prayer 
are not obligatory. The most similar thing to the exaltation of Allah in the beginning 
of the prayer is the following exaltations in the prayer.
675
  
On the other hand, al-Jaṣṣās cl ims th t  l-Shāfi‗ī  lso  pplied qiyās of simil rity 
based on what two cases share in common regarding similar rulings. Al-Jaṣṣās st tes th t 
al-Shāfi‗ī m de  n  n logy between sl ves and freemen in the case of expiation, because they 
share the obligation of worship. Al-Shāfi‗ī m de  nother  n logy between sl ves and animals 
in the case of damage by neglect, because they both can be sold and purchased.
676
 Al-Jaṣṣās 
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says that al-Shāfi‗ī‘s  pplic tions resemble to al-Aṣ mm‘s  pplic tions in t king  pp rent 
similarity into account, but they differ in taking closer rulings into account instead of the 
closer form of the cases. This distinction was later crystallized as similarity in creation (shibh 
      ) and similarity in ruling (shibh       ) in the literature of Islamic legal theory.677 
Ibn  Sur yj is reported to h ve mentioned eight different types of qiyās  nd to h ve 
accepted the authority of         -shabah.678 One of his students, Ab  B kr  l-Q ffāl, 
followed him, while his other students al-  yr fī  nd Ab  Ishāq  l-M rw zī  rejected       
al-shabah.
679
  
In the e rly the fourth hijrī century, a Sh fi‗ī schol r, Ab  B kr  l-Kh ffāf (d. 
between 340-60/952-70) divides analogy into three types. The first type is the stimulating 
(munabbih  qiyās on the me ning of text,  lso known  s fa      -qawl and       according to 
 āhirīs. The second is the comp rison of two things due to the common  spect (‗illa) 
between them.The l st type of qiyās is the qiyās of predomin nt (al-      ) that is based on 
predominance of similarity.
680
  We see that as early as the fourth century, a tendency 
rendering  āhirīs‘ rejection of qiyās me ningless  rose by presenting wh t they c ll al-da    
or fa      -khiṭ    s just   type of qiyās.    
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F. Further Discussions on Qiyās  nd Ijtihād 
One of the discussions of the time w s whether qiyās is  pplic ble in l ngu ge in the 
matter of names, i.e. extension of meaning from one word to another due to a common 
aspect. The majority of scholars are said to have denied this; however, according to what is 
narrated from al-Shāfi‗ī schol rs Ibn Sur yj  nd Ibn Abī Hur yr  (  5  5  , it is possible 
when it is a religio-legal (    „  ) matter, but not in language per se.681 Based on this 
principle, Ibn Surayj issued that        can be called khamr and homosexual relationship can 
be called zīnā (fornication or adultery) and they carry the same ruling.682 
Another discussion w s whether qiyās c n  brog te   ruling b sed on textual sources. 
Even though majority of scholars rejected this, Ibn Surayj was reported, in one of narrated 
opinions of his, to have accepted this type of abrogation. His teacher al-Anmāṭī (         
reportedly, and Ibn Surayj in another narration, said th t ―        -shabah‖ c nnot  brog te 
 ny ruling b sed on textu l sources, but   qiyās th t is extr cted directly from the Quran can 
abrogate a ruling based on the Quran,    qiyās th t is extr cted directly from sunn  c n 
abrogate a ruling based on sunna.‖683 However, his student al-  yr fī does not  ccept 
 brog tion by qiyās.684  
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Simil r views c n be seen for the topic of restriction of gener l text through qiyās. 
  n fī ‗Isā b. Abān  ccepts it on the condition th t the restricted text must h ve h d been 
already restricted by another certain text.
685
 Mu‗t zilī schol r Ab  ‗Alī  l-Jubbā‘ī 
(303/915)
686
 rejects this type of restriction, while his son Ab  Hāshim  l-Jubbā‘ī (321/933), 
later Baṣr n Mu‗t zilī Ab   l- usayn al-Baṣrī (           f mous theologi n  l-Ash‗ rī 
(324/936) accepted this type of specification without any reported condition.
687
  Ibn Surayj 
is reported to h ve  ccepted the restriction of textu l sources with qiyās, if it is strong (    ) 
qiyās.688  
One of the discussions rel ted to qiyās w s whether one c n n me the ruling b sed on 
qiyās as     (religion . Ab    l-Huzayl (227/841) is reported to have said that it cannot be 
c lled dīn, bec use the n me dīn should be used for something solid  nd unch nging. Ab  
‗Alī  l-Jubbā‘ī (303/915) held that only an oblig tory ruling re ched through qiyās c n be 
n med  s dīn  not   recommended ruling.  
Another import nt discussion, which  pp rently beg n in the third hijrī century, w s 
whether every mujtahid is correct in his ijtihād. K f n school (l ter cl ssified as   n fīs , the 
followers of Mālik  nd Ibn Sur yj held th t every ijtihād is correct, while majority of 
al-Shāfi‗īs  ccepted th t even though mujt hid would be sinner if his ijtihād is wrong, there is 
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only one correct ijtihād.689 However, some scholars claimed that there is only one correct 
ijtihād  nd if   mujt hid is wrong in his ijtihād, he would be sinner. This l st view is 
 ttributed to Murji‗ī schol r Bishr  l-M rīsī  nd Mu‗t zīlī schol r  l-Aṣamm, also to a 
al-Shāfi‗ī schol r Ab  ‗Alī b. Abī Hur yra (345/957).690 Ibn Qutayba relates an opinion from 
his opponents, whom he labels sometimes ahl al-r ‘y sometimes  hl  l-k lām, th t since 
ijtihād me ns exertion, the exertion re ching to truth h s the s me v lue  s the exertion 
reaching to error. Therefore, they criticize   dīths th t rew rd more those who re ch to truth 
out of their exertion than those who err.
691
 However, Ibn Qutayba says that ahl al-  dīth 
makes a distinction between those who reach to truth and those who do not, in accord with 
the   dīths they narrate.692 
Another important problem was the place of Qiyās among other sources. Ibn  azm 
cl ims th t Ab    nīf  s id th t qiyās c nnot be  pplied, if there is   mursal h dīth or we k 
h dīth from the prophet,  nd in the m tters of expi tions, punishments and amounts. Also, he 
cl ims th t Ab   l-Faraj (330/941), who reportedly had a manual on  uṣ l  l-fiqh, and his 
disciple Ab  B kr  l-Abh rī (  5     , who  lso reportedly h d   m nu l on uṣ l  l-fiqh  
from Mālikīs, were the first ones who cl imed th t qiyās precedes solit ry reports reg rdless 
of being mursal or musnad.
693
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Ibn Qut yb  (         lists qiyās  s   v lid method  fter se rching for   h dīth  nd 
imitating a scholar whose imitation is considered acceptable.
694
  
Mālikī  l-Jub yrī indic tes th t qi  s c n be  pplied if  ll other superior sources, the 
Qur n, Sunn ,  greement of the umm ,  nd ijmā‗ of  hl  l-M dīn , exh usted.695 
G. Ijtihād vs. T qlīd  
 T qlīd (imit tion   nd its effect in Islamic legal history occupy a central 
discussion in modern schol rship,  nd t qlīd is frequently portr yed  s the c use of the 
st gn tion of Isl mic l w in rel tion to the so-c lled closure of the g te of ijtihād. The g p 
period w s the period in which the first theoretic l discussions concerning t qlīd appeared; 
hence an analysis of these discussions provides sufficient answers for the questions around 
its role in legal history.   
 T qlīd derives from the root q-l-d.  The noun        means the halter of animal 
and it derived from the s me root. T qlīd linguistically means leading someone or something 
to a desired place.
696 In this sense, t qlı d is the  ct of the one being followed r ther th n the 
follower. As   term it is defined  s following someone‘s s ying or  ct on the belief th t it is 
true without reasoning or searching for evidence.
697
 In the literature of Islamic legal theory, 
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the common definition is accepting opinion of another person without evidence.
698
  
 It seems th t t qlı d in the sense of following entire jurisprudence of a particular 
scholar, which is the essence of madhhab institution, was a new phenomenon of the 
fourth/tenth century. Ibn  azm even cl ims th t the schol rs of the first three centuries t citly 
 greed upon the inv lidity of such t qlīd.699 Therefore, the discussions over t qlīd of the g p 
period were closely related to the foundations of madhhabs. It can be argued that the 
presence of scholarly traditions and a sort of affiliation of certain scholars to these traditions 
were already there in the third/ninth hijrī century. An example of which can be seen in the 
writings of Ibn   zm who c lls Ab   āzim ‗Abd  l-‗Azīz b. ‗Abd  l-  mīd (      5  with 
the title of al-  n fī.700 Nonetheless, in the sense of following entirely a particular scholar or 
a body of scholars that constitute a tradition after eponymous figures resulted from 
 cknowledging the v lue of t qlīd in this sense in the fourth tenth century. The discussions of 
t qlīd during the g p period revolved around the question of whether one should follow 
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another person theoretically.  These discussions provided the theoretical basis for one of the 
most important institutions of Islamic thought that is madhhab. What follows below 
examines these discussions to discover turning points in a wide range of diverse thoughts that 
enabled the formation of madhhabs.  
 Al-Sh fi‗ī does not discuss the t qlīd topic in his leg l theoretic l tre tise in the 
new al-R       but he mentions it in his older edition of   -R       and al-Umm and clarifies 
his stance in a several passages. Al-Sh fi‗ī states in the older edition of al-Ris la th t ―It is 
not permissible for someone to imitate another person except the companions. In the case of 
dis greement  mong them, the opinion th t   c liph f vors is prefer ble.‖701 In al-Umm, he 
uses the word well-known when he takes an opinion or deed of a companion as evidence.
702
 
He  lso eng ges in   discussion whether   judge c n decide   c se b sed on someone else‘s 
authority (who is a contemporary of the judge and responds in the negative, even if the other 
person is more knowledgeable or with a higher reasoning capacity.
703
 He states that a judge 
can consult other scholars, because someone else might point out certain sides of the case 
that the judge might have missed, but he cannot accept their opinions without understanding 
it with its evidence  from the kitāb, sunn , ijmā‗ or qiyās,  nd seeing it  s more  ccur te 
th n his own qiyās.704  
Al-Jaṣṣās, however, de ls with the issue extensively in his m nu l of uṣ l  l-fiqh 
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under three sections as On Following the Authority of a Single Companion Where a Contrary 
Opinion is Unknown,
705
 On the Necessity of Reasoning (Na ar) and Disparaging (Dhamm) 
the Blind Imitation,
706
  and On Following the Authority of the Mujtahid.
707
 Even though 
al-Jaṣṣās discusses imit tion in gener l critic lly vis-a-vis reasoning where he attacks those 
who deny reasoning in religious sciences and accept only what is narrated from the 
predecessors such  s Dāw d b. ‗Alī,708 he surprisingly argues for the authority of following 
the authority of companions,
709
 the authority of the scholars for lay-people
710
 and for a 
schol r following  nother if the former is convinced of the l tter‘s correctness. 711 
Interestingly, as opposed to al-Jaṣṣās‘s  ccus tions  g inst Dāw d,  the only book on 
refut tion of t qlīd entitled I       -t      th t Ibn N dīm mentions in his bibliogr phic l 
work belongs to Dāw d b. ‗Alī.712 It is safe to assume that al-Jaṣṣās mixed up his criticisms 
on the attacks against ration-b sed leg l re soning with supporting t qlīd of the s l f  nd 
mentioned the most popular figure of these groups with a term which had a negative 
connotation already. The late  āhirī schol r Ibn   zm‘s writings  lso indic te  the 
inv lidity of t qlīd in  âhirī thinking, which might give us  n outline of nonext nt work of 
Dāw d.  
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 In the Shī‘ī tr dition,  l-Kul ynī (         n rr tes three reports under the title of 
t qlīd. Two of them  re from J ‗f r  l- ādiq  nd one from Musā  l-Kā im. J ‗f r interprets 
the well-known verse about how the People of the Book assigned a divine role to their 
schol rs  nd s ys th t ―they did not liter lly worship them r ther they reg rded wh tever 
these schol rs  djudic ted  s divine prohibition or permission.‖713 Musā  l-Kā im m kes   
comp rison between the t qlīd of the Shi‗   nd th t of the Murji‘ ,  nd st tes th t the 
Murji‗īs  re more loy l in their  dherence to the t qlīd of their imām th n the Shī‗īs.714 Even 
though we do not see   reference to t qlīd in  l-Sh ykh  l-Mufīd‘s works,  l-Sayyid 
al-Murtaḍā discusses the topic  nd st tes th t ―the necessity of t qlīd for l y-people is 
est blished by ijmā‗ both in the p st  nd the present.‖715 
 Ibn Sur yj is reported to h ve s id th t ―If there is   leg l problem th t is urgent, I 
am allowed to imitate another person who is more knowledgeable than me. If its evidence is 
not  v il ble to me  nd if I  m  fr id of missing  n oblig tion, it is not permissible for me to 
issue f twā b sed on th t t qlīd for other people.‖716 This shows that during the time of Ibn 
Surayj a distinction between following a person without knowing the evidence and knowing 
the evidence. 
 Ab  B kr  l-Kh ffāf (d. between    -    5 -     rgues th t there  re ten 
different kinds of t qlīd th t  re permitted  T qlīd of wh t n rr ted from the prophet, t qlīd 
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of what narrated from other th n the prophet, t qlīd of   schol r by l y-person, t qlīd in the 
m tter of muq wwimāt, t qlī of wh t  l-Shāfi‗ī s id in h y wān [  ch pter in  l-Umm   bout 
the t qlīd of Uthmān  t qlīd of wh t  l-Shāfi‗ī s id in his old   -R      [t qlīd of one 
comp nion   there is no t qlīd of someone  fter the prophet  t qlīd of qā‘if [the profession l 
who tr ces f mily herit ge   t qlīd of schol r by     schol r  when the l tter does not h ve 
knowledge of the former‘s proof   nd t qlīd of the news about vision of crescent for 
Ramaḍān.717   
 Al-Jaṣṣās‘s  ccount shows th t the discussions over imit tion evolved  round 
three main topics during the gap period: 
1) Following the authority of companions, which had some detailed nuances 
such as following   comp nion without restriction, following   comp nion‘s opinion 
where a contrary opinion from another companion is not known, and following a 
companion on the amounts of certain entities, because these amounts need a divine 
prescription and cannot be known with ijtihād. 
2) Following the authority of a scholar by another scholar, when the latter 
thinks the former is more knowledgeable than him.  
3) Finally, following the authority of scholars by lay-people.  
The following sections outline the contributions m de during the g p period to 
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these three types of t qlīd  s developed within the period.  
1. Following the Authority of Companions 
The authority of companions was probably one of the rare disagreements among 
different groups of scholar during the time. It was just another way of expressing the 
acknowledgment of the authority of the predecessors. The traditionalist camp was indeed 
supporting the authority of companions, due to the fact that following the predecessor was 
one of the fundamental principles of the traditionalists (ahl al-  dīth . They also frequently 
represented the Quran as the source of authority of the companions. Al- ārith al-Mu āsibī, 
for instance, states that, ―We should follow the successors in addition to the companions, 
because Allah ordains us to follow them in the verse
718
 ―Obey All h  nd obey the prophet 
and those among you who are in authority (‗      -amr).‖719  
 Since the authority of the companions was already there for the traditionalists, 
one wonders the approach of rationalist c mp, especi lly K fī tr dition. The role of 
comp nions w s  cknowledged  mong the founding figures of the K fī tr dition,  lbeit not 
as clear as in the traditionalist camp. Nonetheless, we see that some l ter schol rs in the K fī 
tradition later challenged early preliminary consideration of the authority of the companions. 
Ab   asan al-K rkhī (     5   st tes th t Ab  Y suf used to see th t the opinion of   
companion, when a contrary opinion from another companion is not narrated, is superior to 
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qiyās. However, al-K rkhī dis grees with Ab  Y suf.720 Al-K rkhī  rgues th t only if the 
opinion of a companion is about something outside the re lm of ijtihād, it c n be   v lid 
source ( ujja), because it must have relied on divine prescription (     f).721 However, if it 
is on something in the re lm of ijtihād, it is not   v lid source to be followed. It is cle r th t 
 l-K rkhī w s inclined to distinguish the source of authority from the mere righteousness of 
the companions. He was underlining that the authority was actually the revelation itself, not 
the companions; hence, their authority can be acknowledged as long as it is directly related to 
the revelation, not to them. Al-K rkhī‘s older contempor ry Ab  S ‗īd  l-B rd ‗ī (        , 
however, thinks that in the presence of   comp nion‘s opinion, qiyās should be left, bec use 
the qiyās of the comp nions  re more prefer ble th n our own qiyās due to their direct 
knowledge of the texts from the prophet.
722
 
 Al-Ṭa āwī (        , though not critical as much as al-Karkhī w s, restricts the 
authority of companions. He states that if there is no known contrary opinion from other 
companions, one should follow the opinion of a companion; however, if there is, one is free 
to choose.
723
 He also makes preferences as to which authority to follow within the different 
companions and successors.
724
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2. Following the Authority of a Scholar by Another Scholar 
 One of the key topics that influenced the formation of schools was whether a 
scholar could follow another scholar. Even though following the scholars for lay people was 
accepted by the overwhelming majority, there was a disagreement whether a scholar can 
follow another. This question was heavily related to the formation of the schools of law 
named after the eponymous scholars such as Ab    nīf , Mālik,  nd  l-Shāfi‗ī. The 
discussions over t qlīd in the  rd/9th and early 4th/10th centuries were actually different 
responses to this new phenomenon.  
 According to what had been narrated from them, al-Shāfi‗ī  nd Ab  Y suf 
rejected following  nyone except the comp nions  Ab    nif   nd  l-Sh ybānī  llowed it 
without any restriction. In the third hijrī century, it appears that a third opinion emerged. In a 
particular case, if a jurist performs his reasoning under time pressure where he could not 
research an issue thoroughly, some uṣ lī schol rs  rgued th t he could imitate another 
scholar. However, if there is abundant time, one is not allowed to follow another scholar. 
This opinion is attributed to Ibn Surayj.
725
 Abu  asan al-K rkhī reports that Abu   nīf  
held the same opinion, while al-Sh ybānī  nd Ab  Y suf ruled the impermissibility of 
following another scholar.
726
 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ clarifies the apparent contradiction of what is 
reported from al-Sh ybānī through  nother report s ying th t al-Shaybãnī  llowed following 
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another scholar if he is more knowledgeable than himself.
727
  
Ahl al-h dīth in gener l were  g inst the ide  of imit ting   schol r, since they 
thought that was another way of transferring the authority of the salaf, i.e. what had been 
narrated from them. A mad b.  anbal is reported to have answered a question about whether 
al-Awzā‗ī deserves to be followed more th n Mālik  s follows  ―Do not imit te  ny of them 
for your religion. Take whatever you have from the prophet or his companions. As for the 
successors, one is free.‖728  
Al- ārith al-Mu āsibī indic tes th t when one c nnot find   solution for something 
―one should go b ck to the kitāb  nd sunn   nd those who  re sincere. If one still c nnot 
discover the solutions, one should take the opinion of someone whose piety and reason he 
trusts.‖729  
 Bishr  l-M rīsī (         w s  nother e rly schol r who de lt with the problem 
of t qlīd  nd rejected it entirely for schol rs until they know the source of the issue in kitāb, 
sunn , or ijmā‗, but  ccepted for lay-people who are ignorant of the sources.730 
Ibn Qutayba (276/889) mentions imitation of a scholar whose imitation is considered 
 ppropri te  s   v lid w y  fter se rching for   h dīth  nd even before  pplying   qiyās.731 
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He also states that other topics of interest outside the science of religion,   lāl  nd h r m 
such as knowledge about other nations can be taken from any one; however, religion (      
and      ) is based on divine sanction (    „      nd t qlīd, hence one c n only t ke 
knowledge from someone who has authority without falling into doubt.
732
 As an example, 
after indicating different definitions of hand (yad) to shoulder, elbow, and wrist; to put a limit 
for the punishment of ste ling, i.e.  mput tion of h nd, he requires ―t qlīd of someone who 
h s  uthority to be imit ted.‖733 
Al-Ṭa āwī (          rgues th t in the presence of reports  nd opinions of le ding 
scholars ( ‟            -„    , one should le ve his own opinion b sed on his qiyās  nd 
should imitate them.
734
 
Ab   asan al-K rkhī (340/952) sees that imitation of one scholar by another scholar 
is not exactly an imitation; r ther it is   kind of ijtihād when the l tter holds th t the former is 
stronger  nd more reli ble b sed on ijtihād.735 This differentiation of al-K rkhī l ter became 
 nother intermedi ry term in the liter ture of Isl mic leg l theory between ijtihād  nd t qlīd 
as       „  f         . It w s this underst nding of t qlīd th t p ved the w y for legitim te 
following of earlier scholars; hence, the formation of schools of law. 
It is clear from the above discussions that a particular type of authority closely rel ted 
                                                 
732
 Ibn Qutayba, „U      -        I, 48. 
733
 Ibn Qutayba, G        -        III, 224. 
734
 al-Ṭ hāwī, Shar  al-  „   ‟   -     , IV, 84. 
735
 al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fu     III, 362. 
272 
to the concept of t qlīd between schol rs beg n to emerge  mong the schol rly circles in the 
third hijrī century. The common appropriation of the first generation of Islam and the 
common perception of deterioration by time empowered the idea of following certain 
scholars of the past in order to attain reliable and authoritative knowledge within a tradition. 
However, evident teachings of Islam prohibiting blind-following ( lso known  s t qlīd   led 
scholars to distinguish conscious-following  from blind-following. This compromise paved 
the way for justified and rationalized following of the past generations by the later 
generations.    
3. Imitation of Scholars by Lay-people 
 Despite  ll neg tive  ppro ches tow rd t qlīd,   m jority of the schol rs of the 
time were in agreement on  ccepting the t qlīd of schol rs by l y-people. Only B ghdādī 
Mu‗t zilīs reportedly held th t it is not permissible for  nyone to imitate another person, 
including lay-people. Ab  ‗Alī  l-Jubbā‘ī, however, allowed it for the matters in the field of 
ijtihād.736  
 Al-Ash‗ rī st tes th t  ccording to the m jority of  hl  l-ijtihād   must fti, i.e. the 
one who seeks religious ruling, should imitate what a mufti, i.e. the one who issues religious 
ruling, says. Yet, according to some scholars from ― hl  l-qiyās‖ the mere imitation is not 
permissible, a mustafti should also ask for evidence until the truth becomes apparent for 
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him.
737
  
 Al-Ṭ b rī (         remarks th t ―those who do not h ve necess ry knowledge 
about the reports from the prophet, what the predecessor scholars agreed upon, what the late 
scholars agreed upon, and what the umma narrated deriving from their prophet should not 
issue a fatwa. Rather, they should imitate (        ) the scholars of the umma and follow 
(      „  ) some of them like a lay-m n does.‖738  
H. Conclusion 
Qiyās  s a method in Islamic legal theory, acquired a primary place within the sources 
of law compared to the other ways of reasoning to the extent that it is considered one of the 
four fundamental sources of law as formulated in the later literature with the exception of 
 āhirīs, Imāmīs,  nd Ismā‗īlīs. The g p period witnessed the significant part of the 
development of this method including the discussions on its authority, conditions, elements, 
and its different types. All these discussions demonstrate the important contribution made 
during the gap period and support the overall thesis of this research concerning the 
significance of this period for the development of uṣ l  l-fiqh.   
The authority of qiyās occupied the center of these discussions. Initi lly, in its 
simplest me ning the  pplic tions of qiyās were known under the rubric of r ‘y. First 
criticisms  ppe red  mong cert in Mu‗t zilīs in the l te second  nd e rly third hijrī centuries. 
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However, this  ppro ch did not spre d over m jority of Mu‗t zilīs. The traditionalists (ahl 
al-  dīth  expressed reluct nce tow rd qiyās  pplic tions in the e rly third hijrī century by 
criticizing excessive use of qiyās  nd borrowing from the arguments of the antagonists of 
qiyās. The  pp rent motive w s protecting the independent  uthority of reports. It seems 
from the above examinations in this chapter th t  l-Shāfi‗ī w s not th t influenti l in the 
topic of qiyās during th t time to the extent th t his ch mpioning of qiyās w s not welcomed 
among the traditionalist circles. L ter on, in the l te third hijrī century, liter list tr dition lists 
( āhirīs , Shi‗ī Imāmīs,  nd Ismā‗īlīs continued the opposition of qiyās. K fī school w s This 
chapter identified four main arguments regarding the authority of qiyās. Diverse approaches 
that emerged within the gap period can be summarized as follows: 
 -The first group denied qiyās entirely. They included the   hirīs, Shi‗īs  nd Azāriq  
from Khārijīs. 
2-The second group  re some Mu‗t zilīs such  s  l-Na  ām  nd J ‗f r b. Mub shshir 
who rejected qiyās in leg l m tters, but  ccepted  nd even cl imed necessity for its 
application in theological matters.  
3-The third group consists of some other Mu‗t zilī-oriented   n fī schol rs, such  s 
al-K rkhī  nd  l-Jaṣṣāṣ who accept its authority in both theology and law.  
4-The fourth group is the proto-ahl al-sunna that consisted of scholars from ahl 
al-  dīth, some   n fīs, Shāfi‗īs,  nd Mālikīs who rejected qiyās in theologic l m tters, but 
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accepted it in legal matters.
739
 
 Another important phenomenon that still weighs in the contemporary discussions 
on Isl mi l w  nd th t w s one of the m in theoretic l discussions of the period w s t qlīd. 
Despite the majoritarian recognition of the authority of the salaf (predecessors), t qlīd w s 
initially discussed having a default negative meaning. This negative  ppro ch tow rd t qlīd 
emanated from the emphasis on preserving the authority of the fundamental sources of the 
Quran and Sunna, and condemnation that these textual sources expressed for the imitations of 
earlier people in pre-Islamic period. T qlīd w s  lso condemned  s the  ntithetic l of 
re soning by some schol rs in the discussions of the role of re son in religious m tters. The 
evidence  n lyzed in this ch pter demonstr tes th t the  tt cks on t qlīd were used by m ny 
groups to criticize other groups  nd did not  im  t  tt cking the mere following the e rly 
schol rs per se. Every group justified t qlīd of the e rlier schol rs  s   w y of ijtihād  nd this 
 ppro ch w s l ter tr nsformed to intr -m dhh b ijtihād th t bec me the m in leg l  ctivity 
of the jurists after the formation of schools.  
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CONCLUSION 
 The early centuries of Islamic intellectual history can be described as a period of 
constant struggles among different scholarly groups and independent scholars in asserting 
various solutions for the problem of authority in religion. The questions of who speaks for 
Islam and which opinion, whether theological or legal, should be considered normatively 
Islamic were the central issues. The authority of the Quran was universally agreed upon; 
however, the text of the Quran either did not cover some of the problems that were then 
starting to appear, or was not clear enough to solve all the problems of the early Muslim 
society. This also led to a variety of discussions relating to the interpretation of ambiguous 
texts. Diverse suggestions for addressing the problem of authority appeared in the 
second/eighth century. Suggested sources included: independent reasoning among some 
rationalists; the preserved practices of the city of the prophet  „           -M        mong 
some M dīn n schol rs  the  greements of the community (    „   mong some ‗Ir qī 
rationalist scholars; and the independent authority of the chained reports among 
traditionalists (ahl al-      ). The supporters of these abovementioned sources of authority 
exchanged their ideas with their opponents and affected one another through theoretical and 
dialectical debates. Existing evidence demonstrates that some of these important theoretical 
discussions took place in the correspondences among scholars such  s between Mālik  nd 
Layth b. S ‗d, or between Ab    nīf   nd Uthmān  l-B ttī, and in the refutations written by 
scholars, such  s  l-Sh ybānī‘s al-Ḥ     „          -M       nd Ab  Y suf‘s   -R    „    
       -A   „  in the second/eight century. Similar debates also took place in the realm of 
theology in determining the authority of certain sources. These intellectual debates paved the 
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way for the development of a stratified source methodology that enables one to decide 
whether an argument is valid and acceptable in religion. This source methodology was based 
on the idea of hierarchical checks and balances among certain sources and principles, 
insisting, for example, that the inferior or secondary (f  „) element should be consistent with 
the superior or primary ones (u  l).  
The first five centuries of Islam witnessed constant attempts to redefine, through 
theoretical discussions, what would establish orthodoxy and orthopraxy in Islam. The 
accumulated body of these theoretical discussions among different groups of scholars 
constituted a new genre of scholarly writing. Beginning with oral discussions, this genre 
consisted primarily of refutations, individual treatises that were devoted to certain theoretical 
topics such as   -N   kh wa-al-        (the abrogating and the abrogated), I        -      
(the authority of qiyās , or R      -      (the deni l of qiyās   and certain sections, 
especially the introductions, of particular legal, exegetical, or theological books throughout 
the gap period, such  s Abu B kr  l-Kh ffāf‘s al-Khi  l.  
This dissertation has  rgued th t the  pp rent g p between the works of  l-Sh fī‗ī 
and al-Jaṣṣāṣ has to do with different perceptions of what constitutes uṣ l al-fiqh. Identifying 
uṣ l  l-fiqh only through the mature examples of manuals in the later literature might lead to 
the exclusion of  l-Sh fī‗ī‘s   -R      and even al-Jaṣṣāṣ‘s al-Fu    from the genre due to 
their lack of certain discussions, or a certain kind of organization, or for not using uṣ l  l-fiqh 
as the title of the discipline. In fact, some contemporary scholars have argued for such 
exclusion. This approach, however, does not help us understand the formation and early 
development of uṣ l al-fiqh as a religious science. Uṣ l  l-fiqh is a field of religious science 
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that examines a set of sources and interpretive techniques for the bilateral purpose of 
inferring normative conclusions and checking the normativity of existing conclusions. The 
efforts to restrict the scope of these conclusions within the realm of fiqh in history did not 
even succeed completely. Hence, a more accurate examination of the formation and early 
development of uṣ l  l-fiqh needs to take a topic-based approach in defining uṣ l  l-fiqh and 
identifying those who contributed to its developments with their discussions. Accordingly, 
research aimed at revealing early developments within the field of uṣ l  l-fiqh must examine 
any piece of writing that deals with source methodology and textual interpretive techniques. 
In addition, the fact that certain authors did not identify their writing with the concept of uṣ l 
al-fiqh should not exclude such writings from the genre of uṣ l  l-fiqh. The same can be said 
about other religious sciences that evolved in the early period of intellectual history of Islam. 
For instance, nowhere in S       -       does  l-Sh ybānī refer to the science of fiqh, 
however, no scholar argues that this book does not belong to the genre of fiqh. Similarly, 
certain writings that deal with individual topics of uṣ l  l-fiqh cannot be excluded from the 
genre of uṣ l  l-fiqh.   
In addition, this research has shed important light on various contemporary 
discussions about the essence, origins, and purpose of uṣ l  l-fiqh and its interrel tion with 
other disciplines, especi lly k lām. It has argued that uṣ l  l-fiqh originated from the debates 
that focused on evaluating particular attempts to establish orthodoxy and orthopraxy in Islam. 
Its main purpose was not to provide the essential tools for jurists to derive religious legal 
rulings; furthermore, it never completely became such a scholarly discipline despite 
increasing efforts beginning with the fourth/tenth century to make it so. As for the 
279 
rel tionship between k lām  nd uṣ l  l-fiqh, this dissertation has demonstrated that the 
relationship between uṣ l  l-fiqh  nd k lām w s not   hier rchic l one. R ther, the close 
relationship between these fields was due to their common interest in theoretical topics 
dealing with normativity and authority, which were relevant to discussions of both belief and 
law. For instance, theoretical discussions on general („   ) and specific (     ) texts, the 
definition of ijmā‗, the conditions for accepting transmitted reports, or the authority of 
analogy were crucial for both belief-related issues and legal problems. The reason for using 
the term ‗fiqh‘ instead of using, say uṣ l  l-k lām or uṣ l  l-sunna, as the title of this 
theoretical discipline had to do with gradually increased attention to the field of fiqh and the 
predominance of fiqh related questions compared to the other disciplines, which had yet 
developed into independent fields. This helps to explain, in large part, the reason for 
belief-related or   dīth-related topics remaining in the literature of uṣ l  l-fiqh. 
This research revealed early developments in the field of uṣ l  l-fiqh within the 
so-called gap period in three main topics. This was accomplished by using both extant 
writings of the time and preserved citations in the later literature that imparted information 
about the lost writings of the period. In the topic of solitary reports, the scholars of the gap 
period reached a majoritarian agreement on the authority of solitary reports. The debates 
revolved around the extent of this authority and the conditions for solitary reports to be 
considered authoritative. Traditionalists argued for the independent authority of solitary 
reports, as long as the transmitters in its chain were free from negative critiques. Since their 
focus was on the transmitters, they developed a rich literature on topics dealing with the 
investigation of transmission chains, including the critical analysis of narrator biographies 
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(     ), chain historicity (      ), and attention to any defects („    ) that would weaken the 
reliability of the report. Abundant production of this literature was the main cause for gaining 
the upper hand in identifying authentic reports from inauthentic ones vis-a-vis their 
reason-inclined rivals. They dealt with content criticism only when they were in a dialectical 
debate with their opponents for the sake of argument. The reason-inclined scholars, however, 
were not comfortable with the independent authority of solitary reports that would take away 
the agency of reason. They tried to restrict its authority with various conditions in a stratified 
(u    ) manner by comparing the content of the solitary report to the content of superior 
sources such  s kitāb (i.e. the Quran), and widely acknowledged or agreed upon reports. 
They also identified certain types of deficiencies within a report that can reveal its 
inauthenticity, such as the report having been transmitted solitarily while dealing with a topic 
in which a wide recognition must be expected („          ).    
The gap period witnessed a significant increase in the attention given to the topic of 
ijmā‗. Ijmā‗ w s initi lly b sed on the simple ide  th t building on  lre dy  greed upon 
matters and comparing disagreements to these agreements would provide normative results. 
Irāqī re son-inclined scholars preferred claims based on ijmā‗ over solitary reports. 
Moreover, the distinction between consecutive (           tr nsmission  nd solit ry 
tr nsmission resulted from the  pplic tion of ijmā‗ in the  uthentic tion process of 
transmitted reports. In the l te second  nd e rly third hijrī century, the traditionalists were 
critical of this proposal, seeing it as a threat that would diminish the independent authority of 
solitary reports. However, in the second half of the third century they came to agree with the 
import nce of ijmā‗  s long  s it embodied the authority of the past predecessors, especially 
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the companions. The n ture of ijmā‗  nd its conditions underwent v rious reinterpret tions 
and additions through dialectical debates that took place among the scholars of the time. As a 
result, ijmā‗  s  n  mbiguous concept was widely accepted, but each group, and even some 
individual scholars, defined it and restricted the scope of agreements differently. The present 
day confusion  round the concept of ijmā‗ originates in this diversity of reinterpretations, 
most of which emerged during the gap period.  
The topic of qiyās w s   centr l theoretic l deb te during the g p period. All the 
major counter arguments rejecting the  uthenticity of qiyās occurred during the g p period, 
beginning with some Mu‗t zilī schol rs  nd l ter  rticul ted by   hirī (liter list 
traditionalists) and some Shi‗ī schol rs. The ch pter on the development of qiyās 
demonstrated interrelations among different groups of schol rs in both supporting  nd 
rejecting the  uthority of qiyās. It  lso showed different st ges within the gap period in the 
development of the elements of qiyās  nd the types of qiyās. This topic was also important 
for tracking the influence of  l-Shāfi‗ī on the l ter developments of uṣ l  l-fiqh. Although 
qiyās is given   significant role in  l-Shāfi‗ī‘s theory, his fellow traditionalists seem not to 
have thoroughly accepted his arguments. Ironically, for instance, one of the e rliest 
biogr phers of  l-Shāfi‗ī, Dāwud b. ‗Alī, who p ssion tely pr ised  l-Shāfi‗ī, w s  lso   
traditionalist of the gap period who enthusiastically rejected the  uthority of qiyās. The fact 
that the rivals of the traditionalists were championing qiyās in their theory seems to h ve h d 
more weight on sh ping the  ppro ches of the tr dition lists th n the  rguments of  l-Shāfi‗ī. 
Rather than being a period in which no significant discussion or writing about uṣ l 
al-fiqh were found, this dissertation has argued, from several different types of evidence, that 
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the period between al- Shāfi‗ī and al-Jaṣṣāṣ was a period of independent production on uṣ l 
al-fiqh through oral and written debates. The major topics of uṣ l  l-fiqh consolidated during 
this period of independent contribution and shaped the structure of the following literature of 
uṣ l  l-fiqh. Therefore, this period as a period of independent contributions was highly 
significant and fueled the intellectual production of the following centuries in the history of 
uṣ l  l-fiqh.   
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